Rahman sharifzadeh; seyyed mohammad ali hojati
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 83-91
Abstract
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The principle of impossibility of contradiction categorically claims that every contradiction is impossible. In this study it is attempted to analyze concepts such as “Contradiction” and “No-contradiction” and the relations between these two concepts with man’s cognition ...
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The principle of impossibility of contradiction categorically claims that every contradiction is impossible. In this study it is attempted to analyze concepts such as “Contradiction” and “No-contradiction” and the relations between these two concepts with man’s cognition and understanding. This study attempts to state that the above claims could at most mean that the present humans beings cannot justify “contradiction”. If this interpretation is valid, it might mean that the principle of the impossibility of “contradiction” cannot have valid proofs for itself. It is possible, therefore, to speak about the possibility of contradiction at least in paradoxical situations.
Hamed Ghadiri; Davood Hosseini
Volume 4, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 89-108
Abstract
Anselm’s ontological argument is the most famous one which has been controversial since its appearance. One crucial part of the argument is “if [that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived] exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater.” ...
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Anselm’s ontological argument is the most famous one which has been controversial since its appearance. One crucial part of the argument is “if [that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived] exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater.” According to this part, one can make a comparison between “that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived” when it does not exist and itself when exist. Thus, there is a problem (we dub it self-comparison problem): how can one model this kind of comparison? In this paper we will try to evaluate four attempts to solve the problem–namely those of Milican, Oppenheimer & Zalta, Lewis, and King. In responding to the problem, Milican and Oppenheimer & Zalta have dissolved the problem; Lewis uses possible-worlds semantics to model the comparison; and King, as Lewis, models it but by means of the intentional objects theory. We firstly argue that the problem is genuine and cannot be dissolved, secondly Lewis presupposes his, arguably problematic, possible-worlds metaphysics; and thirdly, King errs in recognizing the relata of the comparison.
Seyed Mohammad Amin Khatami; masood por mahdiyan
Abstract
Continuous logic is generalization of first order logic to a many valued logic with an infinitary truth value set. Many of the results of classic logic and it's model theory have been generalized to continuous logic. Continuous logic not only has many uses in the mathematical analysis and in the model ...
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Continuous logic is generalization of first order logic to a many valued logic with an infinitary truth value set. Many of the results of classic logic and it's model theory have been generalized to continuous logic. Continuous logic not only has many uses in the mathematical analysis and in the model theory of mathematical analysis structures, but also has created new attitudes in classical model theory. Firstly, the present paper study the development of continuous logic from Łukasiewicz logic. Then we have a review on some of the most important basic results of continuous logic, including the completeness of the proof system and the compactness theorem. Finally, according to the concept of continuity with respect to the truth value set, we will introduce a kind of continuous logic that is based on continuous t-norm based fuzzy logics. This will lead to the introduction of two kinds of continuous logics based on Gödel logic and product logic. Then we developed some of the results of continuous logic such as the compactness theorem for these two logics.
Seyed Mohammad Ali Hojjati; Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 95-109
Abstract
Marga Reimer believes that ordinary speakers presuppose Meinongianism and their intuition about the meaningfulness of the sentences contained empty names is based on this fact. We will argue in this paper that her view is not strongly supported. More precisely, there is an alternative view that ...
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Marga Reimer believes that ordinary speakers presuppose Meinongianism and their intuition about the meaningfulness of the sentences contained empty names is based on this fact. We will argue in this paper that her view is not strongly supported. More precisely, there is an alternative view that is incompatible with Reimer's view and as powerful as it in explaining speakers' intuitions. We will argue that there is no plausible reason for preferring Reimer’s view to this proposed alternative.
Taleb Jaberi
Volume 9, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 95-112
Abstract
Identity is one of the most important and at the same time controversial topics in Frege’s writings. In this essay we discuss his account of this subject and try to explain and criticise it’s different interpretations. Our main question is about the elements that Identity is a relation between ...
