عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
In 1970, Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards, Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction operator. Granted the acceptability of the underlying logical system, Gödel’s conclusion that necessarily there exists a God-like being ) ) can be derived from the premises-with Gödel and Scott on the scene, who can say otherwise? Sobel, however, proved that the system faces modal collapse-i.e. P↔□P is derivable from the system. Responding to Sobel, Anderson tried to block this by weakening some axioms and definitions.
In this paper, I will be trying to consider Gödel’s ontological argument (Scott’s version) from a logical point of view, along with Sobel’s criticism and Anderson’s emendations.