Daryoush (Said) Darvishi
Volume 2, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 49-76
Abstract
Dialectical method has certain roots in the Greek philosophical thought before Plato. Such roots may be traced back from Heraclitus and Parmenides to Sophists. There, the first regular uses made of it may be found in Socrates. Though, Aristotle has mistakenly introduced Xenon of Elea as the founder of ...
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Dialectical method has certain roots in the Greek philosophical thought before Plato. Such roots may be traced back from Heraclitus and Parmenides to Sophists. There, the first regular uses made of it may be found in Socrates. Though, Aristotle has mistakenly introduced Xenon of Elea as the founder of dialectical method. Plato inherited Socrates' method. But what is clear is the distinction which may be seen between dialectical methods of Socrates and Plato. The doctrine of Ideas gives much importance to this distinction. This distinction may be summarized in this way that the doctrine of Ideas is in conflict with Socratic ignorance. In other words, Socrates employed the dialectical method to show that his logical style prevents him from providing decisive statements based on knowledge; and that his duty is only "to correct", a correction for which no end may be found. Introducing the doctrine of Ideas, Plato made it completely different. And as this doctrine is introduced, it becomes clear that the end of the dialectical method is revealing the "Idea" of the subject discussed.
The present article tries to show that:
(1) Roots of the dialectical method may be found in the Greek philosophical thought before Plato, and
(2) Probably Xenon of Elea has nothing to do with the dialectical method, and
(3) Doctrine of Ideas is Plato's (and not that of Socrates), and
(4) When this doctrine is added to the dialectical method, it is of a clear impact on the process of finding an end for the logical search; or, to put it more accurately, (5) dialectical method with, and without, the doctrine of Ideas are different from each other.
Comparative Studies in Logic
Ali Reza Darabi
Volume 8, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 49-68
Abstract
In Muslim’s logic of conditionals there is a consensus that the value of necessity conditional is defined by relationship between antecedent and consequent and not by the value of antecedent or consequent. However, in their opinions there are discussions on possibility of truth or falsehood based ...
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In Muslim’s logic of conditionals there is a consensus that the value of necessity conditional is defined by relationship between antecedent and consequent and not by the value of antecedent or consequent. However, in their opinions there are discussions on possibility of truth or falsehood based on value of antecedent and consequent. In some of the Muslim logicians’ texts beside of truth and falsehood a different status is mentioned with different terms such as probable false and true, unknown true and false, etc. Examining the nature of this status is the main question of the current text. In this paper, by reviewing different views of Avicennian logicians it’s shown that this classification is related to discussions on conditionals before introducing quantified conditional by Avicenna and Avicennian logicians attempted to accord it with quantified conditional, we showed that from the opinions of Avicennian logicians the opinions that don’t accept third condition as a participant of truth and falsehood are closer to the fundamentals of Avicennian’s logic.
Mahd Ranaee
Volume 3, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 53-76
Abstract
In 1970, Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards, Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction ...
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In 1970, Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards, Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction operator. Granted the acceptability of the underlying logical system, Gödel’s conclusion that necessarily there exists a God-like being ) ) can be derived from the premises-with Gödel and Scott on the scene, who can say otherwise? Sobel, however, proved that the system faces modal collapse-i.e. P↔□P is derivable from the system. Responding to Sobel, Anderson tried to block this by weakening some axioms and definitions. In this paper, I will be trying to consider Gödel’s ontological argument (Scott’s version) from a logical point of view, along with Sobel’s criticism and Anderson’s emendations.
Alireza Dastafshan; Azar Karimi
Volume 5, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 53-71
Abstract
Avicenna believes that existence is either objective or subjective. Indeed, in his view, the existent and object are never separated from each other and their discrimination is analytical and intellectual; existent and object are Mosaveqat. In other words, what is thing exists and what exists is an object. ...
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Avicenna believes that existence is either objective or subjective. Indeed, in his view, the existent and object are never separated from each other and their discrimination is analytical and intellectual; existent and object are Mosaveqat. In other words, what is thing exists and what exists is an object. In contrast to the Islamic Theologians, the objecthood is wider than existence, because Sabetat about which we have knowledge do not exist; so there should be a kind of realization and permanency beyond the existence. In the current century, in the tradition of analytical philosophy, Nathan Salmon with Non-serious actualism approach and by using free logic believes that the object is what has property; either existent or nonexistent. The objecthood of object is based on having property, rather than the existence.