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Identity is one of the most important and at the same time controversial topics in Frege’s writings. In this essay we discuss his account of this subject and try to explain and criticise it’s different interpretations. Our main question is about the elements that Identity is a relation between them. First of all we explain Frege’s view of Identity in “Begriffsschrift” (Conceptual Notation). The last considerations of Frege about this subject are represented in another well known work of him which is called “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (On Sense and Reference), therefore in the next section we examine the concept of identity in this essay. The aim of this essay is not criticizing the view of Frege, but primarily to understand it, because that is the only way that we can grasp crucial issues like the essence of number in “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik” (Foundations of Mathematics) and Russell’s paradoxes concerning the fifth axiom of “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” (Basic Laws of Arithmetic)
Amir Jalilighazizadeh; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Mohammad Saeedimehr
Abstract
According to the maximalism about truthmaker, every true proposition has a truthmaker. One of the challenges faces maximalism is: what kind of entities are truthmakers of negative propositions? There are many solutions suggested by maximalists. One class of these solutions is based on negative entities. ...
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According to the maximalism about truthmaker, every true proposition has a truthmaker. One of the challenges faces maximalism is: what kind of entities are truthmakers of negative propositions? There are many solutions suggested by maximalists. One class of these solutions is based on negative entities. In the present paper we first briefly explain the problem. Then we indicate some solutions which are based on negative entities and some objections. These solutions are based on views entitled “totality states of affairs”, “polarity”, “absences” and “fundamental negative facts”. According to the solution based on totality states of affairs, in every negative case, in addition to positive facts the totality of them makes another fact, which in turn, plays the role of Truthmaker of negative proposition. According to the polarity solution, objects instantiate the properties into positive and negative manner and negative facts that result from the negative instantiation are considered as Truthmaker of negative propositions. According to the absence solution, the Truthmaker of negative proposition is considered as the absence of Truthmaker belonging to its alternative positive proposition. According to the fundamental negative facts solution, fundamentally there are negative facts the same as positive facts and these facts are Truthmaker of negative propositions.
Faraz Attar
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2010, , Pages 79-102
Abstract
Franz Brentano was one of the most influential philosophers of the second half of nineteenth and early twentieth century. His major role in the history of philosophy can be shown through two aspects. One is that in virtue of his philosophy, we can make a link between the analytic and continental philosophies, ...
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Franz Brentano was one of the most influential philosophers of the second half of nineteenth and early twentieth century. His major role in the history of philosophy can be shown through two aspects. One is that in virtue of his philosophy, we can make a link between the analytic and continental philosophies, and the other is that his doctrines and analyses can still be an origin for most of the philosophical investigations, as it was one century ago; although, because of the glorious personality of his direct and indirect students, his thoughts and insights have been not achieved immediately. Recent efforts in order to re-find and re-understand his philosophy show that Brentano has many valuable ideas in many different areas of philosophical investigations. These efforts show, more precisely, that his thoughts can still be a significant starting point for philosophical inquiry. Brentano’s works, like other influential philosophers’, covers a wide range of philosophical subjects including philosophical psychology, ontology, epistemology, syllogistic logic, ethics, philosophical theology, history of philosophy and many others. This article only focuses on the Brentano’s impact on syllogistic logic. His revision of formal logic has been done around the axis of a fundamental thesis according which all of the subject-predicate judgments should be reduced to existential judgments. We will explore, in this article, the procedure of this thesis development in Brentano’s thought and also its consequences for syllogistic logic. To have a complete understanding of Brentano’s revision of Aristotelian logic, it is required to have some acquaintances with several subjects not directly related to formal logic; e.g. ontology and epistemology.
Lotfollah Nabavi; Amirhossein Yaraghchi
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 83-103
Abstract
From the very beginning up to now the concept of existence has been one of the most controversial ones among the philosophers. Such discussions can be divided into two main parts. The first one refers to the ontological aspects of existence for which one is involved with two schools namely Possibilism ...
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From the very beginning up to now the concept of existence has been one of the most controversial ones among the philosophers. Such discussions can be divided into two main parts. The first one refers to the ontological aspects of existence for which one is involved with two schools namely Possibilism and Actualism anyone of which tries to talk of the scope and limit of things within their own metaphysical principles. The second part includes the issues about existence as a predicate. For these discussions and because we want to consider existence as a first or a second order predicate, we can either talk about the possible existence or its counterpart i.e., the necessary existence of the things. The necessary existence is one of the formula which, in the simplest quantified modal logic of S5 and just like those formula such as BF and CBF, is provable and valid. Although talking of the validity of necessary existence things needs to provide a second degree concept of existence but discussing the validity of Barcan formula needs an existential commitment to the possible things which the possibilists believe are not among the existent things. Following Linsky and Zalta and for defending BF and NE formula, Timotty Williamson has excluded the validity issue of Barcan formula from the first part and he has transferred it to the second part. Thus using the modal properties he provides a new definition of possible things through which one can defend the validity of Barcan formula as well as the necessary existence of things without having any existential commitment to the possibilia. Afterwards, Williamson provides the conditions for talking of the logical existence for things by providing a second-order concept of existence in unrestricted quantification theory and in this way one can have a better understanding of necessary existence.
