The Concept of Representation in Millikan's Biosemantics Theory

Bastin, Hamed; Hodjati, Seyyed Mohammad Ali

Document Type : Research

Authors

¹ PhD Candidate of Philosophy-Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

² The Associate Professor of Philosophy & Logic Department, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

In answer to the Putnam problem about extensional non-determination of language terms, Millikan asks if this problem exists by a new definition of representation according to biological evidences, especially the principle of natural selection. The Millikan’s answer to this question is negative and she believes that the question should be changed to what is that feature, which turns a relation to representation-represented among numerous possible relations between words and objects? Her answer to this question is accorded to a hypothesis that is also the place of disputations and arguments in biology and has its supporters and opponents. Millikan is in the group, which has a historical view to the function and believes that the function of each entity must be defined regarding to what it supposed to do in its appearance history and dedicates the “proper” adjective to such function. The alternative hypothesis believes that the function must be defined regarding to what an entity do at the moment in equivalence to the current status. The key point of presenting the concept of “proper function” by Millikan is a redefinition of representation. In this article, we want to show that the new definition of representation is accorded to the concept of “Functure” as something completely objective, in opposed to the common view of philosophy to the representation, which take it as mental.

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Main Subjects

References

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Logical Studies

The Concept of Representation in Millikan's Biosemantics Theory

References

References

Volume 7, Issue 2 - Serial Number 14
December 2016
Pages 1-28

The Concept of Representation in Millikan's Biosemantics Theory

References

References

Volume 7, Issue 2 - Serial Number 14December 2016Pages 1-28

Volume 7, Issue 2 - Serial Number 14
December 2016
Pages 1-28