karim khanaki
Abstract
Classical first-order logic is the most common logic in mathematics applications as well as in the study of logical foundations. From a long time ago, the only link between logic and mathematical topology was limited to the concept of type spaces, and there were no other links between these two domains. ...
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Classical first-order logic is the most common logic in mathematics applications as well as in the study of logical foundations. From a long time ago, the only link between logic and mathematical topology was limited to the concept of type spaces, and there were no other links between these two domains. Recently, the basic links between these two branches (i.e. logic and topology) have been created, which have led to many applications in both areas of logic as well as in topology. In this article, we will study some of the most important links between these two branches of mathematics as well as their applications. One of the key concepts in mathematical logic and model theory is the concept of stability, which has a completely combinational statement. In this paper, we show that this concept is equivalent to a topological concept for a certain set of functions, and using this we prove a fundamental theorem of Shelah stability theory. We also describe the relationship between the concept of dependence and a topological property of a set of functions, and provide topological proofs of some of the important achievements of model theory. Some of the results of this paper are new.
Mohammad Yazdani; Alireza dastafshan
Volume 9, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 99-131
Abstract
Complex demonstratives are linguistic expressions of the form "that F", that result from combining demonstrative pronouns with simple or complex common noun phrases. There are two well-known theories about the semantic behavior of complex demonstratives: the first is the direct reference theory and the ...
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Complex demonstratives are linguistic expressions of the form "that F", that result from combining demonstrative pronouns with simple or complex common noun phrases. There are two well-known theories about the semantic behavior of complex demonstratives: the first is the direct reference theory and the second is the quantificational theory. According to direct reference theory, complex demonstratives are referring terms and their contents, in demonstrative use, are individuals, and 'f' contributes to fixing the referent of "that F" but contributes nothing to the semantic content of the containing sentence. By contrast, quantificational theory treats complex demonstratives as quantifier phrases, and holds that a two-place relation between properties is contributed to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing the complex demonstrative. This theory claims to account for all sorts of uses of complex demonstratives, such as, demonstrative, NDNS, QI, bound-variable and anaphoric, which have been used by the defenders of this theory to pose objections to the direct reference theory. Yet, direct reference theorists not only can reply to these objections, but also present problems involving given uses in modal contexts and other contexts against quantificational theory, that such contexts can raise serious difficulties for quantificational theory. Altogether, it seems the direct reference theory presents more intuitive explanation about the complex demonstratives
Traditional Logic
Asadollah Fallahi
Volume 7, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 101-127
Abstract
Though going back to Aristotle and porphyre Tyrien,the matter of the four relstions between two concepts, as a distinctive division, is one of the most important innovations in Arabic logic. This devision, for the first time, appeared in Farabi, Ghazali, Razi, and Khunaji in different forms. The devisions ...
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Though going back to Aristotle and porphyre Tyrien,the matter of the four relstions between two concepts, as a distinctive division, is one of the most important innovations in Arabic logic. This devision, for the first time, appeared in Farabi, Ghazali, Razi, and Khunaji in different forms. The devisions of the first three sufferred respectively from the fallacies of ‘non-coherency’, ‘non-exclusivity’ and ‘overlap of the sub-classes of the division’, so the later Arabic logicians didn’t accept them; thus Khunaji’s devision, laking all the fallecies, found its way to the pedagogical books and and established itself in Arabic logic up today. Although it has encountered important paradoxes from the very outset, it could resist all of them and reach its today firmed and established position in Arabic logic. In this paper, we explore the background of the four relations and determine each logician’s contribution in developing the subject.
Kamran Ghayoomzadeh
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2010, , Pages 103-118
Abstract
One of the most important applications of Gödel's completeness theorems is based on their roles the arguments of impossibility of formalization of human mathematical mind in capture of an algorithm or a finite formal system. Two main arguments have been proposed in this way of reasoning. In both ...
