mehdi asgari
Abstract
One of the important issues in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of mental existence and its forms. Among the forms that have become mental, two forms have challenged the foundations of this issue. Forms of community of substance and width and community of transverse categories under each other. The ...
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One of the important issues in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of mental existence and its forms. Among the forms that have become mental, two forms have challenged the foundations of this issue. Forms of community of substance and width and community of transverse categories under each other. The main issue of this article is to show the application of the distinction between the first pregnancy and the common pregnancy in proving and solving the problems of mental existence in Mirdamad. The method of discussion will be library and historical method. The brief answer to this main question is that Mirdamad was able to give the same answer to the problem of mental existence by separating the two, which was later registered in the name of his student Mulla- Sadra. Meanwhile, Mirdamad has had a great impact on the development of the theory of predication and the distinction between the tautological and common technical predication.
Kasra Farsian
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue for this claim that Hegel's logic implies Trivialism. In recent decades among scholars, there is a special interest in rereading classic philosophers through the modern logic, also about Hegel this story is true. Graham Priest, a contemporary philosopher and logician, had ...
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In this paper, I will argue for this claim that Hegel's logic implies Trivialism. In recent decades among scholars, there is a special interest in rereading classic philosophers through the modern logic, also about Hegel this story is true. Graham Priest, a contemporary philosopher and logician, had claimed that we can find Hegel's logic in a paraconsistent way. More specifically, Priest said Hegel's logic is committed to Dialetheism. His claim has some opponents(such as Michela Bordignon) who say Hegel's being dialetheist has some requirements such as commitment to the third truth-value (Glutty value) and this is a dubious presupposition. Bordignon had claimed that in Hegel's logic, there is only one truth-value: true. In three-part of this paper, I will report and criticize accounts of Priest and his opponents, then I will establish an argument for Hegel's being Trivialist, respectively. And finally, I will try to explain what Trivialism is and I will give a reason for defense of it.
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Suhrawardi claims that there can be no one-premissed syllogism, and he makes a reason for this. The issue of the current article is the genealogy of that claim and the logical evaluation of this reason. Our hypothesis is that, historically, the conflict over the possibility or impossibility of the one-premissed ...
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Suhrawardi claims that there can be no one-premissed syllogism, and he makes a reason for this. The issue of the current article is the genealogy of that claim and the logical evaluation of this reason. Our hypothesis is that, historically, the conflict over the possibility or impossibility of the one-premissed reasoning goes back to the Stoics: Chrysippus was the leader of the opposition; and the Antipater of Trasus was the leader of conservativism. This conflict by Alexander Aphrodisias came into the Prepatetic logic, and merged with Aristotle's Syllogistic, and, consequently, the stoical problem of "one-premissed reasoning" was confused with the Aristotelian question of "one-premissed syllogism." Ibn Sina is the source of the transmision of this issue from Alexander to Suhrawardi. Suhrawardi's argument, if he views the refusal of the one-premissed reasoning, is, of course, incorrect; but if he is to refuse the one-premissed syllogism, he can have a good deal of truth.
alireza faraji
Abstract
»Self« or »Ego« is amongst basis of philosophical an psychological thought. Philosopher and thinker of Humanities sciences Frequently, treated a bout its quality and entity so much. Edmund husserl, The Famous phenomenologian in contemporary world believe that, the »Ego« ...
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»Self« or »Ego« is amongst basis of philosophical an psychological thought. Philosopher and thinker of Humanities sciences Frequently, treated a bout its quality and entity so much. Edmund husserl, The Famous phenomenologian in contemporary world believe that, the »Ego« is center of cog native acts. One of the basic act that imputation to Ego, is vocal an expressional acts, and condition of get on this things. namly, that is »Self« or »Ego« can conceived like basis and core of cognation and conceived like busis and core of cognation and comucational instrument of environmental world. In other words, language and subjective analysis can assist it to knowing the thing of world and completed process of knowledge or not. Project of Husserlian Transcendental phenomenology, try to achive it's proper place by »Epoche «of physical and positivistic thought. For this, he analysed the relation of »Ego« and mind in transcendental Framework based on intentional character of consciousness. For this one of my relational implement is expression and speech. That He looked transcendental. In this reaserch we attempt that by analysis concept of transcendental Ego. For Husserl, investigate logical and expressional relation between subjectivity of Ego and world.
