The incompatibility between the connectives of natural language and the language of classical logic in the truth-functionality has led some to think that the language of classical logic is incapable of representing the natural language sentences and formulating the arguments of this language. This paper ...
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The incompatibility between the connectives of natural language and the language of classical logic in the truth-functionality has led some to think that the language of classical logic is incapable of representing the natural language sentences and formulating the arguments of this language. This paper tries to show that the language of classical logic is not entirely incapable of that formulation, and the opposition's claim to the ability of the language of logic in representing the sentences and the arguments of the natural language is not complete. The defenses in this area are divided into two categories of direct and indirect defense. Although Grice's theory is a turning point for indirect defense, this paper deals with some of direct defense against defenders of the incompatibility of formalized arguments in the language of classical logic with natural language: first, with Strawson's arguments in opposition to the representation of natural language sentences by classical logic, we propound Clark's defense, and then we will see young's challenges against Clarke and Clarke's responses.