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One of the most important applications of Gödel's completeness theorems is based on their roles the arguments of impossibility of formalization of human mathematical mind in capture of an algorithm or a finite formal system. Two main arguments have been proposed in this way of reasoning. In both of these arguments, it has been claimed that: the fact according to which human being can understand the truth of the unprovable Gödelian sentence, shows the superiority of human being’s ability in mathematical reasoning to all machines’. But there are some important debates on both arguments. After explaining these two arguments, we will investigate the extensive contentions and challenges between mechanists and anti-mechanists. By explaining and analyzing Gödel's incompleteness theorems and their connection to human arithmetical knowledge, we will show that there is no plausible argument, based on Gödel's incompleteness theorems, which can show the superiority of human being’s ability in mathematical reasoning to the machines’.
Asadollah Fallahi
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 103-126
Abstract
Faqihs and Osulians have dealt with some kinds of universality which are 1. “distributive”, “separative” or “inclusive universality”, 2. “aggregative”, “collective” or “cumulative universality”, and 3. “alternative universality”. ...
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Faqihs and Osulians have dealt with some kinds of universality which are 1. “distributive”, “separative” or “inclusive universality”, 2. “aggregative”, “collective” or “cumulative universality”, and 3. “alternative universality”. They found many uses and examples for the kinds. In this paper, I want to formalize in Modern Logic some of the uses and the examples and to show complexities and intricacies thereof. For this, I employ the combination of quantifiers with negations, conditionals and quantifiers. Then I show that this method, despite its elegance and potentiality, when the rules of Modern Logic are applied to it, gives astonishing, sometimes inadmissible, results and collapse aggregative universality and alternative universality into distributive universality. So, this paper aims to show that the kinds of universality have intricacies and complexities which seeks more investigation on their unknown and dark angles.
Hamidreza Niyati
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 105-126
Abstract
Two things which equal the same thing also equal one another. This well-known sentence had widely been accepted from the period of ancient Greeks and perhaps earlier as an evident axiom. By the introduction of Logic into the Islamic field, Ibn Sina and most of other Muslim logicians after him tried ...
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Two things which equal the same thing also equal one another. This well-known sentence had widely been accepted from the period of ancient Greeks and perhaps earlier as an evident axiom. By the introduction of Logic into the Islamic field, Ibn Sina and most of other Muslim logicians after him tried to affirm this chapter following the lead of Aristotelian syllogism or some other methods. However, it seems that their efforts haven’t been as fulfilled and have received criticism. Arguments for the above syllogism and other similar ones are also continued among the contemporaries. Nevertheless, it gives the impression that lack of enough attention to the contents of the premises of such syllogisms has led to the disappointment of any efforts in demonstrating them. Through the usage of the chapter of four-fold relations, in the analysis of these premises, the equality syllogism would easily be proved provided that the terms used in these syllogistics are universal. Furthermore, through the amalgamation of the chapters of syllogism and the four-fold relations a variety of other syllogisms corresponding to other relations other than equality would emerge all of which would be proved if we employ the previous method and within the traditional logic.
Philosophy of Logic
Mahdi Mohammadi
Volume 8, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 109-125
Abstract
One of the most basic doctrines in the predicate logic is that existence can never be a predicate; rather, it is the particular quantifier. Here I''ll try to explore the views of the founders of Fregean logic on the structure of the proposition, and why it does not take existence as a predicate. Then ...
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One of the most basic doctrines in the predicate logic is that existence can never be a predicate; rather, it is the particular quantifier. Here I''ll try to explore the views of the founders of Fregean logic on the structure of the proposition, and why it does not take existence as a predicate. Then I''ll state their explanation and solution for existential propositions. Finally, I''ll investigate the shortcomings of their analysis. Many analytical philosophers, including Moore, Kneale, Wisdon, Ayer, etc, who have denied ''existence'' as a predicate, have done so as part of their refutation of the ontological argument for the God''s existence. However, here I''ll deal only with Frege, Russell, and Quine. The other philosophers'' stance can more or less be found in one of these three.
asdollah fallahi
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 113-142
Abstract
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We know for logic two systems: the Ancient Logic and the Modern Logic, which are inconsistent in some points of view. In this paper, I want to see if Ancient Logic, versus Modern Logic, is really one logic, has one set of rules, and introduces one methodology. There are many disagreements on the number ...
