Mojtaba Amirkhanloo
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 21-42
Abstract
In this article, a new definition of two concepts, i.e. Conceivability and Imaginability, is presented. First, the desiderata of a definition of Conceivability are given and by choosing two presuppositions, a theory about Conceivability is suggested. In this step, two strategies for the distinction between ...
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In this article, a new definition of two concepts, i.e. Conceivability and Imaginability, is presented. First, the desiderata of a definition of Conceivability are given and by choosing two presuppositions, a theory about Conceivability is suggested. In this step, two strategies for the distinction between the process of Conceiving and Imagining is introduced and after scrutiny about these two strategies, positive definitions of the concepts Conceivability and Imaginability are presented. Second, by perusing the restrictions of Conceivability and by mentioning wide and narrow approaches, a negative definition of these concepts is given. Then, these two definitions are epitomized into one definition. After all, the article is ended by evaluating the capability of our theory about satisfying the desiderata.
Behnaz Bagheri
Volume 6, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 21-41
Abstract
In this article, at first, I have explained correspondence theory of truth and I have dealt with its problems. Then I have explained the truth maker principle in the light of correspondence theory of truth. At the end, I have discussed how this theory can support negative proposition.
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In this article, at first, I have explained correspondence theory of truth and I have dealt with its problems. Then I have explained the truth maker principle in the light of correspondence theory of truth. At the end, I have discussed how this theory can support negative proposition.
Ali asghar jafari valani
Volume 9, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 21-39
Abstract
Relation and logical analysis of its features and rules of inference were one of the logical concerns of Muslim logicians; though each one has different approaches. Not considering the distinction between propositions containing relations and propositions containing categorical concepts has caused some ...
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Relation and logical analysis of its features and rules of inference were one of the logical concerns of Muslim logicians; though each one has different approaches. Not considering the distinction between propositions containing relations and propositions containing categorical concepts has caused some inconsistency in their logical text; that is although Aristotelian logic focuses only on subject-predicate structure of sentences and has not a separate analysis for relations, however, obviously its importance were not neglected. So the inferential rules of relations has not developed in Aristotelian logic due to this inconsistency and it is not easy to capture the Muslim logician`s idea about it. Nevertheless this thread of thought could be found in analysis of Four-fold Relations, conversion of universal negative propositions, the first figure of syllogism, Equality Syllogism and essential and non-essential middle term.
Morteza Hajhosseini
Volume 2, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 23-48
Abstract
connective [statement] is among the foundations of Sinean logic. In the Logic of Shifa, it has been divided into evident and non-evident necessary as well as into various kinds of necessary in terms of necessity and necessary in terms of facts. Without knowing and understanding various kinds of necessary, ...
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connective [statement] is among the foundations of Sinean logic. In the Logic of Shifa, it has been divided into evident and non-evident necessary as well as into various kinds of necessary in terms of necessity and necessary in terms of facts. Without knowing and understanding various kinds of necessary, the nature of necessary connective, its rules, its relation to various kinds of entailment in the modern logic, and the structure of necessary connective cannot be understood and known. Thus, in the present article, after providing Ibn Sina's definition for evident and non-evident necessary connective and analyzing and criticizing some views posed in this concern, I analyze views introduced by Ibn Sina and some later logicians about necessary connective in terms of necessity and in terms of facts (or, as put by Khwajah, verbal and true necessary). Then, I examine and criticize some views posed in this regard which, I think, have gone in wrong direction and got far from Ibn Sina while speaking of Ibn Sina.
According to the results of the present study, firstly, division of necessary into evident and non-evident in Ibn Sina's Shifa has nothing to do with division of conditional into necessary and accidental. Secondly, in dividing necessary into evident and non-evident, Ibn Sina has relied upon the factual world and the necessary relations existing in it. Thus, it should not be thought that such a division is merely based upon logical and merely formal relations. Thirdly, according to Ibn Sina, the necessary connective statement "if five is even, then it is a number" is true in terms of necessity and false in terms of facts. Thus, the reason provided by him for falsity of this connective statement concerns facts and should not be confused with the station of necessity. Fourthly, Ibn Sina's argument for falsity of the above connective statement in terms of facts is a continuous and integrated one consisting of various steps none of which should be regarded as an independent argument. Furthermore, this argument has been stated in the language of predicative logic (and not in the language of propositional logic) and has nothing to do with the fallacy of hiding in the relevance logic.