Hamid Alaeinejad; Morteza Haji Hosseini
Abstract
According to Beall and Restall pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic and intuitionistic logic are all correct. In this type of pluralism, logic is considered to be normative; in the sense that one who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bounded to accept the result of that ...
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According to Beall and Restall pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic and intuitionistic logic are all correct. In this type of pluralism, logic is considered to be normative; in the sense that one who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bounded to accept the result of that argument. Some philosophers try to show that accepting Beall and Restall pluralism is incompatible by the acceptance of the normativity of logic. However, Blake-Turner and Russell have proposed telic pluralism that is not based on the normativity of logic; claiming that their arguments is not threatened by the collapse argument. In this article, by examining telic pluralism, we have determined that Blake-Turner and Russell’s pluralism lacks strong arguments in defense of non-normativity of logic. On the other hand, we try to present a version of the Priest’s collapse argument that still can be used against telic pluralism.
homan mohammad ghorbanian; Sara Ghane
Abstract
Dummett`s philosophy is influenced by two great philosophers : he follows Frege in his methodology and attempts to build metaphysics upon logic and theory of meaning, and he also follows Wittgenstein in his theory of meaning and accepts his use theory of meaning that says in most cases, the meaning of ...
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Dummett`s philosophy is influenced by two great philosophers : he follows Frege in his methodology and attempts to build metaphysics upon logic and theory of meaning, and he also follows Wittgenstein in his theory of meaning and accepts his use theory of meaning that says in most cases, the meaning of a word is its use. Nevertheless, Dummett tries to avoid the radical skepticism found in late Wittgenstein, since he believes if that is true then communication is in constant danger of simply breaking down. His solution against this radical skepticism is introducing the idea of implicit knowledge for our understanding of how language works. In this article, I tried to show how this idea causes Dummet`s theory to be different from Wittgenstein's concept of language. We cannot maintain at the same time both implicit knowledge of the language and think of the theory of meaning as a base for metaphysics.
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical ...
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One of the most perplexing issues in Arabic Logic is the particular quantifier for conditionals. Before discussing particular quantifier at cogent conditionals, Ibn-Sina deals with particular quantifier at categorical propositions and its divisions. But, as we shall see, his explanation at categorical propositions is inconsistent with his discussion at conditionals; and his analogy between the two realms is more confusing than explaining! Despite this, in this paper, I’ll show that by using some branches in Modern Logic, such as second-order logic, modal logic and temporal logic, many of the ambiguities and the objections can be replied. Also, I’ll glance at the reflection of the discussion in some of Ibn-Sina’s great followers: Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi, Afdal Al-Din Al-Khunaji, Athir Al-Din Al-Abhari, Khaje Nasir Al-Tusi, Shams Al-Din Al-Samaqandi and Qutb Al-Din Al-Razi. I shall show haw far they are from Ibn-Sina. Besides, it will be clear that their distinctions between contingent conditional and particular cogent conditional are very weak and, indeed, cannot help any way to understand the distinction.
Morteza Moniri
Abstract
We first look at some controversial issues in mathematical logic. These issues are often confused by non-specialists. The main topics that we will address in this regard are: Tarski's definition of truth, Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth, Gödel's completeness theorem and Gödel's ...