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We know for logic two systems: the Ancient Logic and the Modern Logic, which are inconsistent in some points of view. In this paper, I want to see if Ancient Logic, versus Modern Logic, is really one logic, has one set of rules, and introduces one methodology. There are many disagreements on the number and the exact formulation of the valid rules of Ancient Predicate Logic. For instance, the various formulations of the Obversion and Contraposition (the congruent and the opposite) can be mentioned as evidence for the claim. Since Aristotle has not spoken of contraposition, it can be concluded that adding the two forms of contraposition to his logical rules provide us with two new logical systems, in which the formulations of the quantified propositions differ from that in Aristotle’s system. Also, since there have appeared different theories on Congruent Contraposition and the Obvertion between Muslim logicians, the number of the systems has reached the six. In this paper, introducing an exact definition for each of these systems, I present suitable formulations for the quantified propositions at the mentioned six systems.
Mahdi Azimi
Volume 4, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2013, , Pages 113-142
Abstract
Aristotle and Peripatetics used topoi as the strategies of debate, but Avicenna changed their function to the fallacies of definition. This is one of his outstanding innovations to which the modern scholars didn’t pay attention. This innovation, on one hand, is related to Avicenna’s logical ...
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Aristotle and Peripatetics used topoi as the strategies of debate, but Avicenna changed their function to the fallacies of definition. This is one of his outstanding innovations to which the modern scholars didn’t pay attention. This innovation, on one hand, is related to Avicenna’s logical purposivism; and, on the other, to his bipartite logic. By the former, I mean his belief that the main purposes of logic are: 1. thinking validly and, 2. avoiding thinking invalidly, and any part of Aristotelian logic, not efficient for either of these, either should be eliminated (such as Rhetoric and Poetics) or its function should be changed (such as Dialectics). By the latter, I mean a new logical order by which Avicenna divided Aristotelian logic into two parts: (i) theory of definition and (ii) theory of inference. Now, if we put the mentioned innovation along with the Aristotelian thesis that ‘all sophistic refutations are syllogistic fallacies’, we obtain, in parallel with bipartite logical theory, a bipartite logical pathology, i.e. fallacies of definition and fallacies of inference.
Mahdi Mirzapour; Gholamreza Zakiani
Volume 2, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 117-136
Abstract
It may be historically shown that the theory of distribution is among innovations of logicians of the later Middle Age such as William of Sherwood, Roger Bacon, Peter of Spain, William Ockham, and John Buridan. According to an applied approach, in the contemporary era, this theory has been used in educational ...
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It may be historically shown that the theory of distribution is among innovations of logicians of the later Middle Age such as William of Sherwood, Roger Bacon, Peter of Spain, William Ockham, and John Buridan. According to an applied approach, in the contemporary era, this theory has been used in educational works in the field of general logic to establish validity of Aristotelian syllogism. Focusing on logical thoughts of the eminent thinker of the Middle Age, John Buridan (1295-1361), the present study proves that the theory of distribution is a consequence of the theory of reference; also, referring to Buridan's logical works, it shows that the two rules of "impossibility of the undistributed middle term" and "impossibility of the method of fallacy" which are some applications of the theory of distribution are among innovations of this logician of the Middle Age. And, in their logical textbooks, contemporary logicians have shown, at best, only different readings of the definition of distribution and its rules, and that is not the case that such rules have been invented by them. Meanwhile Peter Geach believes clearly that the theory of distribution is different from the theory of reference, however his view is logically and historically criticized; and it will be shown that it is not a defensible theory. In the conclusion, according to the philosophical-logical framework of Buridan, new definitions of "distributed" and "undistributed" terms will be provided which are based on his logical concepts and terms.