Thus, the idea that division of necessary connective into evident and non-evident corresponds to division of connective into accidental and necessary is not consistent with the contents of Shifa and the present author's interpretation of it. Nor is the idea that Ibn Sina has regarded a necessary with impossible precedent as a necessary connective in terms of necessity and thought that it is false in factual world consistent with his distinction between two stations of necessity and facts.
Davood Hosseini
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 25-48
Abstract
In this paper I expose and evaluate supervaluationist theory of vagueness. Specially, I concentrate on the standard version of it. This criticism is twofold: first, this theory cannot model all intuitions about vague predicates and though it select a proper subset of these intuitions, its preference ...
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In this paper I expose and evaluate supervaluationist theory of vagueness. Specially, I concentrate on the standard version of it. This criticism is twofold: first, this theory cannot model all intuitions about vague predicates and though it select a proper subset of these intuitions, its preference is not justified; second, its psychological solution of sorites paradoxes either is not satisfactory or is ad hoc. I will conclude that, at least, standard version of supervaluationism does not handle vagueness related problems.
Volume 8, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 25-48
Abstract
According to a favored version of inference to the best explanation (IBE), the hypothesis that provides the best explanation for a group of observed phenomena is probably true. One of the key objections against this line of thought is Voltaire’s objection. According to this objection, we have no ...
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According to a favored version of inference to the best explanation (IBE), the hypothesis that provides the best explanation for a group of observed phenomena is probably true. One of the key objections against this line of thought is Voltaire’s objection. According to this objection, we have no reason to believe that the explanatory virtues, as the criteria for selecting the best explanation, provide the likeliest explanation. In this paper, we address probabilistic criteria which are subject to Voltaire’s objection in IBE. To be exact, we scrutinize this question: considering proposed probabilistic criteria for assessing the explanatory hypotheses as the criteria for selecting the best explanation, is it justified to think of the best explanation as the likeliest one? Dealing with this question, the probabilistic criteria will be analyzed in three group: criteria based on Bayes’ theorem, criteria based on confirmation theory and criteria based on explanatory virtues. We argue that none of these criteria can determine the best explanation which provides the likeliest one.
Ali Reza Darabi
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 27-56
Abstract
. This paper presents an analysis to cogent conditional quantifier. There are various approaches to the analysis of conditional quantifier. Some researchers have called this pseudo-quantifier and other authors have interpreted it as being based on temporal logic; or modal logic. In this paper after investigating ...
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. This paper presents an analysis to cogent conditional quantifier. There are various approaches to the analysis of conditional quantifier. Some researchers have called this pseudo-quantifier and other authors have interpreted it as being based on temporal logic; or modal logic. In this paper after investigating and criticizing these approaches, we analyze instances of the cogent conditional quantifier in natural language. Then we determined their formulation in modern logic. Also we have investigated the presuppositions in the ancient logic. The truth of that logic deduction is based on those presuppositions. In the current approach, it becomes clear that the cogent conditional quantifier can only be analyzed on the basis of relevant logic and modal logic. Also for truth of deductions, acceptance of two presuppositions "the possibility of the antecedent" and "the necessity of relevance of the antecedent and the consequence in the universals" is necessary.
Davood Hosseini
Volume 3, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 27-51
Abstract
In this paper I first explain the fuzzy system and its roots in language speakers’ intuition, as claimed by its champions. I then introduce a quasi-formal interpretation of the standard logical system of fuzzy. After that I criticize the theory in two ways: first, I argue that its proponent's responses ...
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In this paper I first explain the fuzzy system and its roots in language speakers’ intuition, as claimed by its champions. I then introduce a quasi-formal interpretation of the standard logical system of fuzzy. After that I criticize the theory in two ways: first, I argue that its proponent's responses to the problem of Exact Truth-values are irrelevant or insufficient. Second, I show the theory does not have a uniform solution to the Sorites Paradox; especially the psychological parts of proposed solutions are not persuasive.
Dariush Darvishy
Volume 5, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 29-51
Abstract
For Different thinkers, throughout history, ‘The unknowable non-existent’ has had different meanings. However, despite these differences, the ordinary absolute non-existent in Muslim philosophy (ma‘dūm muṭlaq; non-existent in both the external world and in the mind), can be expressed ...
