Logical Studies

Abstract Aristotelian logic is categorical logic, and its central topic is syllogisms with categorical premises. Avicennian logicians have the same approach. Although Aristotle wanted to deal with syllogisms with conditional premises, nothing has been received from him. Muslim logicians, however, have dealt with conditional propositions, although the central topic of their logic, under the influence of Aristotle, was categorical logic, and hence have tried to analyse conditional propositions in the same way as categorical propositions. Most of them have accepted the reduction of conditional propositions to categorical propositions. In this paper, the amount of logical similarity between these two kinds of propositions is investigated. Some similarities are evident; however, some distinctions are also evident, so we cannot say that all judgments belonging to categorical propositions apply to conditional propositions. Therefore, the Avicennian logician’s approach to considering conditional propositions as essentially predicative is mistaken and leads to treating the relations of “condition” and “predication” as the same, whereas they are completely different.

Abstract The present article is one of the first written in the Western world on the relationship between logic and ontology (or metaphysics in general). Bocheński shows that Gottlob Frege, the father of mathematical logic, by placing truth instead of inference as the subject matter of logic, brought logic very close to ontology and metaphysics, to the point that some of Frege's followers, such as Heinrich Scholz, considered logic and ontology to be one and the same. On the other hand, of course, a group such as Ernest Nagel remained faithful to tradition and considered logic and ontology to be completely distinct from each other. In explaining this historical controversy on the relationship between logic and ontology, Bocheński points out that the roots of this controversy are in Aristotle's two books on syllogisms and polemics (originally titled Prior Analytics and Topics). In Prior Analytics, Aristotle expresses his logical results (i.e., the moods of syllogism) in the form of truths and laws, while in Topics, he had proposed logical results in the form of rules of debate and of dialogue between two opponents (the questioner and the answerer). Bocheński claims that the logical tradition after Aristotle, from the Stoics to before modern logic, all saw logic in the form of Aristotele’s Topics, i.e. as rules of debate and dialogue, unlike mathematical logicians such as Leibniz, George Boole, and Frege, who saw logic in the form of Aristotele’s Prior Analytics, i.e. as axioms and laws.

Abstract For Aristotle both words and propositions signify. However, the question is what the significate is and under what conditions a specific word or proposition can have a single signification. This issue leads to a discussion of homonymy and "to be spoken of in many ways." Of the 20th-century Aristotelian scholars, Irwin argues that the significate is essence, while Shields contends that the significate is meaning, which has multiple degrees ranging from shallow meaning (the lexical) to deep meaning (the essence). This paper argues that the main factor in the signification of words and propositions is that the significate must have real unity. The real unity of the signified of words, determined based on the doctrine of Categories, can occur in two forms: "in virtue of one," such as human, and "with reference to one," such as being. On the other hand, the true unity of the significate of propositions relates to the real unity of the conditions under which a proposition can be true. Therefore, in Aristotle's discussion of signification, we are seeking real unity, and ordinary linguistic meaning is not his ultimate goal. The significance of this discussion lies in this fact that the signification of words is one of Aristotle's important tools in philosophical discourse.

Abstract Aristotle with introducing Modal logic in Organo and Essentialism and Essence in Organon and Metaphysics was one of the vanguard in metaphysical and logical challenging discussions. One of the most important subjects in history of logic and Aristotle’s philosophy is a presentation of consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s modal logic and conforming it with accounts of Aristotle’s essentialism in Organon and Metaphysics. This interpretation and commentary is penetrating inside Aristotle’s remarks and comparing it with modern philosophy. In this Article, we criticize one of the interpretations in ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ form and then introduce a new other interpretation, which was exposed by Richard Patterson, with two substantial feature. The first feature is pertaining to the consistency of Aristotle’s modal logic. We can say this interpretation is the best explanation about this consistency among other interpretations. The second feature is coincidence between this interpretation with Aristotle’s essentialism in Metaphysics. We examine and then confirm that this interpretation with instruments of ‘strong necessity’ and ‘weak necessity’ in modal syllogisms with two necessity premises.

Abstract From his viewpoint, logic cannot in advance shape a fixed form for determination of thought; because every determination had its own special form. The transformation ofsoul (Geist) can't be apprehend within traditional logic, so it clings to earlier forms of Geist and as a result, neither it can comprehend new manifestations and determinations of Geist, nor can it form a native metaphysic for each Folkaccording toGeist’s determination for them. Such logic will turn finally to skepticism.
In the following paper, it will be explained how Hegel's epistemological- ontological logicis trying to transformthe nature of thought. In his opinion, the role of logic is not merely speculation, but also identifies and unification of thought with Being. Therefore, his logic alongside possessing content, determinate the content of thought. Hegelian logic is a complete philosophical system, capable of conceptualizing every Geist's unique determination.By his ontological-epistemological logic, Hegel finds metaphysic as a possible science, without entanglementin Kantian dogmatism.

Abstract The family resemblance’s theory of Wittgenstein is the most influential contemporary theory of, or, to put it more precisely, against “definition”. The theory’s main opposition is towards essential definitions, whose leading theoretician is known to be Aristotle. In modern era, This theory have been considered a challenge to essentialism. In this essay, after expressing the theory of family resemblance and backgrounds of those in opposition to the Aristotelian definition, By extracting criticisms of the theory to essential definitions and answers them according to the text of Aristotle, I’m trying to show that expressing such criticisms to the Aristotelian definition due wittgenstein’s misunderstanding and ignorance than the Aristotle’s essential definitions. To achieve this thesis, will be used of phenomenology and analytical methods. Examining the philosophers’ own works was among the investigation’s priorities.