Borzuya Beglari
Volume 9, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 53-93
Abstract
When Saul Kripke published Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I in 1965, all previous matters, Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK interpretation), topological interpretation, Beth models, were effected by its clarity and perspicuity and then it became the standard, ...
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When Saul Kripke published Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I in 1965, all previous matters, Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK interpretation), topological interpretation, Beth models, were effected by its clarity and perspicuity and then it became the standard, easy to understand and quite useable semintics for intuition logic of the Brouwer-Heyting. Since then very much research, books and papers was done in to clarify, understand and facilitate the paper. Kripke wrote this paper while he was at the end of the decade of fertile thinking in modal logic and its semantical analysis and publishing very creative 6 papers that completely changed the insight of modal logic. In Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I, for designing an analysis for semantcs of intuitionistic logic he used his own method in modal logic and Cohn’s, American mathematician, notion of forcing. In this essay we are going to investigate the historiography and then translation it to Persian.
Mahmoud Zeraatpishe; atefe Ranjbar darestani
Volume 5, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 55-69
Abstract
A fortiori logic is a kind of formal logic which its arguments, unlike the common arguments of Aristotelian logic, has four terms through which after comparing usually two persons, things, works to each other, the description of one of them is ascribed/ denied to/ from the other. This logic, in spite ...
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A fortiori logic is a kind of formal logic which its arguments, unlike the common arguments of Aristotelian logic, has four terms through which after comparing usually two persons, things, works to each other, the description of one of them is ascribed/ denied to/ from the other. This logic, in spite of Sion’s belief, is found in Quran, so richly that we can say that it is the prominent logic of Quran. In this research, I will study a fortiori logic in Quran, after giving an introductory explanation of it.
dariush Darvishi
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 57-82
Abstract
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In Organon, Aristotle treats predication exactly like affirmation. There exists no predication which is not affirmative. Negation in Organon is negation to the predication. When a quality is denied of an object, we are not faced with a kind of prediction. This paper attempts to prove that this Aristotelian ...
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In Organon, Aristotle treats predication exactly like affirmation. There exists no predication which is not affirmative. Negation in Organon is negation to the predication. When a quality is denied of an object, we are not faced with a kind of prediction. This paper attempts to prove that this Aristotelian view will lead to certain paradoxes which cannot be solved or answered through Aristotelian logic. However, finally, we prove that this Aristotelian notion is outright wrong and negative predication does not function like a deadlock in logic and it can be possible. Since, this article employs the method of Obversion and Aristotle defiantly rejects this method, to defend the methodology of this study, this Aristotelian view is analyzed and its falsity is displayed. In brief, the present article has the following claims:
1)- Predication and affirmation are not the same and negative predication also exists.
2)- Contrary to the views of almost all ancient logicians, Modified affirmative predicates are not really affirmative and they are negative.
3)- Obversion, is a true and usable method for the goals of old logic.
4)- Existential Import rule is true but incomplete, and its correct form can be as follows: "The attribution of a negative or affirmative judgment is subsidery to its proof." Therefore, any predication whether negative or affirmative cannot be operated on a non- existent entity and therefore negative Proposition with the Empty Subject are on the basis of their subjects false.
Jenan Izadi; Mahdi Ghaedsharaf
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 59-94
Abstract
The main question of this paper is how one can devise a semantic theory in Mulla Sarad’s framework of thought. Indicating methodological points concerning the relation between semantics, metaphysics, epistemology, the article attempts to approach to Sarda’s semantic theory. Among the results ...
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The main question of this paper is how one can devise a semantic theory in Mulla Sarad’s framework of thought. Indicating methodological points concerning the relation between semantics, metaphysics, epistemology, the article attempts to approach to Sarda’s semantic theory. Among the results of this article we can indicate to preference of logical language to natural language based on logical and demonstrative reason, determining word and sentence as the smallest meaningful units of language based on the theory of aspects, and non-interference of subject based on the emanation theory.
Mohammadmohsen Haeri; Davood Hosseini
Abstract
Logical realism, in a sense, is realism about the subject matter of logic. What is logic really about? Talk of logic is more or less synonymous with talk of the relation of logical consequence; the relation that holds between the premisses of an argument and its conclusion. However, in the history logic, ...