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For Different thinkers, throughout history, ‘The unknowable non-existent’ has had different meanings. However, despite these differences, the ordinary absolute non-existent in Muslim philosophy (ma‘dūm muṭlaq; non-existent in both the external world and in the mind), can be expressed in this way: absolute non-existent is never existed in external world or in mind (rather it is impossible to be conceived in the mind), neither detailedly nor un-detailedly, neither in perception nor in imagination and intellect. ‘The absolute non-existent’ leads us to a paradox which is usually called the paradox of informing from absolute non-existent; suppose that (P) is ‘The absolute nonexistent is unknowable’, since the very P is a kind of knowledge or information about the absolute nonexistent, so we are encountered to a paradox. In this paper I explore the roots of the ‘absolute nonexistent’ and the paradox in Greek philosophy; actually in Parmenides and Plato.
Analytical Philosophy
Hamed Zamani Pozve
Volume 7, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 29-44
Abstract
Early Wittgenstein separate meaning from ideas by attaching necessity to language. In his view, language has a logical structure which is a model of existing necessities in the world. He define object in a specific way to explain existing necessities in the world. At his viewpoint there is a sign for ...
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Early Wittgenstein separate meaning from ideas by attaching necessity to language. In his view, language has a logical structure which is a model of existing necessities in the world. He define object in a specific way to explain existing necessities in the world. At his viewpoint there is a sign for each object in possible language and each object has some possibilities to join others which the existing relations are some of those possibilities. Wittgenstein thinks logical structure of language is caused by scaffolding of world and language is meaningful just in a way of picturing the world. Without saying anything about communication between people, Wittgenstein studies how language is possible and as an answer he shows logical form. In Wittgenstein’s design of language Subject lose its position that sets function of words but objects and their possibilities to join each other take that position.
Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Ali Reza Darabi; Lotfollah Nabavi
Volume 5, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 31-53
Abstract
According to a rule in Avicenna's logic, there exists cohesion between any two necessary hypothetic propositions with identical quantity, different quality, identical antecedent, and denial of the consequent. The rule is introduced and has been argued for, by Avecinna. After him, this rule is criticized ...
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According to a rule in Avicenna's logic, there exists cohesion between any two necessary hypothetic propositions with identical quantity, different quality, identical antecedent, and denial of the consequent. The rule is introduced and has been argued for, by Avecinna. After him, this rule is criticized by Avicennian logicians. Khunaji questioned Avecinna’s pre-assumptions of this proof by examples of natural language. After Khunaji, some logicians like Nasir al-Din Tusi, Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi tried to answer Khunaji’s critiques by presenting some better formalizations of Avecinna’s arguments or defending his pre-assumptions. In this paper, after introducing the arguments of both sides together with their detailed formalizations, it is concluded that the answers to Khunaji’s critiques are not enough to prove the aforementioned rule, and accepting this rule still requires new arguments.
Analytical Philosophy
Behnam Zolqadr; Davood Hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 31-40
Abstract
According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, ...
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According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object and have their properties independent of whether they are intended or not. (2) Anti-realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object only if they are intended. Otherwise they are not object and thus no properties are ascribed to them. In this essay we will raise some objections to Priest’s anti-realist Modal Meinongianism, and then we propose a different anti-realist approach. In our account of anti-realist Modal Meinongianism fictional objects are considered as incomplete objects.
Zeinab Barkhordari; Ramin Rohi
Abstract
تصور و تصدیق به عنوان دو بخش مبنایی و نظام آفرین در منطق، همواره مورد توجه بوده است. زیربنای منطق دوبخشی، بحث تصوّر و تصدیق است؛ از اینرو از زمان ابنسینا تا به امروز، ...
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تصور و تصدیق به عنوان دو بخش مبنایی و نظام آفرین در منطق، همواره مورد توجه بوده است. زیربنای منطق دوبخشی، بحث تصوّر و تصدیق است؛ از اینرو از زمان ابنسینا تا به امروز، و با توجه به منطق نوین غرب، در اینباره مسائل مختلفی به میان آمده است. منطق دوبخشی بر اساس تقسیم علم حصولی به تصور و تصدیق پایه گذاری شده است. با توجه به ماهیت تقسیم و وجود اختلاف نوعی بین اقسام، مسألۀ نسبت بین تصوّر و تصدیق، از میان تمام این مسائل، اهمّیت بیشتری دارد. چیستی این نسبت بر "منطق تقسیم بندی"، "ابتناء یا عدم ابتناء این دو بر هم"، "امکان تحقق ذهنی هریک بدون دیگری" و مسائل وابسته به این مسائل تاثیر مستقیم دارد. ابن سینا، قطب الدین رازی و ملاصدرا، (در اثری مستقل) از اندیشمندانی هستند که به این مساله پرداخته اند. مقاله حاضر گشودن گرههای تحلیلی در تقسیمبندی علم حصولی به تصوّر و تصدیق در آثار سه اندیشمند را برای به دست آوردن نسبت بین تصوّر و تصدیق و نیز نقش هرکدام در حصول دیگری و در نهایت دستیابی به نظری جامع از آرای ایشان دربارۀ ماهیت تصوّر و تصدیق، مدنظر قرارداده است. در این پژوهش، از طریق تفکیک مقام زبان (لفظ) از مقام ماهوی، علم حصولی تبیین و تحلیل شده است: در مقام ماهوی فقط تصدیق و از طریق مقام زبان و ارتباط بین زبان و اندیشه، تصوّر به دست میآید. چنان که علم حصولی تکهستهای باشد، علم منطق در واقع تکبخشی خواهدبود.
