Logical Studies

Are Ontological Pluralism and Monism Notationally Variant of Each Other? and Two Similar Problems

Document Type : Research

Author

Mohammad Hossein Esfandiari

Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2025.46957.1450
Abstract
One of the questions in ontological pluralism is whether or not to accept the generic quantifier. But if we accept the generic quantifier due to reasons that are for the acceptance of the generic quantifier, then ontological pluralism will face problems due to other reasons, for example, it is as if pluralism and monism are just notationally variant of each other and there is no genuine and important difference between them. In other words, the acceptance of generic quantifier offers a kind of monistic counterpart for pluralism, and this monistic counterpart causes three basic problems for pluralism. Of course, these three problems are considered to be one of the most important criticisms of ontological pluralism. In the following article, these three problems are discussed. After clarifying each of them, we have criticized and rejected them. Our key in rejecting these three problems is the assumption that the generic quantifier is not an elite and fundamental quantifier and can only be defined based on restricted quantifiers. Therefore, it has been shown that ontological pluralism, if accepts the generic quantifier and if it does not consider this generic quantifier as elite, it will not face any problem.

Keywords

Analytic metaphysics
ontology
quantificational pluralism
generic quantifier
notational variant
Subjects
References:


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Logical Studies
Volume 16, Issue 1 - Serial Number 1
September 2025
Pages 173-202

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