Morteza Mazginejad; Lotfollah Nabavi; Seyed Mohammad Hojati
Volume 6, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 117-141
Abstract
Gentzen divides rules of logical system into ‘operational rules’ and ‘structural rules’. By operational rules she means the rules of introduction and elimination of a logical constant. Structural rules represent the fundamental (structural) characteristics of an argument ...
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Gentzen divides rules of logical system into ‘operational rules’ and ‘structural rules’. By operational rules she means the rules of introduction and elimination of a logical constant. Structural rules represent the fundamental (structural) characteristics of an argument in such a way that any change in them causes changing in the whole system. In his works, Gentzen mentions that the meaning of logical constants can be achieved only through operational rules. This point is the infrastructure of inferentialism approach on meaningfulness of logical constants. Christopher Peacocke criticizes the basis of inferentialism approach. He believes that all structural and operational rules should be considered as the definition of logical constants. In response to this claim, Ian Hacking argued that accepting Peacock’s idea, will lead to a lack of conservation. Lack of conservation causes system incompatibility. In this paper, after careful examination of structural rules and expressing its difference with operational rules, Hacking argument will be evaluated and criticized and finally a solution to the problem will be presented.
Traditional Logic
Moosa Malayeri
Volume 7, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 117-158
Abstract
This article is an comparative study between Mulla Sadra and Tabatabai common approach regarding the efficiency of the causal argumentation, in the realm of philosophy. Mulla Sadra relying on the theory of simplicity of existence, and on which is simple have not essential definition and therefore no ...
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This article is an comparative study between Mulla Sadra and Tabatabai common approach regarding the efficiency of the causal argumentation, in the realm of philosophy. Mulla Sadra relying on the theory of simplicity of existence, and on which is simple have not essential definition and therefore no argument, found that the causal argumentation is not useful to existence recognition. Sadra based on the rule Zavatol Asbab, says that the Aposteriori Demonstration sometimes completely invalid, and sometimes with poor performance valid. He then weaken or even condemn the role of argument in the realm of philosophy. Then resign to antilogical approach.. Tabatabai based on three cognitive science major rule, first, deny the causal argumentation then existence recognition too. Then design a new argument, the argument by the public obligations, Molazemate Ammeh. This problem shows the inability of the essential logic in the realm of existential philosophy. This article denes the efficiency of the causal argumentation, but believes that, the theory of argument by the public obligations, Molazemate Ammeh, is the worthwhile discovery, which compensates for shortcomings of the essential logic.
Fereshteh Nabati
Volume 5, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 121-140
Abstract
Diodorus is a famous Megarian philosopher. He defines modal notions (necessity, impossibility, and possibility) in terms of temporal concepts. These definitions are consistent with his deterministic position. Among his modal definitions what is more discussed is possibility. He defines possible as that ...
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Diodorus is a famous Megarian philosopher. He defines modal notions (necessity, impossibility, and possibility) in terms of temporal concepts. These definitions are consistent with his deterministic position. Among his modal definitions what is more discussed is possibility. He defines possible as that which either is or will be. In other words there is no possible thing that never be actualized. This definition is not commonsensical, so he supported his position with an argument called the Master Argument. Nowadays some have tried to reconstruct Master Argument with modern logic. Here we want to peruse two of them, i.e. Prior, Rescher.
Philosophy of Logic
Volume 8, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 123-152
Abstract
Sentential connectives in classical propositional logic, according to their definition, are truth function. Contemporary philosophers of logic and language propose two main theories regarding truth functionality of counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language. Some (including Strawson ...