mohammad amin baradaran nikou; gholamreza zakiany; malek hoseini; hasan miandari
Abstract
Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics, A.2, introduces the principles of science. In Post An, A10, He describes three kinds of foundations of science. There seem to be some discrepancies between the classification in A.2 and three kinds of the foundations in A.10. It is ...
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Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics, A.2, introduces the principles of science. In Post An, A10, He describes three kinds of foundations of science. There seem to be some discrepancies between the classification in A.2 and three kinds of the foundations in A.10. It is also not clear which of these principles and foundations can have all the features of a premise of science. This paper represents the puzzles that arise in interpreting the texts in question. It describes the Aristotle’s principles of science and suggests that only one kind of them can be considered as a premise of science; the principles that assume both the subject of science is and what it is. It is necessary to distinguish between Aristotle's premises of science, the foundations of science and the prior knowledge. The puzzles are solved with the help of this distinction and notes from other texts in Post An. So a consistent interpretation between A.2 and A.10 is achieved. The proper interpretation helps to understand Aristotle’s epistemology correctly.
مهناز امیرخانی; شهناز شایانفر; فاطمه منصورزاده
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 37-58
Abstract
In the discussion of mingled modalities of the fist figure, Avicenna thought that the mode of conclusion doesn’t follow major premise just in two modes (the combination of proper minor with existential major and proper absolute minor premise with affirmative necessary) while according to the Khaje ...
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In the discussion of mingled modalities of the fist figure, Avicenna thought that the mode of conclusion doesn’t follow major premise just in two modes (the combination of proper minor with existential major and proper absolute minor premise with affirmative necessary) while according to the Khaje Toosi's thought, other modes, including attribute major (one of the general and specific conditional or general and specific conventional), don’t follow the mode of conclusion as well. Studying the works of the ancient logicians, we find out that the number of the modes comes up to 42. Identifying mode of conclusion, logicians are agreed on 31 modes, but disagreed on their rest 11, though none of them considered the conclusions of these 11 modes as followings of the major. The present thesis is studying the mentioned 31 modes, their standards/criterions and the logicians' reasons of the mode of conclusion. In addition, the issue of those 11 modes would be discussed later in an independent survey.
Seied Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Homan Mohammad Ghorbanian; Lotfollah Nabavi; Arsalan Golfam
Volume 4, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 44-64
Abstract
Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are ...
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Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are based on the concepts of ‘regularities’, ‘correct uses’ and ‘possibility of semantic mistakes’. But some philosophers have scrutinized the slogan ‘meaning is normative’ and have found some flaws in pro arguments. There are good reasons to consider the normativity of meaning as a side effect of ‘being public ’; that is, meaning, as itself, is neutral to correct or incorrect uses, but the moral or social laws of society impose several norms on language.
Maziar Chitsaz
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2010, , Pages 33-49
Abstract
Abstract: This article examines the concept of contradiction, law of non-contradiction and dialetheism in non-classical logic. The main purpose of this paper is examining different definitions of the concept of contradiction and the influence of such differences in accepting or rejecting the low of non-contradiction. ...
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Abstract: This article examines the concept of contradiction, law of non-contradiction and dialetheism in non-classical logic. The main purpose of this paper is examining different definitions of the concept of contradiction and the influence of such differences in accepting or rejecting the low of non-contradiction. Here I try to show, by appealing to an especial conception of contradiction, that how it is possible to make dialetheism plausible. In section 1, basic terms are introduced. Section 2 covers different definitions of contradiction. This section shows that according to diverse conceptions of contradiction, we could have different notions of dialetheism. In section 3, I review most important arguments of the proponents of the low of non-contradiction and try to refute them on the basis of the definitions of section 2. Finally it will be showed that new approaches to dialetheism is due to using semantic instead of ontology, multi-valued logic, vagueness and alternates theory of truth.