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Logical realism, in a sense, is realism about the subject matter of logic. What is logic really about? Talk of logic is more or less synonymous with talk of the relation of logical consequence; the relation that holds between the premisses of an argument and its conclusion. However, in the history logic, this has not always been the case. Before placing logical consequence at the heart of logic, the Frege-Russell view was dominant in the philosophical community; a view according to which logic is primarily about logical truths. In this paper, we argue that logic is about logical consequence and not logical truth. Then we list a couple of motivations for investigating a metaphysics of logic. Proponents of logical realism typically base their theories upon logical truths as logical facts. In this article, we aim to turn the emphasis from logical truths to logical consequence(s) as the primary object(s) of logical realism and give a general outline on how to be a realist about logical consequence.
Behzad Hamidieh
Volume 4, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 65-88
Abstract
Even though, in Aristotelian and Islamic logic and philosophy, inherently impossible affairs don’t actualize in the world and can’t be actualized, they are considered meaningful, and thus their characteristics and their philosophical judgments have been discussed by Islamic philosophers. ...
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Even though, in Aristotelian and Islamic logic and philosophy, inherently impossible affairs don’t actualize in the world and can’t be actualized, they are considered meaningful, and thus their characteristics and their philosophical judgments have been discussed by Islamic philosophers. In this paper, I have argued that there are some flaws in the arguments which have presented for the meaningfulness of impossible affairs by such philosophers. In addition, I have suggested some philosophical and logical arguments for their meaninglessness. According to some Islamic philosophy rules, such as ‘the contrast between a’dam wa malike’ (positive and privative), we can argue that impossible affairs are indeed compound words which are constructed through wordplay. Although the parts of such compound words may have meaning, they, as a whole, don’t refer to anything and so don’t bring about anything in our minds. We have just the illusion of their meaningfulness when we are talking about them, and that’s why we call them ‘pseudo-concepts’. This view has some important consequences which have been discussed in the paper.
Mahdi Behniafar
Abstract
This paper examines two rival versions (normative-axiomatic and psychologistic) about the nature of deduction and its relation with intuition in Descartes' thought. The ideal of the first version is to reduce the role of the faculty of memory and, sometimes, the role of the faculty of imagination in ...
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This paper examines two rival versions (normative-axiomatic and psychologistic) about the nature of deduction and its relation with intuition in Descartes' thought. The ideal of the first version is to reduce the role of the faculty of memory and, sometimes, the role of the faculty of imagination in long chains of deduction due to their fallibility in Descartes' view. Achieving this ideal also depends on the mental training and practicing to place longer inferential chains in a single Cartesian intuition. This version accepts the independence of a logical consequence, considers deduction to be definable on the basis of definiens such as rules of inference and the basic principles of logic, and does not contradict the axiomatic tree of Cartesian knowledge. But the second version essentially sees deduction as nothing more than an intuitive grasping: a simple mental act that is nothing more than a complex intuition of several intuitive things. Therefore, this version considers deduction to have no logical regulations and considers it indefinable based on definiens such as logical principles and rules, and instead places the grasp of a truth that manifests in a kind of psychological clarity experienced by the knowing subject. These two versions try to seem compatible with cognitive objectivity and offer an innate and inadoptable reading of Cartesian logic; But since the second version contradicts both the more fundamental points of Descartes' thought and the independence of logic, this version cannot lead to the cognitive objectivity and innateness of logic in an acceptable way.
Gholamreza Zakiany
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2010, , Pages 51-78
Abstract
Eleven centuries after its appearance, Aristotle’s Organon was translated into Arabic and by acquainting with such translations, some elite scholars, e.g. al-Fārābi and Ibn Sinā, started to write and publish logical writings in the Islamic world. These writings caused rising and developing the ...
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Eleven centuries after its appearance, Aristotle’s Organon was translated into Arabic and by acquainting with such translations, some elite scholars, e.g. al-Fārābi and Ibn Sinā, started to write and publish logical writings in the Islamic world. These writings caused rising and developing the logic among Muslims. Analyzing and assessing the first Arabic translations of the Organon make us acquainted, on the one hand with the Muslims attention to the Greek philosophical heritages in the earlier centuries and on the other hand with the amount of these translations accuracy. Abdul-Rahmān Badawī has gathered and edited the first Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Organon and Porphyry’s Isagoge in a three volume book. After comparing Arabic translation of Syllogism to its original Greek and to English (Jenkinson) and Persian (Adib-Soltāni) translations of the Prior Analytics, we found almost one hundred differences between them. We have categorized these differences under some titles as preference and cost of translation, unintelligible Arabic, supplemented statement, translation mistakes, change and replacement of examples, errors of editing and added explanations. In addition to indicating the significance of the translation age, we touch, in the introduction of this article, some other subjects such as Organon translation, Syllogism’s translator, Badawī’s translation, methodology of comparing different translations and preferences of Arabic translation.
