Masoud Jannati Fard Amoozgar
Abstract
Kripke's method in be suspected on the sameness of metaphysics and epistemology is to introduce examples of violations; Introduction of a priori possible beside necessary experimental propositions. It is disputed in these counterexamples. What follows is an attempt to revive metaphysics through natural ...
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Kripke's method in be suspected on the sameness of metaphysics and epistemology is to introduce examples of violations; Introduction of a priori possible beside necessary experimental propositions. It is disputed in these counterexamples. What follows is an attempt to revive metaphysics through natural language semantics parallel to Prof. Kripke's suggestion. In the body of the article, I try to show the concomitance of Frege's logic and his proper names semantics with the Copernican revolution. At first, from showing the inefficiency of Frege's (descriptive) proposal in the semantics of proper names, I conclude that there is no escape except the John Stuart Mill’s proper names semantics and the direct connection of the name and named. In the second step, I will try to demonstrate the inadequacy of descriptions for separating actual and fictional names also the Noncompliance of existence and determination, and from there show the otherness of metaphysics and epistemology. When the descriptive referencing to proper name implicitly root in Copernican revolution, uncertainty on descriptive referencing will result uncertainty on conformity of metaphysics and epistemology.
Seyed Mohammad Ali Hojjati; Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
Volume 6, Issue 2 , September 2015, , Pages 95-109
Abstract
Marga Reimer believes that ordinary speakers presuppose Meinongianism and their intuition about the meaningfulness of the sentences contained empty names is based on this fact. We will argue in this paper that her view is not strongly supported. More precisely, there is an alternative view that ...
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Marga Reimer believes that ordinary speakers presuppose Meinongianism and their intuition about the meaningfulness of the sentences contained empty names is based on this fact. We will argue in this paper that her view is not strongly supported. More precisely, there is an alternative view that is incompatible with Reimer's view and as powerful as it in explaining speakers' intuitions. We will argue that there is no plausible reason for preferring Reimer’s view to this proposed alternative.