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We first look at some controversial issues in mathematical logic. These issues are often confused by non-specialists. The main topics that we will address in this regard are: Tarski's definition of truth, Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth, Gödel's completeness theorem and Gödel's incompleteness theorems, and first and second-order logic. Next, we will introduce some non-classical logics and their place in philosophical logic as well as logic in computer science. In addition, we discuss some philosophical issues related to logic. Among the issues we discuss are the definition of logic, the difference between logic and logical system, and the challenge of monism versus pluralism in the choice of logic. By separating logic from logical systems, we will defend the view that mathematical logic, as part of mathematics, should only be committed to the standards of mathematics. In this regard, any non-classical logic system that meets these standards will have legitimacy.
fateme sadat nabavi
Abstract
In recent decades, formalization in mathematical structures has been developed in different areas with logical nature. These mathematical structures besides providing more precise and sufficient languages than natural ones, would be a base for constructing assistant software in these areas. One ...
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In recent decades, formalization in mathematical structures has been developed in different areas with logical nature. These mathematical structures besides providing more precise and sufficient languages than natural ones, would be a base for constructing assistant software in these areas. One of these logic-nature areas is "osool'e fegh" which is the logic governing jurisprudential inferences in Islamic approaches. Hence, a mathematical logic for "osool'e fegh" would provide a useful device for both 'analyzing and comparison of jurisprudential inferences' and, 'designing assistant software'. In this paper we introduce our mathematical logic approach to "osool' e fegh". We search a determining logic for "ossl'e fegh" in the formal logic context, as it is in fact the "logic of Fegh". After a survey on different meanings of "vajeb" and its properties, which is the basic deontic concept in "osool' e fegh" literature, we construct a formal language for "logic of Fegh" according to dynamic logic and formalize some jurisprudential rules in this language.
hasan mehrnia; Majid Zamani
Abstract
From his viewpoint, logic cannot in advance shape a fixed form for determination of thought; because every determination had its own special form. The transformation ofsoul (Geist) can't be apprehend within traditional logic, so it clings to earlier forms of Geist and as a result, neither it can comprehend ...
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From his viewpoint, logic cannot in advance shape a fixed form for determination of thought; because every determination had its own special form. The transformation ofsoul (Geist) can't be apprehend within traditional logic, so it clings to earlier forms of Geist and as a result, neither it can comprehend new manifestations and determinations of Geist, nor can it form a native metaphysic for each Folkaccording toGeist’s determination for them. Such logic will turn finally to skepticism. In the following paper, it will be explained how Hegel's epistemological- ontological logicis trying to transformthe nature of thought. In his opinion, the role of logic is not merely speculation, but also identifies and unification of thought with Being. Therefore, his logic alongside possessing content, determinate the content of thought. Hegelian logic is a complete philosophical system, capable of conceptualizing every Geist's unique determination.By his ontological-epistemological logic, Hegel finds metaphysic as a possible science, without entanglementin Kantian dogmatism.
Ismael noshad; Morteza haji Hosseini
Abstract
The debate of Abu Sa'id Syrafi Nahwi and Abu Bashar Mata is one of the key nodes of Islamic civilization.This debate was the focus of the two main streams that arose from the Abbasid ideological reform. One-way Translation Movement and its implications and other way ideological and theological and jurisprudential ...
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The debate of Abu Sa'id Syrafi Nahwi and Abu Bashar Mata is one of the key nodes of Islamic civilization.This debate was the focus of the two main streams that arose from the Abbasid ideological reform. One-way Translation Movement and its implications and other way ideological and theological and jurisprudential systems, generated in Age of Editing. Apart from serious issues regarding the position of logic and the relation between logic and language and syntax, this debate drives the tension caused by the collision of the two above-mentioned flows.In this paper,with the historical and genealogical descriptions of the Translation Movement and the Age of Editing, we go to discursive analysis of the debate, and explain this ideological tension. It seems that the results of this debate have also had a wide range of implications for Islamic thought, and have had sustained changes in both the ideological and philosophical trends. After debate, the ideological stream left out the former enemy with logic and attracted logic for use.The philosophical flow was also diverted from logics and went to the foundations that Farabi and Avicenna called peripatetic school.
137. .
Abstract
تقی الدین ابوالعباس احمد ابن شهاب الدین عبد الحلیم ابن تیمیه (661-728ه ق) در میان طیف وسیع مخالفان و منتقدان و ستیزهجویان منطق (ارسطوئی/سینوی) و بطور عام عقلیمشربی فیلسوفان ...