Traditional Logic
Amin Shahverdi
Volume 7, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 59-82
Abstract
In this paper, Avicenna’s disjunctive propositions are treated from multiple aspects. In the first section of this paper, disjunction propositions are considered in Shifā, and it shown that there are differences between Avicenna’s and later interpretations, e.g Rāzī interpretation, in ...
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In this paper, Avicenna’s disjunctive propositions are treated from multiple aspects. In the first section of this paper, disjunction propositions are considered in Shifā, and it shown that there are differences between Avicenna’s and later interpretations, e.g Rāzī interpretation, in this point. In the next section, two general interpretations about Avicenna’s disjunctive propositions are studied and we reveal deficiencies of them. Based on “Confilict” concept as the main core of Avicenna’s view on disjunction propositions, this paper specifies Relevent-Modal interpretation more precise than others but it doesn’t precisely coincide with Avicenna’s view. Finally an alternative interpretation is suggested with respect to Stopper view on Stoic conditional and we show that this interpretation also has deficiency but it formulates Avicenna’s disjunctive propostions better than others.
Behnam Zolqadr; Fereshteh Nabati
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 63-84
Abstract
Hintikkain analysis of the semantics of epistemic logic, according to respond to the problem of logical omniscience, used Impossible Worlds. It was the first appearance of the term Impossible World. Graham Priest also appeals to Impossible Worlds in analysis of intentional contexts. After an exposition ...
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Hintikkain analysis of the semantics of epistemic logic, according to respond to the problem of logical omniscience, used Impossible Worlds. It was the first appearance of the term Impossible World. Graham Priest also appeals to Impossible Worlds in analysis of intentional contexts. After an exposition of different approaches to Impossible Worlds and their applications, we will analyze Priest’s responses to the problem of logical omniscience and three other problems concerning epistemic logic. The semantic which he invented for intentional contexts is widely based on Impossible Worlds. During our inquiry we will also meet different aspects of these non-normal worlds.
Comparative Studies in Logic
Mahdi Azimi
Volume 8, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 63-86
Abstract
The purpose of current article is to report and to analyze a part of the history of Exposition specially, and the history of logic in Islamic civilization generally. Aristotle uses the exposition in several places of his syllogistic, including in the proof of E-conversion. The problem of current article ...
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The purpose of current article is to report and to analyze a part of the history of Exposition specially, and the history of logic in Islamic civilization generally. Aristotle uses the exposition in several places of his syllogistic, including in the proof of E-conversion. The problem of current article is the recent application. Since Theophrastus there have been many challenges in the proof of E-conversion by exposition. Alexander of Aphrodisias tries to resolve the challenges and, in order of it, propose two different interpretations about the mentioned exposition the second of which, on the basis of our analysis, is a reductio ad absurdum in which existential introduction, commutation, and existential elimination have been used. The fact shows that Aristotle’s logic, in this part, depends both on propositional and predicate logic. Again this interpretation considers the exposition as a non-syllogistic proof because of its usage from singular term, and shows that Alexander who counts the Aristotle’s syllogistic as the logic of universal terms is right. In Islamic world, Ibn Sina, Kunaji, and Tusi follow the same interpretation and even offer a more clear understanding of the mentioned rules, so that Ibn Sina and Tusi expressly talk about a distinction which today is made between proper name and arbitrary name. But Suhrawardi and Fakhr al-Din Razi who are influenced by Alexander’s first interpretation expose no brilliant acuity, not in understanding the nature of Aristotle’s logic, and not in understanding the rules involved in the proof of E-conversion by exposition.
Mohsen Kashi; Seyed Mohammad Ali Hojati
Volume 9, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 63-81
Abstract
The main Frege’s question in “On sense and reference” is that how we can understand the difference between cognitive value of a=a and a=b? “a=a” is analytic and a priori while “a=b” is a posteriori and has different cognitive value. Frege’s ...
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The main Frege’s question in “On sense and reference” is that how we can understand the difference between cognitive value of a=a and a=b? “a=a” is analytic and a priori while “a=b” is a posteriori and has different cognitive value. Frege’s theory of sense and reference wants to answer to this question. Sense is mode of presentation of the reference. The difference between modes of presentation of reference can be a good reason for cognitive value of empirical identities. In analytic philosophy, this response is considered as some strength of Frege’s theory. We are going to argue that if we accept the suggested logical form by Frege and his theory of sense and reference, then empirical discovery is vanished. We ascribe other logical form to Frege’s intended sentences and this form displays the requirement for empirical discovery and it does not need to resort to his theory of sense and reference.