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Sentential connectives in classical propositional logic, according to their definition, are truth function. Contemporary philosophers of logic and language propose two main theories regarding truth functionality of counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language. Some (including Strawson 1952; Mitchel 2008; Young 1972; Read 1995) have argued that counterparts of the sentential connectives in natural language are not truth function; on the other hand, others (including Grice 1975; Clark 1971; Jackson 1979) propose arguments for their truth functionality. Grice's (1975) defense of truth functionality of conditionals ("if…then…") in natural language which is formulated on the basis of the ideas of assertability and implicature has had a central role in the literature of recent decades. The main goal of this paper is to consider and criticize Grice's defense of truth functionality of conditionals in natural language.
Lotfollah Nabavi; Zinat Ayatollahi; Mohammad Saeedi Mehr; Mohsen Javadi
Volume 5, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 125-145
Abstract
In traditional Aristotelian logic, the absence of a logical relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements seems to be evident, due to some characteristics of the logic. Prior relying on this fact that modern logic does not possess such characteristics, present a paradox against ...
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In traditional Aristotelian logic, the absence of a logical relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ statements seems to be evident, due to some characteristics of the logic. Prior relying on this fact that modern logic does not possess such characteristics, present a paradox against the advocates of the logical gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. In this paper, we, first, explain this paradox and a number of philosophical solutions have been proposed to solve it. Then, we illustrate and evaluate the Beall’s ‘many-valued logic’, which has been introduced as a solution to this paradox. We’ll see that this paradox could be solved in the context of the ‘relevant logic’ too. But besides of this paradox, Prior presents two other arguments, which although these two logics solve the paradox, we’ll show that each of them is unable to response to these two other arguments.
Ata Hashemi
Volume 4, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 129-144
Abstract
Quine, the famous American empiricist philosopher, in wake of his criticisms of quantified modal logic, believes that the logic is committed to a doctrine which he calls Aristotelian Essentialism, and tries to prove that the doctrine is meaningless. He defines Aristotelian Essentialism as a doctrine ...
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Quine, the famous American empiricist philosopher, in wake of his criticisms of quantified modal logic, believes that the logic is committed to a doctrine which he calls Aristotelian Essentialism, and tries to prove that the doctrine is meaningless. He defines Aristotelian Essentialism as a doctrine which distinguishes between things’ essential and accidental properties, and the distinction is independent from the language in which the things are referred to, and also the ways by which they are specified. In the present paper, based on Aristotle's works, I have tried to find out whether Quine has defined the Aristotelian essentialism correctly, and whether his criticisms of essentialism include what Aristotle means by essentialism or not? I have argued that Quine has not analyzed Aristotelian essentialism correctly. Keywords: Essentialism, Modality, Aristotle, Quine.
Abozar Ghaedifar; Seyed Mohammad Ghaderi
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 131-144
Abstract
Expressing the contradictory of atomic modal and universal compound modal, Khunaji utilizes two different methods to infer the contradictory of modal particular compound proposition. In one method, he accounts contradictory of modal particular proposition a disjunctive- predicated universal proposition ...
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Expressing the contradictory of atomic modal and universal compound modal, Khunaji utilizes two different methods to infer the contradictory of modal particular compound proposition. In one method, he accounts contradictory of modal particular proposition a disjunctive- predicated universal proposition and in the other method he accounts contradictory of this proposition a disjunctive proposition which the subject of one of the two sides is bounded by common predicate of disjunction particles. In this paper after a brief review of quality contradiction atomic modals and universal compound propositions in viewpoint of Khunaji, we will consider the quality contradiction particular compound modals in the viewpoint of this logician and we demonstrate that Khunaji is the inventor of the first method to infer the contradictory from this proposition and is the first logician discovered the disjunctive predicated proposition. We will also show that Khunaji in the second method of inference was owed Kashshi and he was the second logician that utilizes this method.
Amin Seidi; seyyedahmad faghih; Jamal Sorosh
Abstract
Farabi is the first Muslim logician to define conversion in his works. Ibn Sina, by borrowing from him and adding the adverb "survival of falsehood", has defined the conversion as follows: " Displacement of the subject and predicate along with the survival of the quality, truth and falsehood.". The logicians ...