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تقی الدین ابوالعباس احمد ابن شهاب الدین عبد الحلیم ابن تیمیه (661-728ه ق) در میان طیف وسیع مخالفان و منتقدان و ستیزهجویان منطق (ارسطوئی/سینوی) و بطور عام عقلیمشربی فیلسوفان مسلمان قرار دارد . کسانی که تمامی آنان دغدغۀ بازگشت به سنت و سلف دارند ( از جمله ابوبکر باقلانی، امام الحرمین جوینی، محمد امین استرآبادی، ابن الصلاح، جلالالدین سیوطی، شیخ عبداله جیلانی، ابوالنجا الفارض، و ..) اما وجه تمایز او نظامپردازی و استدلالآوری و صورتبندی اشکالات ناظر به منطق ارسطویی است که از قضا با بسیاری از نقدهای معرفتشناسان دوران جدید و منطقدانان جدید مشابه و مشترک است. وی در چندین کتاب به تفصیل انتقادات خود را مطرح میکند، اما در کتاب الردّ علی المنطقیین بر مبنای تصویر دو بخشی منطق ( تصور و تصدیق) و طرح نقد خود علیه دو مدعا در مورد هر بخش منطق، نظامی برای ردیات خود پرداخته است و کتاب خود را در چهار فصل تبویب میکند: الف) تصور مطلوب جز بوسیلۀ تعریف (حد) به دست نمیآید. ب) تعریف، علم به تصورات را به دست میدهد. ج) تصدیق مطلوب جز از طریق قیاس حاصل نمیشود. د) قیاس یا استدلال منطقی علم به تصدیق را حاصل میکند.
Karim Khanaki
Abstract
From the beginning of the emergence of new logic, fundamental links have been established between logic and various branches of mathematics, which led to solving mathematical problems and, conversely, solving basic problems in logic itself. One of the challenges of the logical methods in the study of ...
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From the beginning of the emergence of new logic, fundamental links have been established between logic and various branches of mathematics, which led to solving mathematical problems and, conversely, solving basic problems in logic itself. One of the challenges of the logical methods in the study of mathematical structures is the impossibility of studying some of the important structures of mathematics, including analytic structures, in the framework of the first-order language and logic. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a suitable logic for studying these structures and then solving problems in the analysis using logical tools. At the beginning of this article, we will briefly review some suitable logics for studying the structures in mathematical analysis, and will outline some of the most important uses of logic in analysis. Then we present and prove one of the recent achievements, which is an important application of logic in analysis. In particular, we study the concept of definability in logic and its relation with mathematical analysis.
AliAsghar Khandan
Abstract
Definition and category of fallacies differs in works of philosophers and logicians. In this article after a short report of this issue, a new definition and category has been presented for fallacies and on this base, the role of ordinary argument or enthymematic has been highlighted. Enthymematic is ...
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Definition and category of fallacies differs in works of philosophers and logicians. In this article after a short report of this issue, a new definition and category has been presented for fallacies and on this base, the role of ordinary argument or enthymematic has been highlighted. Enthymematic is an argument with one sentence as introduction from which the conclusion is achieved. As logicians say, major premise is omitted in enthymematic and in many cases it is for hiding the false of major premise. Because the mentioned point has example in many fallacies, the golden key for identifying fallacies is so designed: Reconstruction of the first argument, adding the major premise in form on a conditional proposition, generalizing the conditional proposition, and doubting about its truth. In continuation twenty examples have been chosen from books of teaching fallacies to show successfulness of golden key. Finally there is a list of more than fifty Identifiable fallacies whit this method, mentioning this important point that identifying fallacies with golden key has many advantages in comparison with the common method of introducing different fallacies one by one.
Nasrin Seraji poor; Elaheh sadat Agha seyyed yusef
Abstract
Avicenna's innovation on Conditional Categorical Syllogism is known as a turning point in Islamic logic. Conjunctive conditional syllogism is accepted as valid; but there are some problems and different opinions about Disjunctive syllogism. In his works, He mentions various conditions to determine the ...
