Document Type : Research

Authors

1 The Assistant Professor of Philosophy-Logic, Birjand University, Birjand, Iran

2 The Associate Professor of Philosophy & Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is the Horwich arguments in "Meaning, use and truth ", which is published in the Mind journal (1995). In this article, he defends the idea of Wittgenstein, use theory, in contrast to the arguments raised against the approach. Horwich focus specifically on Kripke's criticism. Kripke in his famous article "Wittgenstein on rules and private language: An elementary exposition " is trying to show that the application cannot provide the meaning. Horwich refuse Kripke argument. For this purpose, he offers both strong and weak interpretation of the premises of Kripke argument and then criticizes both. After review Horwich Criticisms on Kripke we evaluate his criticisms.

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Main Subjects

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