Philosophy of Language
Ahmad Ebadi
Volume 7, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 83-99
Abstract
Some philosophers of language believe some sentences despite of their predicative structure, haven’t ability of truth and falsity, because the speaker don’t means by these sentences describing the reality but means doing an action. These sentences are named speech acts. Before of philosophers ...
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Some philosophers of language believe some sentences despite of their predicative structure, haven’t ability of truth and falsity, because the speaker don’t means by these sentences describing the reality but means doing an action. These sentences are named speech acts. Before of philosophers of language, the muslims logicians regard to this point. They called these sentences by "pseudo-predication composition". Pseudo-predication composition was proposed in several problems. The first field of this innovation was the critique of the criteria of ability of truth or falsity of predicative sentences and the solving of liar paradox. Although the problem of speech act wasn’t developed in logic of Islamic period but the muslims logicians were discovered it. The study of muslims logicians' viewpoints about speech acts and comparing it with viewpoint of philosophers of language is very useful.
Mohammad Mahdi kamali
Volume 9, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 83-98
Abstract
There are three theories regarding the quality of ascription of essential on essence and on each other. Most logicians consider that ascription of genus and differentia on the genre and on each other is common technical predication. But according to Allameh Tabatabai, the genus is the same as the ambiguous ...
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There are three theories regarding the quality of ascription of essential on essence and on each other. Most logicians consider that ascription of genus and differentia on the genre and on each other is common technical predication. But according to Allameh Tabatabai, the genus is the same as the ambiguous genre and the differentia is the same the determined genre and the genre is the complete essence without ambiguity and actuality. Contrary to popularity, therefore, he considers ascription of genus and differentia on the genre is primary essential predication but ascription of genus and differentia on each other is common technical predication. But Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, one step ahead of Allameh Tabatabaee, considers that ascription of genus and differentia on the genre and on each other is primary essential predication. In this article, while explaining all three perspectives, we first criticize them and finally we conclude that the famous theory is correct.
Mahdi Azimi
Volume 2, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2011, , Pages 85-102
Abstract
In his Isagoge, Porphyry provides circular definitions for genus and species; and to justify this point, following Aristotle, he attaches emphasis to correlation between the two concepts and that the definitions for two correlative concepts should be circular. Ibn Sina, however, interprets Aristotelian ...
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In his Isagoge, Porphyry provides circular definitions for genus and species; and to justify this point, following Aristotle, he attaches emphasis to correlation between the two concepts and that the definitions for two correlative concepts should be circular. Ibn Sina, however, interprets Aristotelian point in another way; and, in some places in his works, he rejects Porphyry's definitions strongly. Jonathan Barthes, who is one of the most eminent editors (experts) of the ancient philosophy, provides a report and assessment other than those of Ibn Sina. The present essay concerns a comparative study of Ibn Sina and Bartes' ideas and represents similarities and dissimilarities between ideas of the two commentators in this special field.
Philosophical Logic
Mohammad Foroughi; Hadi Vakili; Azam Ghasemi
Volume 8, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 87-108
Abstract
Most of definitions presented for material/immaterial thing have a common form: first they define material thing, then they define immaterial thing as a thing that is not material. There is a common objection to these kind of definitions: all of them are such that we cannot define something between material ...
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Most of definitions presented for material/immaterial thing have a common form: first they define material thing, then they define immaterial thing as a thing that is not material. There is a common objection to these kind of definitions: all of them are such that we cannot define something between material thing and immaterial thing. In this research we try to investigate common definitions of material/immaterial thing, then web prove that according to Mulla Sadra''s viewpoint about Substantial Motion of human soul, we should define some levels between pure material and pure immaterial, In fact there should be a spectrum beginning from pure material thing and ending to pure immaterial thing. Then we show that this new viewpoint to definition of material/immaterial thing (spectrum view) is not compatible with traditional definition system that uses Alhasr al''Aghi. Finally we propose a new approach toward definition of immaterial (and material) thing using fuzzy logic.
somayyeh feriduni
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2010, , Pages 93-112
Abstract
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The necessities and requirements of the standard logic of phenomenology create some problems in the analysis of fictional propositions which are replete with imaginary identities and lack signifiers. However, the logical conditions of these propositions as the constituent parts of language, is very ...