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Avicenna's innovation on Conditional Categorical Syllogism is known as a turning point in Islamic logic. Conjunctive conditional syllogism is accepted as valid; but there are some problems and different opinions about Disjunctive syllogism. In his works, He mentions various conditions to determine the truth-value of Alternative syllogism and considers the Exclusive disjunctive syllogism as invalid. Following Avicenna's thoughts, Nasir al-din Tusi declares the Exclusive disjunctive syllogism invalid and holds that syllogism consists of two disjunctive propositions that are not valid either. Agreeing with some of the general conditions of the syllogism, other contemporary logicians namely Afzal al-din Khunaji and Siraj al-din Ormavai declares the two types as valid. It seems that the only way to solve the disagreement between the logicians on this issue is to change premises into the conjunctive syllogism and then follow the rules of conjunctive and finally reach the conclusion through changing Conjunctive into Disjunctive Syllogism.
koorosh salimi
Abstract
Abstract: In this article, which is written in the field of Aristotle logic in general and absolute Syllogism in particular, the aim is to present a new method for representing predicative propositions by considering the negative terms on the developed Vann diagram. This method is capable of displaying ...
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Abstract: In this article, which is written in the field of Aristotle logic in general and absolute Syllogism in particular, the aim is to present a new method for representing predicative propositions by considering the negative terms on the developed Vann diagram. This method is capable of displaying and inferring all possible results from two premises in all forms with any combination of negative and positive terms. It is also able to infer all the equations of each predicative proposition. This method is easy and decidable and having high expressive power. Conventional diagrammatic methods are either incapable of representing syllogism with negative terms or, if able to work with negative terms, do not have the desired visual representation that is the main purpose of diagrammatic representations. This method uses three-value valuation of lines and surfaces on a vann diagram, and the representation of each proposition is done by drawing a two-part arc.
Saeedeh Shahmir
Abstract
In this paper,, I will first introduce the ontological view of Wittgenstein as it appears in the Tractatus. He starts his ontological discussion with the discussion of facts, which he then clarified by appealing to the notions of state of affairs and simple objects. I will then discuss his semantic view, ...
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In this paper,, I will first introduce the ontological view of Wittgenstein as it appears in the Tractatus. He starts his ontological discussion with the discussion of facts, which he then clarified by appealing to the notions of state of affairs and simple objects. I will then discuss his semantic view, which is based on his Picture Theory of Language, which brings in the notion of propositions. In such an analysis, he appeals to the notion of basic or elementary propositions and names. In his view, there is an isomorphic relationship (actually correspondence) between the logical structure of language (and its mental counterpart, thought) and the world. It is only in such a relation which a proposition can gain any meaning, or Sense. In this paper, I will investigate the relationship between the early Wittgenstein's ontological and semantic views and the way these views are related to other basic logical ideas in the Tractatus.
Fatemeh Shirmohammadzadeh Maleki
Abstract
Intuitionistic logic is a non classical logic obtained by omitting the axiom of excluded middle from classical logic. This logic was created by philosophical motivation towards the foundation of mathematics. There are several semantics for intuitionistic logic (such as Kripke semantics, neighborhood ...
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Intuitionistic logic is a non classical logic obtained by omitting the axiom of excluded middle from classical logic. This logic was created by philosophical motivation towards the foundation of mathematics. There are several semantics for intuitionistic logic (such as Kripke semantics, neighborhood semantics and topological semantics) that are sound and complete. In this paper, we first present two new neighborhood semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic (IPC). Then we establish soundness and completeness of IPC with respect to these new neighborhood semantics. The relation between neighborhood and topological semantics are also investigated. One of these new neighborhood semantics is introduced with a somewhat more complex definition than the usual neighborhood semantics which was introduced before. This semantics is called NB-neighborhood semantics. In order to establish completeness with respect to NB-neighborhood semantics for IPC, first we need to introduce a system WF of subintuitionistic logic, weaker than Corsi's basic subintuitionistic system F.