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Farabi is the first Muslim logician to define conversion in his works. Ibn Sina, by borrowing from him and adding the adverb "survival of falsehood", has defined the conversion as follows: " Displacement of the subject and predicate along with the survival of the quality, truth and falsehood.". The logicians after Ibn Sina, led by Tusi, have found several inaccuracy in this definition and have tried to provide an accurate and consistent definition with the logical system. In this research, while measuring and evaluating these problems and answers, the historical course of definition of conversion by Muslim logicians has been studied. For this purpose, the evolution of the definition of conversion has been studied and by mentioning the problems of the definitions of logicians such as "Farabi", "Akhavan Al-Safa", "Fakhr Razi", "Ibn Sahlan Savi", etc., we have been led to the conclusion that "Khunji" and his contemporaries definition ("Tusi", "Ermoi", etc.) is a suitable and correct definition.
Seyedeh Zahra Musavi; Mahnaz Amirkhani
Volume 3, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 137-148
Abstract
This essay studies Nisab Arba` or the relationships between universal concepts from historical aspect. The great pre-Avicennian logicians as like as Aristotle and Farabi, and also Avicenna himself didn’t pay attention to the issue of the four relationships between universal concepts with respect ...
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This essay studies Nisab Arba` or the relationships between universal concepts from historical aspect. The great pre-Avicennian logicians as like as Aristotle and Farabi, and also Avicenna himself didn’t pay attention to the issue of the four relationships between universal concepts with respect to their extensionality and comparability. Ghazali was the first philosopher who raised the above issue with intellectual restriction, without contrast relation. Afzal al-din khunaji and siraj al-din Urmawi–following him– were the first post-Ghazali logicians that explained the four relationships in the current forms, and the relations between their contraries.
120. .
Mohsen Shabani Samghabadi; Lotfollah Nabavi; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
morteza mezginejad; fatemeh Baghery nejad
Volume 9, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 183-225
Abstract
Aristotle commences controversial debate with introducing three figures of syllogism. Then, the fourth figure was added to syllogism. In contrast to the other three figures which have a few discuses, the fourth figure has a lot of discussion and disagreements about conclusion conditions. Three controversial ...
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Aristotle commences controversial debate with introducing three figures of syllogism. Then, the fourth figure was added to syllogism. In contrast to the other three figures which have a few discuses, the fourth figure has a lot of discussion and disagreements about conclusion conditions. Three controversial difference can be seen in this figure: (1)The worth of it (2) The conclusion conditions (3) the valid types of fourth figure. Some logician Before Athir al-Din al-Abhari (from Ibn Salah Hamedani to Afzal al-Din Khaneji), which are called antecedents accepted five valid types of the fourth figure under specific conditions and some logicians after him accepted eight valid types. It is worth mentioning that Abhari in some circumstances added three valid types to the five accepted types of fourth figure. Some of logicians after him (Taftazani, Hajj Molla Hadi Sabzavari) accepted eight types without any attention to these circumstances. We investigate the background of the fourth figure and its conditions. After approving the primary idea, we concentrate on the rootes of this mistake and show that the misunderstanding about Abhari’s phrases was caused the expansion of his idea in modality syllogism to syllogism in general.
Mehdi Mirzapour
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2010, , Pages 119-150
Abstract
Aristotelian deduction rules, which are usually considered as “THE RULES OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM” in the elementary logic text books, are proper tools which help beginners in logic to examine the validity of a categorical syllogism. Authors of Persian logic text books, influenced by ...
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Aristotelian deduction rules, which are usually considered as “THE RULES OF THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM” in the elementary logic text books, are proper tools which help beginners in logic to examine the validity of a categorical syllogism. Authors of Persian logic text books, influenced by the authors of English logic text books, rewrite these rules with only some minor changes and revisions in their books and apply them for the same aim. These revisions depend on many different factors including the authors’ personal interests and those English logic text books which were his main reference. The main aim of this article in the first step is to provide an analytical method for formalizing the rules of deduction which can lead us to find a mechanical and algorithmic method and in the next step, is to follow this computable and formal approach to analyze and criticize the deduction rules in Persian logic text books. In addition to categorizing “The rules of the categorical syllogism”, we will propose a new version of such formalized rules by appealing to the concept of “distribution”.