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The necessities and requirements of the standard logic of phenomenology create some problems in the analysis of fictional propositions which are replete with imaginary identities and lack signifiers. However, the logical conditions of these propositions as the constituent parts of language, is very significant and it cannot be denied or ignored that in the ordinary language, fictional identities are referred to and their relevant propositions are both accepted and rejected. In this paper, the auther has attempted to employ the definite framework of the possible worlds, to find explanations for the manner of referring to these propositions and the value of their truth. A few logic-related issues of fictional texts are also treated in this study; the author, also presents a system for the logic of fictional propositions.
Amir Hossein Zadyusefi; Davood Hosseini
Volume 4, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2013, , Pages 95-112
Abstract
Among contemporary Islamic philosophers, Mesbah Yazdi has proposed a theory about primitive propositions. He claims, first, that primitive propositions are analytic and secondly that concepts they are made up of, are secondary philosophical concepts. Here, we first introduce his theory of primitive propositions ...
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Among contemporary Islamic philosophers, Mesbah Yazdi has proposed a theory about primitive propositions. He claims, first, that primitive propositions are analytic and secondly that concepts they are made up of, are secondary philosophical concepts. Here, we first introduce his theory of primitive propositions and then give some counterexamples in order to show that this theory does not match with the classical characterization of primitive propositions. Some of these counterexamples are not analytic and others neither are analytic nor composed of secondary philosophical concepts. The upshot is that both Mesbah’s criteria for primitiveness are defective.
Seyyed Ammar Kalantar
Volume 6, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 95-116
Abstract
According to the common interpretation, Aristotle, in the fourth chapter of “De Interpretatione”, defines statement based on truth and falsehood. But in the end of the fifth chapter, he offers another ‘account’ of ‘simple’ statement. In this article, I will ...
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According to the common interpretation, Aristotle, in the fourth chapter of “De Interpretatione”, defines statement based on truth and falsehood. But in the end of the fifth chapter, he offers another ‘account’ of ‘simple’ statement. In this article, I will argue, that the account is in fact the definition of statement without qualification based on belonging and not belonging as elements of the realm of reality. Accordingly, the interpretations of commentators about the last part of the fourth and the fifth chapter will be presented. Then it is discussed that the definition of statement based on truth and falsehood is incorrect and has some incompatibilities with the Aristotle's text. After that, my interpretation of Aristotle's text will be explained and it is indicated that dividing concepts of signifiers is defined in a different manner. Finally, the chosen definition of statement and its similarities with Porphyry's interpretation are explained.
Mahmoud Zeraatpisheh; ghasemali kochenani
Volume 2, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 97-116
Abstract
In dealing with uninvited guests as natural propositions and propositions that are based on primary essential predication, the term “predication” has undergone some semantic changes; according to the elements of “unity” and “difference” three periods may be distinguished: ...
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In dealing with uninvited guests as natural propositions and propositions that are based on primary essential predication, the term “predication” has undergone some semantic changes; according to the elements of “unity” and “difference” three periods may be distinguished: (1) the period in which “what causes the unity” is external and “what causes the difference” is in the mind, (2) the period in which “the unifier”, in addition to its being in the outside world, may be in mind too and “the differing factor”, also, moves to the top level of mind or another mind, (3) the period in which “the unifier” and “the differing factor”, besides in viewed and viewer, may regularly be located in viewer and viewed. Without separating these periods, the theory of “distinction of the predications” in Mulla Sadra’s works cannot correctly be read. In this article, in fact, “what causes the unity” and “what causes the difference” will be analyzed in a historical development so that some parts of obscurities about this theory may be removed.
Faraz Attar
Volume 3, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 97-136
Abstract
Quine's theory of meaning can be studied through several aspects. This article concentrates on one of the most important ones, i.e. ''Indeterminacy of translation''. In the thesis, several sides of Quine's philosophy are combined, so that studying and interpreting it seem to be a difficult task. ''Indeterminacy ...