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Non-contradiction Paradox that challenges the most impotant principle of knowledge, assuming that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” concoludes that that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is not impossible”. Mulla Sadra tries to solve ...
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Non-contradiction Paradox that challenges the most impotant principle of knowledge, assuming that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” concoludes that that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is not impossible”. Mulla Sadra tries to solve the paradox by distinction between two type of predication called ‘awwali’ and ‘shayi’. He presupposes a subject-predicate structure in these proposisions. Denying such a presupposition, this article suggest another solution. Non-contradiction Paradox that challenges the most impotant principle of knowledge, assuming that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” concoludes that that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is not impossible”. Mulla Sadra tries to solve the paradox by distinction between two type of predication called ‘awwali’ and ‘shayi’. He presupposes a subject-predicate structure in these proposisions. Denying such a presupposition, this article suggest another solution. Non-contradiction Paradox that challenges the most impotant principle of knowledge, assuming that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” concoludes that that “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is not impossible”. Mulla Sadra tries to solve the paradox by distinction between two type of predication called ‘awwali’ and ‘shayi’. He presupposes a subject-predicate structure in these proposisions. Denying such a presupposition, this article suggest another solution.
Kamran Ghayoomzadeh; Alireza Dastafshan
Abstract
The problem of existential commitment is how and to what extent we are committed to accept the existence of certain objects in the world and especially the objects we talk about because of our use of language. “Geach’s Puzzle” which is an interesting and famous problem in existential ...
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The problem of existential commitment is how and to what extent we are committed to accept the existence of certain objects in the world and especially the objects we talk about because of our use of language. “Geach’s Puzzle” which is an interesting and famous problem in existential commitment induced by an anaphoric text is a general problem about the existential commitments of the third speaker (narrator) in a discourse with more than two speakers. The solution defended in this dissertation is that if the first two speakers speak of an object which didn’t initially exist, they have actually created it as an abstract mythical object. Now, the third speaker can commit himself to accept the existence of that object while reporting what those two speakers had said without any need to agree with the properties they had ascribed to that object. The object indeed exists, because it was created in a myth.
Aliasghar Morovat
Abstract
In this article, we research this issue: The problems of the proviso of modal opposition between the contradictory propositions. Most of the logicians in Islamic world have accepted the modal opposition as a proviso of contradiction between two modal propositions. In their opinion, if two contradictory ...
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In this article, we research this issue: The problems of the proviso of modal opposition between the contradictory propositions. Most of the logicians in Islamic world have accepted the modal opposition as a proviso of contradiction between two modal propositions. In their opinion, if two contradictory propositions had a common modality, we should deny either the Law of Non-Contradiction or the Principle of Excluded Middle. So, there is no choice but opposition in “Modality”. In this paper, I want to show that the sameness of modalities has no problem; and contrary to what the logicians thought, it is the modal opposition that leads to deny the Principle of Excluded Middle. From the point of view of this paper, the root of the mistake is confusion between ‘necessity of negation’ and ‘negation of necessity’ (as well as between ‘perpetuity of negation’ and ‘negation of perpetuity’). So, the modal sameness is needed for contradiction, not the modal opposition.
GHOLAMALI MOGHADDAM
Abstract
Easiness in teaching is one of the educational principles in science. Observance of this principle in discovering, defining, explaining, reasoning, and explaining the results, helps us to accelerate learning. Logic, which claims to measure and correct thought, Must be more observant of this principle ...
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Easiness in teaching is one of the educational principles in science. Observance of this principle in discovering, defining, explaining, reasoning, and explaining the results, helps us to accelerate learning. Logic, which claims to measure and correct thought, Must be more observant of this principle than other sciences. But it seems that, the naming of modal proposition in traditional logic is less committed to this principle. This method of naming in the early stages of education, reduces the desire of the logic student to continue the discussion in modal Logic, and will lead to the isolation of modal Logic in traditional logic schools. So, the research question is: what is the critique of the traditional modal Logic method in naming modal proposition? And how can we change this method to make it easier to teach logic? In this article - analytically - we have criticized the naming method of modal proposition in traditional modal Logic. And we have shown that how can we use proper names in naming modal proposition. This way, reduced the difficulty of naming modal proposition in traditional modal Logic.