Philosophy of Language
Reza Soltani; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 8, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 39-62
Abstract
Kripke in his famous book, Naming and Necessity, introduces the concept of “rigidity” for designation of singular terms; and by using it, he refutes the Descriptive Theory of Meaning. If a term is rigid it means that it designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which it exists. ...
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Kripke in his famous book, Naming and Necessity, introduces the concept of “rigidity” for designation of singular terms; and by using it, he refutes the Descriptive Theory of Meaning. If a term is rigid it means that it designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which it exists. Kripke, in third lecture, extends the concept of “rigidity” to all natural kind terms. This extension has had several interpretations which can be put into two categories: the sameness in designation, and the essentialist approaches. The sameness in designation approach, however, confronts “the trivialization problem”,i.e. not only natural kind terms, but also all general terms are rigid designators since each of them designates a property which remains the same across all possible worlds. An argumentative way has been proposed to refute trivialization problem. This approach is based on considering abundant objects as the designatum of singular terms and parallelism between these words and general terms. In this paper we will criticize this approach and show that it conflicts with some semantic roles of general terms and also our intuition concerning the truth value of sentences containing them.
Traditional Logic
Mahmoud Zera’atpisheh
Volume 7, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 41-57
Abstract
The verse 81 of Zokhrof says: "If God has a child, so I am the first of worshipers." Most of the interpretators believes that this verse contains an argument which can be expressed in a modes tollens form. But despite their attempt to proposal the form of this argument as they claim, no one of their ...
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The verse 81 of Zokhrof says: "If God has a child, so I am the first of worshipers." Most of the interpretators believes that this verse contains an argument which can be expressed in a modes tollens form. But despite their attempt to proposal the form of this argument as they claim, no one of their formulized arguments do not match the verse and cannot keep the truth and validity. The difficulty of interpretation of this verse and the variety and difference of it is undoubtedly rooted from the word "first" (which can be interpreted in different meaning which none of them can support the validity of a modes tollens). In this research, after studying these proposal formulations according to modes tollens, a fortiori argument will be proposed and it is claimed that this form of argument, with an extra term, can better shows the content of the verse.
Masoud Zia Ali Nasab Pour
Volume 9, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 41-61
Abstract
In this paper I evaluate Geirsson’s justification model for modal beliefs which he proposes in “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification” (2005). Geirsson’s justification model is based on conceivability. Geirsson gives an analysis of conceivability in terms of ...
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In this paper I evaluate Geirsson’s justification model for modal beliefs which he proposes in “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification” (2005). Geirsson’s justification model is based on conceivability. Geirsson gives an analysis of conceivability in terms of imagination. Geirsson admits that his account is similar to Yablo’s model, but he claims that it advances discussion in several ways. One of the claimed improvements is to employ propositional imagination for justification of modal beliefs. In this paper I will argue that Geirsson’ claimed advancements are not very useful. For among other things propositional imagination as he defines it could not provide justification for modal beliefs. Moreover Geirsson could not give an answer to the question “what exactly is propositional imagination?” based on which what he considers propositionally imaginable, e.g. denial of Goldbach's conjecture, would still be imaginable but metaphysically impossible propositions would not be propositionally imaginable.
Mahdi Ranaee
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 43-64
Abstract
In his 1987 paper, Jordan Howard Sobel showed that Gödel’s ontological argument faces modal collapse and, therefore, it is not sound. C. Anthony Anderson, in his 1990 paper, proposed an amended version of the argument in which modal collapse is blocked. In his parody, Graham Oppy, however, ...
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In his 1987 paper, Jordan Howard Sobel showed that Gödel’s ontological argument faces modal collapse and, therefore, it is not sound. C. Anthony Anderson, in his 1990 paper, proposed an amended version of the argument in which modal collapse is blocked. In his parody, Graham Oppy, however, cast a serious doubt on the soundness of Anderson’s version. Alexander Pruss, however, in his 2009 paper, endeavored to block this parody by proposing some new Gödelian ontological arguments. In this paper, I will be trying to inquire into Gödel’s ontological argument, Sobel’s objections, Anderson’s emendations, Oppy’s parody, and Pruss’ ontological arguments.
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Salman Panahi
Volume 4, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2013, , Pages 43-64
Abstract
Realism is an intuitive idea which most people accept explicitly or implicitly. It is hard to find someone who does not accept mind-independent things or the relation between truth and states of affairs; however, how the connection between language and reality can be stated is a controversial issue, ...
