Philosophical Logic
Javad Azimi Dastgerdi
Abstract
In an article titled " Non-contradiction Paradox", Mahdi Azimi mentioned Mulla Sadra's words are in response to the non-contradiction Paradox. Azimi says that Mulla Sadra examines the statement “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” then using the subject-predicate ...
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In an article titled " Non-contradiction Paradox", Mahdi Azimi mentioned Mulla Sadra's words are in response to the non-contradiction Paradox. Azimi says that Mulla Sadra examines the statement “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” then using the subject-predicate structure Mulla Sadra tries to solve the paradox by distinction between two type of predication called ‘awwali’ and ‘shayi’. Azimi considers the paradox to be the result of its structure and proposes the structure □~(A&~A) for the statement “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible”. In this structure, there is no need for a subject for a paradox to occur. But firstly, he rejects the subject-predicate structure for that statement without any reason. Secondly, Muslim philosophers mention the proposed structure along with the previous structure for the principle of Non-contradiction but the proposed structure does not produce a paradox that requires a solution. Thirdly, with a closer look, there is a paradox on the proposed structure. Fourthly, □~(A&~A) is not a complete translation of the principle of Non-contradiction.
Philosophical Logic
Fateme Sadat Nabavi; Hosein Kamkar; Zinat Ayatollahi; Alireza Shahbazi
Abstract
When formalizing the Islamic legal reasoning system, we encounter various categories of justifications which require different logical operators. For instance, certain ones possess a certain epistemic value; thus, accepting them necessitates accepting the accompanying causal and logical ramifications. ...
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When formalizing the Islamic legal reasoning system, we encounter various categories of justifications which require different logical operators. For instance, certain ones possess a certain epistemic value; thus, accepting them necessitates accepting the accompanying causal and logical ramifications. However, there are other types of justifications that hold significance only within a legal system. These justifications may not necessarily have any direct bearing on truth or knowledge but are instead concerned with establishing the rules of institiuationThis article presents an axiomatic logical framework based on the "Count As" logic (logic of institutions) and non-monotonic logic, as well as the justification logic. This framework can represent the logical properties of two category of valid justifications in the Islamic Legal Reasoning, namely, Amaarat and Osul-al-Amaliyyah. In fact, the legal consequences of both as well as the rational consequences of Amaarat are valid, but the rational consequences of Osul-al-Amaliyyah are not accepted. Our framework can represent this difference.
Philosophical Logic
morteza Hajihosseini; Hamide Bahmanpour
Abstract
In Classical Logic, it is not possible to conclude from "If P then Q" that "It is not the case that if P then ∼Q". This argument, whose conditional counterpart is known as Boethius' thesis, is abundantly attested in the realm of causal, conceptual, and logical relations. Aristotle's thesis "It is ...
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In Classical Logic, it is not possible to conclude from "If P then Q" that "It is not the case that if P then ∼Q". This argument, whose conditional counterpart is known as Boethius' thesis, is abundantly attested in the realm of causal, conceptual, and logical relations. Aristotle's thesis "It is not the case that if P then P" is not a theorem in this logic. Furthermore, in Classical Logic, each of the two propositions P and Q is derived from "It is not the case that if P then ∼Q", against which there is a lot of evidence. The Non-Truth Functional System of Propositional Logic is an answer to these problems, in which causal, conceptual, and logical relations are analyzed, formulated, and evaluated in accordance with natural intuition without exception. In article "Hajhosseini's Non-Truth Functional Logic", Asadollah Fallahi makes three specific criticisms of this system: "The number of inference rules are reducible", "Every propositional variable is a theorem, and this system and its extension are trivial" and "The extension of the Non-Truth Functional System reduces to classical logic". In this article, we show that the first criticism is based on some incorrect proofs. Also, the second criticism arises from the incorrect definition of some non-truth functional combinations or the incorrect proof of some arguments. Finally, the third criticism is solved by reducing the rules of distributivity. For our answer to his repeated criticisms we refer to the article "Critical Review of a Criticism on the Theory of Truth-Functional System".
Philosophical Logic
Mahdi Assadi
Abstract
Since the Elements of Philosophical Logic, written by Dr. Lotfollah Nabavi, is the first Persian book in the difficult area of philosophical logic, it is not flawless supposedly. So, we have tried in this paper to criticize the writer’s own specific views in the book. In the Tense logic chapter, ...
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Since the Elements of Philosophical Logic, written by Dr. Lotfollah Nabavi, is the first Persian book in the difficult area of philosophical logic, it is not flawless supposedly. So, we have tried in this paper to criticize the writer’s own specific views in the book. In the Tense logic chapter, for example, he falsely considers the Avicennian permanence inevitably general than the necessity because of neglecting the distinction between the eternal necessity and the essential necessity and the division of the latter to temporal and atemporal. In Epistemic logic, he falsely attributes the negative introspection to Socrates and neglects that the positive introspection is counter–intuitive and suffering from the infinite regress. In Free logic, he wrongly considers the existence predicate incompatible with the logical rules of Aristotelians and regards its use in syllogism to be problematic. In addition, problems such as repetition, contradiction, obversion rule, and proposition’s having two components can also be responded in the existence predicate. Some of the author's own answers and resolutions are also problematic: the problem of non-comprehensiveness; the problem of unity of meaning in "existent" and "real"; and the problem that converting a proposition such as "there is no impossible in essence/by means of the other" to "no impossibility is in essence/by means of the other" is not truth-maintainer. In Relevant logic, many of the author's phrases in explaining that Paraconsistency does not result in Dialetheism are controversial as well.