Human Mohammad Ghorbanian
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 127-148
Abstract
Lewis Carroll in “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles?” questioning one the most important basis of logic and by narrating a fanciful dialog asks why we should move from premises to the conclusion. Is logic itself enough to justify the use of logic or we need something beyond logic to do that. ...
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Lewis Carroll in “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles?” questioning one the most important basis of logic and by narrating a fanciful dialog asks why we should move from premises to the conclusion. Is logic itself enough to justify the use of logic or we need something beyond logic to do that. In this article two main approaches have been considered. First, logical approach which Bertrand Russell is its most important member and second, social-internalism approach which Peter Winch advocates. These two main philosophers have referred several times to Carroll’s article. According to Russell, analyzing logic is suffice to explain why consequent will infer from premises, and on the other hand, Winch and his followers thinkevery inference has a root in historic understanding of life and if this understanding fails, logic will falls apart too. I will make some objections to both of these. At the end, I propose that the solution is to return to formal logic. If formal logic understood well, there won’t be any need to seek for another logic to teach us how to use logic. Valid formal inferences are what logic consists of and if someone violates these inferences, he is out of the boundaries of logic.
omid karimzadeh
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 143-158
Abstract
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In this article, I will at first explain the meaning-based theory of Davidson and the manner of its application in the identification of the criterion for the logical truth. To achieve this end I will refer to the Principles of lexical axioms and the principles of Phrasal axioms along with their applications ...
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In this article, I will at first explain the meaning-based theory of Davidson and the manner of its application in the identification of the criterion for the logical truth. To achieve this end I will refer to the Principles of lexical axioms and the principles of Phrasal axioms along with their applications in Davidson’s theory. In order to criticize Davidson's theory, Evans selects the extentional attributive adjectives and shows that through employing a certain Kind of interpretation, one can make a meaning based theory in which the extentional attributive adjectives can appear in the phrasal axioms; therefore these principles cannot identify the extention of logical constants. To answer Evans criticism; I will use the concept of the violence of the basic linguistic intuition which Davidson uses that in replying to Foster. To this end, I will show that in spite of their superficial differences the criticisms proposed by Foster and Evans have basic origins. In the conclusion part of this article, I refer to the impossibility of reducing the semantic features of language to its syntactic qualities.
Mohammad Shafiei; aram batobeh
Abstract
The possibility, or lack thereof, of drawing a sharp distinction between the observable and unobservable entities, as a main debate between the scientific realism and antirealism, is still one of the most controversial problems in philosophy of science. One of the arguments offered in favour of realism ...
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The possibility, or lack thereof, of drawing a sharp distinction between the observable and unobservable entities, as a main debate between the scientific realism and antirealism, is still one of the most controversial problems in philosophy of science. One of the arguments offered in favour of realism states that there is in principle no such a determinate distinction. On the other hand, the consistency of scientific antirealism relies on the distinction between the observable and the unobservable. If such a distinction is shown to be untenable in an objective manner, then as a consequence the antirealistic viewpoint would be inconsistent. Antirealists, in order to save the consistence of their viewpoint, point out to the (alleged) vagueness of the notion of “observable” and thus try to retain the distinction despite the apparent problems around it, as is the case in some well-known solutions for the paradox of vagueness. In this paper we will give a new interpretation of Linear Logic as it may shed a new light on the problem of vagueness and accordingly contribute to the studies pertained to the problem of the distinction between the observable and unobservable entities. We will show that if the offered approach to the problem of vagueness would be correct then to appeal to the vagueness of the notion of observabilty would not be helpful for the antirealistic viewpoint.
