Kamran Ghayoomzadeh
Abstract
Aristotle with introducing Modal logic in Organo and Essentialism and Essence in Organon and Metaphysics was one of the vanguard in metaphysical and logical challenging discussions. One of the most important subjects in history of logic and Aristotle’s philosophy is a presentation of consistent ...
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Aristotle with introducing Modal logic in Organo and Essentialism and Essence in Organon and Metaphysics was one of the vanguard in metaphysical and logical challenging discussions. One of the most important subjects in history of logic and Aristotle’s philosophy is a presentation of consistent interpretation of Aristotle’s modal logic and conforming it with accounts of Aristotle’s essentialism in Organon and Metaphysics. This interpretation and commentary is penetrating inside Aristotle’s remarks and comparing it with modern philosophy. In this Article, we criticize one of the interpretations in ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’ form and then introduce a new other interpretation, which was exposed by Richard Patterson, with two substantial feature. The first feature is pertaining to the consistency of Aristotle’s modal logic. We can say this interpretation is the best explanation about this consistency among other interpretations. The second feature is coincidence between this interpretation with Aristotle’s essentialism in Metaphysics. We examine and then confirm that this interpretation with instruments of ‘strong necessity’ and ‘weak necessity’ in modal syllogisms with two necessity premises.
MohammadJavad Kiani Bidgoli
Abstract
From ancient Greece to the world today, the problem of induction has preoccupied the minds of thinkers, especially logicians and philosophers. The use of induction in various fields has multiplied the importance of the matter. There are different answers to this problem; Since induction has always been ...
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From ancient Greece to the world today, the problem of induction has preoccupied the minds of thinkers, especially logicians and philosophers. The use of induction in various fields has multiplied the importance of the matter. There are different answers to this problem; Since induction has always been considered as another type of argument alongside deduction, and deduction is justified by almost all logicians, some have tried to justify induction as a deduction; On the other hand, some groups have tried to resemble deduction and induction by discrediting and taking the validity of deduction. Other people have taken a different view of the issue and some have ruled out the issue. In this article, while stating the problem and the answers are given to it and categorizing the contents, we will deal with an answer from the second group and present and translate an article by Susan Haack, which is about justifying deductive reasoning. In her article, Susan Hawke, while expressing the challenges of induction, tries to contrast these challenges with deduction and show that deduction, like induction, has problems but has been freed from them by assuming some things, and he examines these presuppositions.
saeed Anvari
Abstract
Medieval logicians chose acronyms for valid syllogism moods. These names were chosen in such a way as to determine the type of propositions used in the minor and major premises and the result of the syllogism. Moreover, it showed how the valid moods of the second to fourth figure return to the moods ...
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Medieval logicians chose acronyms for valid syllogism moods. These names were chosen in such a way as to determine the type of propositions used in the minor and major premises and the result of the syllogism. Moreover, it showed how the valid moods of the second to fourth figure return to the moods of the first figure and the method of rejecting and converting the valid moods of those figures to the first figure. The vowels used in this name indicate the type of proposition. For example, the name of the first mood of the analogy is Barbara. The vowels used in this acronym indicate the type of proposition enclosed in the premises and the conclusion of these moods of syllogism. In this article, these acronyms and their related points are explained. Also, the reason for the difference of these names is stated in the fourth figure, And the history of the changes of these names is mentioned in the fourth figure. Finally, a comparison between this method and the method of using the general rules of inference by Muslim logicians has been made, And the advantages and disadvantages of each of these two methods are stated.
Meghdad Ghari
Abstract
In this note, we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. By making use of the fixed point operators (or diagonal operators) introduced by Smorynski in his Diagonalization Operator Logic, we introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs QLP. We then ...
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In this note, we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. By making use of the fixed point operators (or diagonal operators) introduced by Smorynski in his Diagonalization Operator Logic, we introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs QLP. We then formalize the Knower Paradox and various self-reference versions of the Surprise Test Paradox in these fixed point extensions of QLP. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for which there is no justification or evidence, we propose a solution to the self-reference version of the Surprise Test paradox. We show that one of the axioms of QLP (the Uniform Barcan Formula) could be the reason for producing contradiction in these paradoxes, and thus by rejecting this axiom we can avoid contradiction in the aforementioned paradoxes. By introducing Mkrtychev models for the fixed point extensions of QLP, we further show that these fixed point extensions (without the Uniform Barcan Formula) are consistent.
Amer Amikhteh; Seyyed Ahmad Mirsanei
Abstract
In this paper, a non-classical axiomatic system was introduced to classify all moods of Aristotelian syllogisms, in addition to the axiom "Every a is an a" and the bilateral rules of obversion of E and O propositions. This system consists of only 2 definitions, 2 axioms, 1 rule of a premise, and moods ...
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In this paper, a non-classical axiomatic system was introduced to classify all moods of Aristotelian syllogisms, in addition to the axiom "Every a is an a" and the bilateral rules of obversion of E and O propositions. This system consists of only 2 definitions, 2 axioms, 1 rule of a premise, and moods of Barbara and Datisi. By adding first-degree propositional negation to this system, we prove that the square of opposition holds without using many of the other rules of classical logic (including double negation elimination). We then show that the Propositional Substructural Logic SLe is the best logic to study Aristotelian Syllogisms. Also, based on the IFLe square of opposition, the rules of conversation and the rules of negation are completely proved in Muzaffar's logic. For this purpose, we used the monadic first-order logic with the same standard deductive apparatus of quantifiers in classical logic, plus the axioms of "some a is an a" and "some not-a is a not-a". Finally, to show that there is no existential commitment to general terms in categorical logic, the Strong Four-Valued Relevant-classical Logic KR4 was used. With the same existential interpretation of the quantifiers and the standard translation of the quarter quantified.