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Quine's theory of meaning can be studied through several aspects. This article concentrates on one of the most important ones, i.e. ''Indeterminacy of translation''. In the thesis, several sides of Quine's philosophy are combined, so that studying and interpreting it seem to be a difficult task. ''Indeterminacy of translation'' says that there is no fact of the matter to choose between two or more inconsistent translation manuals that each of them conforms to all of the native's behavioral criteria. After illustrating the asymmetry between ''indeterminacy of translation'' and ''under-determination of theory of nature'', we can conclude that the certain content of ''Indeterminacy of translation'' is an ontological claim about meaning. Therefore, at first, Quine's understanding of meaning, his preferred ontology, and the relation between these two, must be explained and described, and then the asymmetry between these two theses can be discussed. An attitude toward these subjects from this point of view, not only is perceived an original apprehension of theory of meaning, but also can originate a new method in order to study abstract objects, propositional attitudes and mental states.
Mina Ghajargar
Volume 5, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 97-120
Abstract
In Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger analyzes Leibniz's doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems to show that how any kind of logic founds its grounds in metaphysics. After questioning the relation between being and thought, he describes the structure of judgment in Leibniz's ...
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In Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger analyzes Leibniz's doctrine of judgment down to basic metaphysical problems to show that how any kind of logic founds its grounds in metaphysics. After questioning the relation between being and thought, he describes the structure of judgment in Leibniz's theory of judgment and refers to its historical origin. He demonstrates that concepts like subject and predicate and their relation in proposition or judgment and also the definition of truth in Leibniz's thought are grounded in metaphysical theories. Yet one of the most important Leibniz's concerns was the independency of logic from metaphysics to build his metaphysics on the basis of such logic.
Analytical Philosophy
Morteza Mezginejad; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 7, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 97-116
Abstract
The main purpose of this article is the Horwich arguments in "Meaning, use and truth ", which is published in the Mind journal (1995). In this article, he defends the idea of Wittgenstein, use theory, in contrast to the arguments raised against the approach. Horwich focus specifically on Kripke's criticism. ...
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The main purpose of this article is the Horwich arguments in "Meaning, use and truth ", which is published in the Mind journal (1995). In this article, he defends the idea of Wittgenstein, use theory, in contrast to the arguments raised against the approach. Horwich focus specifically on Kripke's criticism. Kripke in his famous article "Wittgenstein on rules and private language: An elementary exposition " is trying to show that the application cannot provide the meaning. Horwich refuse Kripke argument. For this purpose, he offers both strong and weak interpretation of the premises of Kripke argument and then criticizes both. After review Horwich Criticisms on Kripke we evaluate his criticisms.
Philosophy of Logic
Volume 8, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 97-122
Abstract
In article of “social factors in mathematical and logical knowledge” The Author shows that social factors are determinant in logical and mathematical knowledge as differences of mathematicians, variety of contradiction in Reductio ad absurdum, deconstruction in infinite values, Wittgenstein`s ...
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In article of “social factors in mathematical and logical knowledge” The Author shows that social factors are determinant in logical and mathematical knowledge as differences of mathematicians, variety of contradiction in Reductio ad absurdum, deconstruction in infinite values, Wittgenstein`s analysis of Sum, change of the concept of evidence in history, Begging the question of proof of axioms, Begging the question of justification of logical rules by the value tables, Prior`s argument against formalists, absence of preference for psychological explanations against sociological ones, paradoxes of material implication, To appeal to intuition rather than reasoning, the critique of circular reasoning, conventionality of logical rules, harvest paradox … In analysis of this evidences, first, I determined minimalistic evidences as the principle of contradiction, modus ponens, reductio ad absurdum. Second, I analyzed the cases as Infinite values, Wittgenstein`s point of view, value tables, Prior`s argument, convention, Lack of necessity in obviousness of concepts in the obvious propositions, uncertain conceptions… At last I showed that social factors are not considered essential in logical and mathematical knowledge.
Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian
Volume 5, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 105-123
Abstract
Semantic stipulations, i.e. the principles which are the main constructors of the meanings of words, have different forms for each category of words. Kripke`s theory is the most suitable model which identifies the appearance of the stipulations. In general, semantic stipulations are some usages of a ...
