عنوان مقاله [English]
external world and in the mind as well) paradox, so many solutions have been suggested: The difference in the intension and extension and its equivalent; the difference in the battī and lā–battī and its equivalent; and so forth. Having a glance at the incorrectness of these resolutions, the essay shows the knowability of the absolute non–existent. Although here a few of thinkers previously have tried to show the knowability, we will show that their resolutions, due to not paying attention to the exact and strong definition of the unknowable and un-declarable absolute non–existent, are problematic. By summing up the different versions of the meaning in question, we will argue for the knowability of the absolute non–existent by means of four proofs: 1. the principle of non–contradiction; 2. non–existence qua non–existence; 3. the non–existentiality of the subject; 4. proof by reductio ad absurdum.