Assadollah Fallahi
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 65-81
Abstract
The first who discussed separately the conversion of the verity and actuality propositions was Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, but Afzal Al-Din Al-Khunaji criticized most of the logical rules introduced by Al-Razi on the conversions of those propositions and many criticisms of Al-Khunaji have been accepted ...
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The first who discussed separately the conversion of the verity and actuality propositions was Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, but Afzal Al-Din Al-Khunaji criticized most of the logical rules introduced by Al-Razi on the conversions of those propositions and many criticisms of Al-Khunaji have been accepted by the later logicians. I have discussed the conversion of the actuality propositions in another paper and showed that in two cases, Al-Razi was wrong and Al-Khunaji was right; but on the other cases, their controversies is rooted in different interpretations of the terms involved. In this paper, I'll show that similar fallacies and similar differences in interpretations have occurred; thus, Al-Razi insisted that in verity propositions, the affirmative modal propositions (but the two possible) were not self-converted and the negative perpetual ones had not conversions. In these cases, Modern Modal Logic supports Al-Khunaji's judgments. In the other cases, I'll show that Al-Razi have been taking the modal verity propositions with two modal operators and Al-Khunaji with one; and this is the secret behind the controversies on the conversion.
Gholam Reza Zakiani; Mohammad Amin Baradaran Nikou
Volume 4, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2013, , Pages 65-93
Abstract
What Aristotle codified in Organon is not only the science of logic, but also the logic of science or methodology. Until now, Aristotle’s interpreters have agreed that the Theory of Demonstration and Syllogistic method have central role in the Aristotelian methodology, and the other parts of his ...
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What Aristotle codified in Organon is not only the science of logic, but also the logic of science or methodology. Until now, Aristotle’s interpreters have agreed that the Theory of Demonstration and Syllogistic method have central role in the Aristotelian methodology, and the other parts of his logic, like Dialectic, are in shadow. But some contemporary thinkers such as Jaakko Hintikka show that in the Aristotle's methodology, the role of Dialectic is as crucial as the theory of syllogism. Hintikka, in the light of well-balanced look to the parts of Aristotle's logical system, shows the consistency and the harmony between the Organon’s method and Aristotle metaphysical problems, and also the prevailing methodology of his time. Furthermore, Hintikka demonstrates that this methodology is a result of Aristotle's theory of Cognitive Psychology.
Analytical Philosophy
Shahram Shahryari
Volume 7, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 67-96
Abstract
The "Strong Programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge is known by Edinburgh school and the relativistic approach of this school. According to their attitude all things accounted as "knowledge", have causes that make them acceptable in the society; no matter they are right or wrong. And the ...
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The "Strong Programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge is known by Edinburgh school and the relativistic approach of this school. According to their attitude all things accounted as "knowledge", have causes that make them acceptable in the society; no matter they are right or wrong. And the sociologists have to find these causes. This program, despite weaker programs that exclude scientific knowledge, is based on the idea that social factors have a role in the formation of empirical scientific knowledge, and even mathematics and logic -- types of essential knowledge. In this article we are trying to introduce and explain Edinburgh school's thought on logic and mathematics. So, first of all we will introduce the intellectual foundations of this school, and then we will try to explain briefly its main approaches with respect to sociological aspects in mathematics and knowledge. Then we will focus on the most important and outstanding case studies and their appraisal. Finally we will bring forward some points about their theoretical approaches and present some conclusions that seem to be drawn from this discussion.
Volume 8, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 69-96
Abstract
The family resemblance’s theory of Wittgenstein is the most influential contemporary theory of, or, to put it more precisely, against “definition”. The theory’s main opposition is towards essential definitions, whose leading theoretician is known to be Aristotle. In modern era, ...
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The family resemblance’s theory of Wittgenstein is the most influential contemporary theory of, or, to put it more precisely, against “definition”. The theory’s main opposition is towards essential definitions, whose leading theoretician is known to be Aristotle. In modern era, This theory have been considered a challenge to essentialism. In this essay, after expressing the theory of family resemblance and backgrounds of those in opposition to the Aristotelian definition, By extracting criticisms of the theory to essential definitions and answers them according to the text of Aristotle, I’m trying to show that expressing such criticisms to the Aristotelian definition due wittgenstein’s misunderstanding and ignorance than the Aristotle’s essential definitions. To achieve this thesis, will be used of phenomenology and analytical methods. Examining the philosophers’ own works was among the investigation’s priorities.