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Semantic stipulations, i.e. the principles which are the main constructors of the meanings of words, have different forms for each category of words. Kripke`s theory is the most suitable model which identifies the appearance of the stipulations. In general, semantic stipulations are some usages of a word that has been accentuated. So, as long as the stipulations remains fixed, discoveries and inventions do not change the meaning of a word. Also, to justify the way which any meaning engender from semantic stipulations and how the meanings of the words in one sentence affect each other, radial model is very suitable one. Radial model, unlike those models which concentrate on the conceptual and obstruct definitions of words, shows a dynamic way of producing meanings.
Fereshteh Nabati
Volume 4, Issue 1 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 109-128
Abstract
Diodorus, Philo, and Chrysippus were the most important Megarin-stoic logicians. Modalities were one of the most interesting topics for them. In the history of logic, their views about modal concepts, definition of necessity, possibility, impossibility and the relations between these concepts are important ...
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Diodorus, Philo, and Chrysippus were the most important Megarin-stoic logicians. Modalities were one of the most interesting topics for them. In the history of logic, their views about modal concepts, definition of necessity, possibility, impossibility and the relations between these concepts are important and can be helpful to illustrate some other logicians’ views. Because of the deterministic view which is associated with his definitions of the modal concepts, Diodorus’ views have been discussed more than two other logicians’ views,. Philo and Chrysippus’ definitions are closer to common sense but aren’t compatible with their deterministic views.
Amin Shahverdi; Mohammad Ali Ejeii
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 111-130
Abstract
This article studies the stoic logic and the interpretation of which presented in the first half of twenty century. Since the encounters of the first researchers of this period to stoic logic is based on the modern logic presuppositions, we have called this approach classic and have attempted to examine ...
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This article studies the stoic logic and the interpretation of which presented in the first half of twenty century. Since the encounters of the first researchers of this period to stoic logic is based on the modern logic presuppositions, we have called this approach classic and have attempted to examine the interpretations that this approach have presented of the connectives of the logic, i.e. disjunction, conjunction, conditional, and negation. In the lights of new works on stoic logic, the defects of the classic reading of these connectives will be shown. In the end of the paper we will explain that the classic understating of negation and conjunction connectives is right according to truth table, even though doesn’t convey stoic concepts completely. We will also show that the classic understanding of disjunctive and conditional connectives is wrong in some cases.
Hamed Ghadiri; mohammad saeedimehr
Volume 9, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 113-136
Abstract
Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) in most of his philosophy focused on the question ‘how does mind/language hook onto the world?’ He followed this question and proposed various opinions in different fields of philosophy. In semantics, he defended semantic externlism and in metaphysics and ontology, ...
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Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) in most of his philosophy focused on the question ‘how does mind/language hook onto the world?’ He followed this question and proposed various opinions in different fields of philosophy. In semantics, he defended semantic externlism and in metaphysics and ontology, he criticized metaphysical realism through two arguments including model-theoretic argument. Here I will show that Putnam’s argument for semantic externalism and his model-theoretic argument, while are different in field, structure, and formulation, have been supported by a common thought concerning the relation between mind/language and the world. To achieve this goal, firstly I will introduce both arguments and propose new formulations for them. Secondly, I will enumerate five similarities between these formulations, and finally, on the basis of these similarities, I will propose the supporting thought formed as an argument. According to this supporting thought, the strict separation between mind and the world leads to indeterminacy of referential relation between them; but our common sense and realistic intuition implies that this relation is determined; therefore, mind and the world are not strictly separated; i.e. are interpenetrated.
Saeedeh Shahmir
Abstract
One of the goals, or perhaps the most important goal of Bertrand Russell’s prominent attempts in his philosophical and logical works was to establish a sort of Ideal or Perfect Language in order to be used to deal with the varieties of complexities, ambiguities, and paradoxes which in one way or ...
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One of the goals, or perhaps the most important goal of Bertrand Russell’s prominent attempts in his philosophical and logical works was to establish a sort of Ideal or Perfect Language in order to be used to deal with the varieties of complexities, ambiguities, and paradoxes which in one way or another appear in natural languages. Such a project is built on the central notion, or better methodology, of Logical Analysis. Russell by using his logical analysis can distinguish between (genuine proper) names and definite descriptions, which further helps him to cope with three main problems: informativeness of identity claims, negative existentials, and non-existents, that is, those expressions which have no reference whatsoever. In this paper, I will introduce and explain Russell’s view in two parts: The Conceptual Aspect of his analysis, which involves the definition of logical analysis, and the Extensional Aspect, which brings in his famous Theory of Descriptions.