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Realism is an intuitive idea which most people accept explicitly or implicitly. It is hard to find someone who does not accept mind-independent things or the relation between truth and states of affairs; however, how the connection between language and reality can be stated is a controversial issue, at least among philosophers. Based on the most popular theories about the problem, there is a direct correspondence between lingual elements and external world. At first glance, it seems acceptable, like many other intuitive ideas, but further examination reveals some dissatisfactions. Hilary Putnam, well known American contemporary philosopher, has criticized such a point of view (‘Metaphysical Realism’ as he has called), partly using model theoretic based arguments. Model theory is a branch of mathematical sciences which studies the connection between a language and its interpretations. This paper attempts, less technical and more intuitive, to examine Putnam's Permutation argument in which he uses model theoretic concepts and theorems to show that Metaphysical Realist is not able to fix reference of the elements of language via fixing truth value of the whole sentence in which those elements appear.
Gholam Reza Zakiani; Mohammad Amin Baradaran Nikou
Volume 6, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 43-71
Abstract
According to Smith, Organon for Aristotle is a special means to demonstrate that first philosophy is possible. For him, it’s incorrect to think that the aim of Organon is the introduction of Aristotle’s methodological theories. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle by a demonstration tries to ...
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According to Smith, Organon for Aristotle is a special means to demonstrate that first philosophy is possible. For him, it’s incorrect to think that the aim of Organon is the introduction of Aristotle’s methodological theories. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle by a demonstration tries to show that an undemonstrative knowledge is necessary and sufficient condition for demonstrative knowledge (episteme). The aim of undemonstrative knowledge is the aim of first philosophy, that is, coming to the first principles of any science. Smith considers the demonstration in question depends on other Aristotle’s logical theories in Organon involving theories of definition, predication, dialectic, categories, and deduction. Furthermore, in the last section of Posterior Analytic, Aristotle expressing a process called Nous shows that coming to the undemonstrative knowledge is possible.
Traditional Logic
Amin Shahverdi
Volume 7, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 45-66
Abstract
In spite of the completeness of modern propositional logic which is accepted by logicans, the compeletness of Stoic logic is a subject that is dubted. In this paper, aftet investigating various systems which are reconstructed by modern scholars for Stoic logic, the compeletness of these systems is studied ...
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In spite of the completeness of modern propositional logic which is accepted by logicans, the compeletness of Stoic logic is a subject that is dubted. In this paper, aftet investigating various systems which are reconstructed by modern scholars for Stoic logic, the compeletness of these systems is studied and it is shown that these systems may not be satisfied Stoic standards for valid arguments. Therefore, it is wrong that the completeness of these systems is ascribed to Stoic logic. Finally, it is negated that Stoic logic is compeleted in this sense that all valid arguments may be reduced to “indemonstred”s and it is shown that in addition to “indemonstrated”s and arguments which may be reduced to “indemonstrated”s, There are some other arguments which are accepted by Stoics as valid
Alireza Dastafshan
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 49-61
Abstract
The Liar is a self-referential sentence which says that it is false. In this article, we will first show that the main two traditional and well-known solutions of this paradox cannot survive a serious scrutiny. Then, we will use two important premises to introduce a new solution for the problem. The ...
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The Liar is a self-referential sentence which says that it is false. In this article, we will first show that the main two traditional and well-known solutions of this paradox cannot survive a serious scrutiny. Then, we will use two important premises to introduce a new solution for the problem. The first premise is that “propositions” (rather than sentences) are truth-bearers (even though we sometimes assign truth value to sentences, when we do that, we are well aware that we are not talking accurately; but this kind of inaccuracy is allowed only as far as it doesn’t cause serious problems such as paradoxes). After adding this premise to the discourse, the Liar sentence will be rephrased in a more accurate way as a sentence which says that the proposition it expresses is false. The second premise is the theory of structured propositions according to which propositions are ordered sets (that is to say a proposition is of the ontological genre of sets). Then, using the regularity principle in set theory, we will show that no set can be a member of itself and since a proposition is a set, it can’t include itself as a member and can’t express its own falsehood. In this way, we prove that no such proposition exists and the Liar sentence is without content and meaningless. Taking propositions as truth bearers and using the theory of structured propositions lead to an acceptable solution for the Liar paradox which in its turn can be taken as an advantage of those theories about truth-bearers and the nature of propositions.
