Analytical Philosophy
Behnam Zolqadr; Davood Hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 1 , August 2016, , Pages 31-40
Abstract
According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, ...
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According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object and have their properties independent of whether they are intended or not. (2) Anti-realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object only if they are intended. Otherwise they are not object and thus no properties are ascribed to them. In this essay we will raise some objections to Priest’s anti-realist Modal Meinongianism, and then we propose a different anti-realist approach. In our account of anti-realist Modal Meinongianism fictional objects are considered as incomplete objects.
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati; Salman Panahi
Volume 4, Issue 2 , September 2013, , Pages 43-64
Abstract
Realism is an intuitive idea which most people accept explicitly or implicitly. It is hard to find someone who does not accept mind-independent things or the relation between truth and states of affairs; however, how the connection between language and reality can be stated is a controversial issue, ...
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Realism is an intuitive idea which most people accept explicitly or implicitly. It is hard to find someone who does not accept mind-independent things or the relation between truth and states of affairs; however, how the connection between language and reality can be stated is a controversial issue, at least among philosophers. Based on the most popular theories about the problem, there is a direct correspondence between lingual elements and external world. At first glance, it seems acceptable, like many other intuitive ideas, but further examination reveals some dissatisfactions. Hilary Putnam, well known American contemporary philosopher, has criticized such a point of view (‘Metaphysical Realism’ as he has called), partly using model theoretic based arguments. Model theory is a branch of mathematical sciences which studies the connection between a language and its interpretations. This paper attempts, less technical and more intuitive, to examine Putnam's Permutation argument in which he uses model theoretic concepts and theorems to show that Metaphysical Realist is not able to fix reference of the elements of language via fixing truth value of the whole sentence in which those elements appear.