Assadollah Falahi
Volume 5, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 71-103
Abstract
Shams al-Din Samarqandi, a seventh Iranian logician, has proposed a new theory on conditional syllogism against Avicenna. Avicenna believed that conditional syllogism had only 19 valid moods; but Samarqandi, denying this similarity, validated only 7 moods. Samarqandi considered in his analysis only the ...
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Shams al-Din Samarqandi, a seventh Iranian logician, has proposed a new theory on conditional syllogism against Avicenna. Avicenna believed that conditional syllogism had only 19 valid moods; but Samarqandi, denying this similarity, validated only 7 moods. Samarqandi considered in his analysis only the quality conditions of the syllogism and did not pay attention to quantity conditions and in providing counterexamples for the invalid moods, he ignored their quantificational differences. If we consider just quality, as Samarqandi did, we’ll find a surprising similarity between his valid moods and the contemporary relevance logic, so that all Samarqandi’s valid moods are valid in relevance logic and vice versa. But if we look at the quantity of the propositions involved, we’ll encounter some difficulties, which are rooted in his interpretation of conditional quantifiers.
Rahman Sharifzadeh; Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 5, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 73-96
Abstract
In a paper entitled ‘the paradox of informing from absolute known; analyzing the concept of information’ we attempted, through a new approach, to find a new solution to the paradox of informing from absolute unknown. In his paper ‘A critique of ‘the paradox of informing from absolute ...
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In a paper entitled ‘the paradox of informing from absolute known; analyzing the concept of information’ we attempted, through a new approach, to find a new solution to the paradox of informing from absolute unknown. In his paper ‘A critique of ‘the paradox of informing from absolute unknown; analyzing the concept of information’’ Asadi has tried to challenge our arguments. However in his paper we have found some incorrect and superficial analysises, weak criticisms, and misunderstanding of some of our ideas.
Rahmatollah Rezaie
Volume 6, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 73-93
Abstract
In traditional logic, definitions are divided into essence oriented and accident oriented definitions, which the first one is considered inaccessible for some reasons and thus, the second is seen as the only feasible kind of definition. However explaining the nature and the conditions of the ...
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In traditional logic, definitions are divided into essence oriented and accident oriented definitions, which the first one is considered inaccessible for some reasons and thus, the second is seen as the only feasible kind of definition. However explaining the nature and the conditions of the accident oriented definition has created some problems. As a result, accident oriented definition ended up with the fate of essence oriented definition and lost its logical and epistemological value. It seems that one might in the Avicenna's logic tradition reconstructs accident oriented definition, which of course requires reconsidering ‘definition’ and its conditions.
Gholamreza Zakiani
Volume 2, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 77-95
Abstract
About 11 centuries after its emergence, Aristotle's Organon was translated into Arabic; and, based on such translations, scholars such as Farabi and Ibn Sina created logical works in the Islamic world. Because of these works, logic emerged and flourished among Muslims. Through analysis and evaluation ...
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About 11 centuries after its emergence, Aristotle's Organon was translated into Arabic; and, based on such translations, scholars such as Farabi and Ibn Sina created logical works in the Islamic world. Because of these works, logic emerged and flourished among Muslims. Through analysis and evaluation of the first translations of Organon, we may get familiar with, on the one hand, attention paid by Muslims to the Greek heritage in the first centuries of Islam and the extent of accuracy and correctness of such translations on the other. Abdolrahman Badawi has collected and edited the first Arabic translations of Aristotle's Organon together with Porphyry Isagoge in three volumes. When we compare the Arabic translation of Organon with the Greek text as well as English (Jenkinson), Persian (Adibsoltani) translations of the Prior Analytics (Book 2), we find almost 100 minor and major discrepancies. We have classified such discrepancies under shortages in translation, inconceivable Arabic, added phrases, changed examples, errors made in edition, and preference for the unoriginal text
Rahman Sharifzadeh; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hojati
Volume 3, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 77-95
Abstract
In this paper, after criticizing Sadra’s solution which is the distinction between Primitive and Common Predications, we will suggest a new solution based on analyzing the concept of ‘informing’ and show that ‘our inability of informing from absolute unknown’ is a feature ...
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In this paper, after criticizing Sadra’s solution which is the distinction between Primitive and Common Predications, we will suggest a new solution based on analyzing the concept of ‘informing’ and show that ‘our inability of informing from absolute unknown’ is a feature of our cognitive state, not absolute unknown itself.
