درباب واقعیت‌های منطقی: واقع‌گرایی دربارۀ رابطۀ نتیجۀ منطقی

نوع مقاله: پژوهشی اصیل

نویسندگان

1 دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 استاد‌یار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تربیت مدرس تهران

چکیده

به یک تعبیر، واقع‌گرایی درباب منطق واقع‌گرایی درباب موضوع منطق است.اما، منطق واقعاً دربارۀ چیست؟ صحبت از منطق کم و بیش به معنای صحبت از رابطۀ نتیجه منطقی تلقی می‌شود؛ رابطه‌ای که میان مقدمه‌های یک استدلال و نتیجۀ آن استدلال برقرار است. در تاریخِ منطق همواره این‌چنین نبوده‌است:در قرن بیستم دیدگاه فرگه-راسلی مبنی بر تلقی‌کردنِ منطق به عنوان مجموعه‌ای از صدق‌های منطقی در جامعۀ علمی حاکم بود. در این مقاله ابتدا دلایلی ارائه خواهیم کرد که نشان دهد که بهتر است که موضوع علم منطق را رابطۀ نتیجۀ منطقی بدانیم و نه صدق منطقی.  آنگاه دلایلی ارائه می کنیم تا نشان دهیم که چرا بحث دربارۀ متافیزیک منطق اهمیت دارد. در متافیزیک منطق، نظریات واقع‌گرا عموماً فرض کرده‌اند که موضوع علم منطق صدق منطقی است.در تقابل با این رویکرد غالب، الگوهایی ارائه کرده‌ایم که با فرض اینکه موضوع منطق رابطۀ نتیجۀ منطقی باشد، چگونه می‌توان درباب منطق واقع‌گرا بود. این الگوها الهام گرفته از راه‌حل‌هایی هستند که در ذیل مسئلۀ متافیزیک رابطه‌ها در تاریخ متافیزیک مطرح شده‌اند

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

On Logical Facts: Realism about Logical Consequence

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammadmohsen Haeri 1
  • Davood Hosseini 2
1 Tarbiat Modares University
2 Assistant Professor, Tarbiat Modares University. Philosophy Dep
چکیده [English]

Logical realism, in a sense, is realism about the subject matter of logic. What is logic really about? Talk of logic is more or less synonymous with talk of the relation of logical consequence; the relation that holds between the premisses of an argument and its conclusion. However, in the history logic, this has not always been the case. Before placing logical consequence at the heart of logic, the Frege-Russell view was dominant in the philosophical community; a view according to which logic is primarily about logical truths. In this paper, we argue that logic is about logical consequence and not logical truth. Then we list a couple of motivations for investigating a metaphysics of logic. Proponents of logical realism typically base their theories upon logical truths as logical facts. In this article, we aim to turn the emphasis from logical truths to logical consequence(s) as the primary object(s) of logical realism and give a general outline on how to be a realist about logical consequence.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Logical realism
  • Logical consequence
  • Logical truths
  • Logical facts
  • Relation
 

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