Mohammad Ebrahim Maghsoudi
Abstract
I will argue that the more advanced semantic paradoxes do not cause any trouble with Tarski's solution to the liar paradox, i.e. drawing a hierarchical picture of language, but that they even go further to provide guidance for discovering the true structure of metalanguage. Paradoxes arise when we presuppose ...
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I will argue that the more advanced semantic paradoxes do not cause any trouble with Tarski's solution to the liar paradox, i.e. drawing a hierarchical picture of language, but that they even go further to provide guidance for discovering the true structure of metalanguage. Paradoxes arise when we presuppose a global layered structure for language. Metalanguage should not be considered as the upper layer of language, but rather as a defined topology on object language, which allows for a variety of hierarchical structures. In this more exact picture of metalanguage, Tarski's conception of truth must be construed as a local one, i.e. truth as a local predicate. This approach may shed some light on the less explored aspects of semantic paradoxes, especially Yablo's paradox. I will discuss that by considering a circular topology, a non-self-referential and non-paradoxical model can be obtained to locally attribute truth and falsehood to Yablo's expressions.
Abdolali Shokr
Abstract
The induction is a kind of argument in logic, which, despite the degradation of its validity in comparison with the demonstrative proof, has considerable significance. One of the best method for motivating, learning, strengthening beliefs and also guidance to the general public, is the inductive method. ...
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The induction is a kind of argument in logic, which, despite the degradation of its validity in comparison with the demonstrative proof, has considerable significance. One of the best method for motivating, learning, strengthening beliefs and also guidance to the general public, is the inductive method. Although the Qur'an has used arguments in specific cases for guidance purposes in various ways, the inductive method has a lot of abundance. Other methods of reasoning, such as the rational argument, are less in the Qur'an compared to the induction. The reason for this claim is the God's recommendation to look at the fate of the past generations. In fact, one of the arguments of the Holy Quran in some verses is that if you act like the previous generations, you will have the same fate. It seems that one of the God's purpose is to warn his audiences and guide them. Due to the high volume and number of subjects in the Quran about inductive method, this essay deals only with the research of the terms "Siru" (look for) and "unzoru" (look) and their derivatives. The result of this research suggests that induction is more applied than other kinds of arguments and its effect is undeniable.
Reza Mosmer
Abstract
In the Tractatus (remarks §3.02-3.031) Wittgenstein argues that an illogical world is inconceivable and it is impossible to talk about it. Ryle (1946), in contrast, thinks that one’s puzzlement with inconceivability of an illogical world and impossibility of talking about it, is resolvable. ...
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In the Tractatus (remarks §3.02-3.031) Wittgenstein argues that an illogical world is inconceivable and it is impossible to talk about it. Ryle (1946), in contrast, thinks that one’s puzzlement with inconceivability of an illogical world and impossibility of talking about it, is resolvable. He believes that the puzzle is not real and the debate about meaningfulness of sentences about illogical world is provoked by categorical mistake. Ryle argues that the term “(il)logical” can only be applied to subjects who are capable of observing and breaching logical rules. The world and its facts, accordingly, cannot follow or breach the rules of logic. This means that the whole worry about predication of the concept “(il)logical” on the world, is groundless and absurd. The term “(il)logical” cannot be applied to the world and predication of it on the world is, indeed, an instance of committing category mistake. In this paper, after explaining Wittgenstein and Ryle’s positions in this debate, I shall try to show that Ryle’s argument against Wittgenstein is not sound. To this end, I appeal to Gilbert Harman’s distinction between logic and rationality, and implication and inference, respectively. I argue that Ryle has failed to observe this vital distinction.