Philosophical Logic
Fereshte Nabati
Abstract
Nowadays modal logic is one of the important areas of logic, but at the beginning of the emergence of modern logic, there was not much attention to this branch of logic, and even the founders of modern logic, including Russell, had an anti-modal position. One of the factors that led Russell to adopt ...
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Nowadays modal logic is one of the important areas of logic, but at the beginning of the emergence of modern logic, there was not much attention to this branch of logic, and even the founders of modern logic, including Russell, had an anti-modal position. One of the factors that led Russell to adopt such a position was the belief that logic is truth functional and extensional, and this is something that the introduction of modality destroys.Of course During the long period of his philosophical work, Russell has taken many and varied positions about modal notions. From the beginning, he did not have an anti-modal position. At first, he considered necessity as a description of an implication, and after some time, he introduced it as a primitive, basic and indefinable concept. Then, in some of his works, following Moore, he considered necessity as a kind of logical priority of propositions, but in the end he took an anti-modal position and tried to completely discard the modal notions. He said that these concepts are properties of propositional functions, not properties of propositions. But Russell has used second-order logic for explaining the modal concepts and explaining the difference between possibility and existence (which declares both of them to be properties of propositional functions), but even with this, he is not able to completely remove the modal notions from language and logic.
Philosophical Logic
Volume 8, Issue 1 , April 2017, , Pages 15-38
Abstract
Ali Wahidiyan Kamyad claimed in an article named “Methodology of Usage of Fuzzy Logic in Islamic View” that fuzzy logic is a part of the logic of sacred Quran. This claim was supported by a group of researchers, while it seems that the evidences to prove it are incomplete. So it seems necessary ...
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Ali Wahidiyan Kamyad claimed in an article named “Methodology of Usage of Fuzzy Logic in Islamic View” that fuzzy logic is a part of the logic of sacred Quran. This claim was supported by a group of researchers, while it seems that the evidences to prove it are incomplete. So it seems necessary to study the main claim again. What will be come at the continuing contains some critiques to this claim with respect to the Quranic evidences for which has been given. Besides some partial critiques to the correspondence of the Quranic examples which are claimed to be corresponded to the fuzzy argument given, it will be shown that there is a main fault in the claim that Quran has used in some verses the fuzzy logic which is based on a confusion of what is explicitly occurred in the passage as an argument (Mansus argument) and what is in ascribed to the passage by the reader (Mustanbat argument).
Philosophical Logic
Mohammad Foroughi; Hadi Vakili; Azam Ghasemi
Volume 8, Issue 1 , April 2017, , Pages 87-108
Abstract
Most of definitions presented for material/immaterial thing have a common form: first they define material thing, then they define immaterial thing as a thing that is not material. There is a common objection to these kind of definitions: all of them are such that we cannot define something between material ...
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Most of definitions presented for material/immaterial thing have a common form: first they define material thing, then they define immaterial thing as a thing that is not material. There is a common objection to these kind of definitions: all of them are such that we cannot define something between material thing and immaterial thing. In this research we try to investigate common definitions of material/immaterial thing, then web prove that according to Mulla Sadra''s viewpoint about Substantial Motion of human soul, we should define some levels between pure material and pure immaterial, In fact there should be a spectrum beginning from pure material thing and ending to pure immaterial thing. Then we show that this new viewpoint to definition of material/immaterial thing (spectrum view) is not compatible with traditional definition system that uses Alhasr al''Aghi. Finally we propose a new approach toward definition of immaterial (and material) thing using fuzzy logic.
Philosophy of Language
Hamed Bastin; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 7, Issue 2 , December 2016, , Pages 1-28
Abstract
In answer to the Putnam problem about extensional non-determination of language terms, Millikan asks if this problem exists by a new definition of representation according to biological evidences, especially the principle of natural selection. The Millikan’s answer to this question is negative ...
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In answer to the Putnam problem about extensional non-determination of language terms, Millikan asks if this problem exists by a new definition of representation according to biological evidences, especially the principle of natural selection. The Millikan’s answer to this question is negative and she believes that the question should be changed to what is that feature, which turns a relation to representation-represented among numerous possible relations between words and objects? Her answer to this question is accorded to a hypothesis that is also the place of disputations and arguments in biology and has its supporters and opponents. Millikan is in the group, which has a historical view to the function and believes that the function of each entity must be defined regarding to what it supposed to do in its appearance history and dedicates the “proper” adjective to such function. The alternative hypothesis believes that the function must be defined regarding to what an entity do at the moment in equivalence to the current status. The key point of presenting the concept of “proper function” by Millikan is a redefinition of representation. In this article, we want to show that the new definition of representation is accorded to the concept of “Functure” as something completely objective, in opposed to the common view of philosophy to the representation, which take it as mental.
Analytical Philosophy
Behnam Zolqadr; Davood Hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 1 , August 2016, , Pages 31-40
Abstract
According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, ...
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According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object and have their properties independent of whether they are intended or not. (2) Anti-realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object only if they are intended. Otherwise they are not object and thus no properties are ascribed to them. In this essay we will raise some objections to Priest’s anti-realist Modal Meinongianism, and then we propose a different anti-realist approach. In our account of anti-realist Modal Meinongianism fictional objects are considered as incomplete objects.