Abstract   According to the common interpretation, Aristotle, in the fourth chapter of
“De Interpretatione”, defines statement based on truth and falsehood. But in the end of the fifth chapter, he offers another ‘account’ of ‘simple’ statement. In this article, I will argue, that the account is in fact the definition of statement without qualification based on belonging and not belonging as elements of the realm of reality. Accordingly, the interpretations of commentators about the last part of the fourth and the fifth chapter will be presented. Then it is discussed that the definition of statement based on truth and falsehood is incorrect and has some incompatibilities with the Aristotle's text. After that, my interpretation of Aristotle's text will be explained and it is indicated that dividing concepts of signifiers is defined in a different manner. Finally, the chosen definition of statement and its similarities with Porphyry's interpretation are explained.  

Abstract For Different thinkers, throughout history, ‘The unknowable non-existent’ has had different meanings. However, despite these differences, the ordinary absolute non-existent in Muslim philosophy (ma‘dūm muṭlaq; non-existent in both the external world and in the mind), can be expressed in this way: absolute non-existent is never existed in external world or in mind (rather it is impossible to be conceived in the mind), neither detailedly nor un-detailedly, neither in perception nor in imagination and intellect. ‘The absolute non-existent’ leads us to a paradox which is usually called the paradox of informing from absolute non-existent; suppose that (P) is ‘The absolute nonexistent is unknowable’, since the very P is a kind of knowledge or information about the absolute nonexistent, so we are encountered to a paradox. In this paper I explore the roots of the ‘absolute nonexistent’ and the paradox in Greek philosophy; actually in Parmenides and Plato.
 
 
 

Abstract One of the crucial problems concerning Aristotle's modal logic is the incompatibility of his claims about the necessity and his teachings in the case of absolute syllogism. This problem has led to many controversies since Aristotle time, and most researchers have come to the conclusion that Aristotle’s modal logic is contradictory. This article attempts through a new reading, which is as compatible as possible with Aristotle's claims, and based on his works and also his closer interpreters’ works such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, explains transferring necessity from a necessary premise to the conclusion and shows how Aristotle's viewpoint makes our argument possible and sound.
 
 

Abstract To have an applied attitude to Aristotelian logic it is necessary to understand deeply and correctly his syllogism and hence its figures. In this paper, we will discuss syllogism carefully in more details; one of the most important topics in syllogism is the valid and invalid moods, but the problem is that thinkers have not paid so much attention to invalid and sterile moods as they have paid to valid moods. Here we give an equal importance to these two kinds of moods, and will indicate their practical role in the Aristotelian logic.

Abstract Quine, the famous American empiricist philosopher, in wake of his criticisms of quantified modal logic, believes that the logic is committed to a doctrine which he calls Aristotelian Essentialism, and tries to prove that the doctrine is meaningless. He defines Aristotelian Essentialism as a doctrine which distinguishes between things’ essential and accidental properties, and the distinction is independent from the language in which the things are referred to, and also the ways by which they are specified. In the present paper, based on Aristotle's works, I have tried to find out whether Quine has defined the Aristotelian essentialism correctly, and whether his criticisms of essentialism include what Aristotle means by essentialism or not? I have argued that Quine has not analyzed Aristotelian essentialism correctly.
Keywords: Essentialism, Modality, Aristotle, Quine.

Abstract About 11 centuries after its emergence, Aristotle's Organon was translated into Arabic; and, based on such translations, scholars such as Farabi and Ibn Sina created logical works in the Islamic world.
Because of these works, logic emerged and flourished among Muslims. Through analysis and evaluation of the first translations of Organon, we may get familiar with, on the one hand, attention paid by Muslims to the Greek heritage in the first centuries of Islam and the extent of accuracy and correctness of such translations on the other. Abdolrahman Badawi has collected and edited the first Arabic translations of Aristotle's Organon together with Porphyry Isagoge in three volumes. When we compare the Arabic translation of Organon with the Greek text as well as English (Jenkinson), Persian (Adibsoltani) translations of the Prior Analytics (Book 2), we find almost 100 minor and major discrepancies. We have classified such discrepancies under shortages in translation, inconceivable Arabic, added phrases, changed examples, errors made in edition, and preference for the unoriginal text

Abstract Eleven centuries after its appearance, Aristotle’s Organon was translated into Arabic and by acquainting with such translations, some elite scholars, e.g. al-Fārābi and Ibn Sinā, started to write and publish logical writings in the Islamic world. These writings caused rising and developing the logic among Muslims. Analyzing and assessing the first Arabic translations of the Organon make us acquainted, on the one hand with the Muslims attention to the Greek philosophical heritages in the earlier centuries and on the other hand with the amount of these translations accuracy. Abdul-Rahmān Badawī has gathered and edited the first Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Organon and Porphyry’s Isagoge in a three volume book. After comparing Arabic translation of Syllogism to its original Greek and to English (Jenkinson) and Persian (Adib-Soltāni) translations of the Prior Analytics, we found almost one hundred differences between them. We have categorized these differences under some titles as preference and cost of translation, unintelligible Arabic, supplemented statement, translation mistakes, change and replacement of examples, errors of editing and added explanations. In addition to indicating the significance of the translation age, we touch, in the introduction of this article, some other subjects such as Organon translation, Syllogism’s translator, Badawī’s translation, methodology of comparing different translations and preferences of Arabic translation.