Seyed Mohammad Amin Khatami; Esfandiar Eslami
Abstract
In the early 19th century, the ''principle of bivalence'' of the Aristotelian logic was challenged. Of course, Aristotle himself was questioned the applicability of this principle to propositions concerning future contingents, and he answered it via something like as modalities of possibility. However, ...
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In the early 19th century, the ''principle of bivalence'' of the Aristotelian logic was challenged. Of course, Aristotle himself was questioned the applicability of this principle to propositions concerning future contingents, and he answered it via something like as modalities of possibility. However, Aristotle did not abandon the principle and it has not received much attention till the Renaissance. From Renaissance to the early 19th century, some philosophical considerations to this issue were developed. Rejecting the principle of bivalence implies alternative accounts of various kinds of logics such as many-valued logics in the context of logic. In this article, we first survey the development of many-valued logics by reviewing motivational ideas behind many-valued logics together with examining the aims and scopes of some of these logics. Then, we devote the rest of the paper to study various aspects of "truth value sets" and "interpretation of logical connectives" in many-valued logics to obtain a more comprehensive view on these logics.
Seyyed Ammar Kalantar
Abstract
In this article I discuss Aristotle’s view on εστί (“is”) being a verb in de interpretaine and the significations which he explicitly attributes to “is”, and in several points the views of some of Aristotle’s commentators, including Ammonius, Boethius, ...
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In this article I discuss Aristotle’s view on εστί (“is”) being a verb in de interpretaine and the significations which he explicitly attributes to “is”, and in several points the views of some of Aristotle’s commentators, including Ammonius, Boethius, al-Farabi, and Aquinas, are reported and criticized. Therefore, first Aristotle's definition of verb is examined, including its most important feature, “additionally signifying time”. In fact, "is" is due to having this feature is a verb, and thus the first signification of "is" becomes clear. After that, I discuss other two significations of "is", namely “additionally signifying combination” and "determination of truth", and the relation of these three significations to each other. Finally, it is concluded that according to Aristotle, "is" (with two objects) does not signify a categorical thing, but only additionally signifies combination. And since "is" is additionally signifying time, it can be said that for Aristotle in de interpretaione "is" is additionally signifying temporal combination.
Seyed mahdi Mohammadi
Abstract
From the time physicists have proposed the quantum logic, this logic is formed somehow in relation with quantum mechanics and experiences based on it. In fact, quantum mechanics and experiences gained from it assumed an approval to this logic. One of the highlights of the quantum mechanics, is uncertainty ...
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From the time physicists have proposed the quantum logic, this logic is formed somehow in relation with quantum mechanics and experiences based on it. In fact, quantum mechanics and experiences gained from it assumed an approval to this logic. One of the highlights of the quantum mechanics, is uncertainty principle, which is a doctrine to reject the divisibility in quantum logic. Also EPR is assumed as a doctrine to reject the quantum mechanics. In the case of rejection of quantum mechanics, does the quantum logic also be questioned? In this paper it is shown that the uncertainty principle is rejecting the divisibility principle and EPR The aim of this study is to show that the uncertainty principal rejects divisibility principal, and hidden-variable theory which comes after EPR paradox, known as a rival theory, (even in the case of rejection of standard quantum mechanics) doesn’t reject the quantum logic. The outcome of this is that in practice quantum logic is independent of quantum mechanics, and it might be applied in areas other than quantum mechanics.
Ali asghar jafari valani; mahya mehrjedi
Abstract
Early and later logicians all agree on the possibility of discussing the justifiable theorems in logic and the discussion of triple materials in philosophy; But on the other hand, there are discrepancies in the description of the term general possibility among logicians. One of the most significant differences ...
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Early and later logicians all agree on the possibility of discussing the justifiable theorems in logic and the discussion of triple materials in philosophy; But on the other hand, there are discrepancies in the description of the term general possibility among logicians. One of the most significant differences is the view of Zainuddin Kashi, one of Fakhr Al-din Razi's greatest students. In his book "Hadaiq al-Haqaiq", he claims that philosophers before him had defined the general possibility of denying the necessity of one of the parties to existence and non-existence, while they had agreed to deny the necessity of the opposite side of the issue. In this article, we try to reflect on the general possibility from the perspective of Zayn al-Din Kashi by looking at the views of scholars and logicians on the term possibility, in particular, and acknowledge that his claim is influenced by dual definitions. Fakhr Al-din Razi is in the book "Al-Mulakhas" and "Sharh Esharat".
Hossein Shaqaqi
Abstract
ایده زبان ایدئال از مباحث مهم و محوری در فلسفه تحلیلی است. عمده فیلسوفان جریان نخست فلسفه تحلیلی که از فرگه آغاز و در راسل و ویتگنشتاین متقدم و پوزیتیویستهای منطقی بسط ...
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ایده زبان ایدئال از مباحث مهم و محوری در فلسفه تحلیلی است. عمده فیلسوفان جریان نخست فلسفه تحلیلی که از فرگه آغاز و در راسل و ویتگنشتاین متقدم و پوزیتیویستهای منطقی بسط یافت نه تنها از این ایده استقبال میکنند، بلکه تحقق آن را همچون هدفی اصلی و محوری دنبال میکنند. اما ایده زبان ایدئال در جریان دوم فلسفه تحلیلی، که آن نیز ملهم از آثار و ایده-های فرگه است و در مور و ویتگنشتاین متاخر بسط مییابد، رو به افول نهاد. در اینجا سعی خواهیم کرد اولا تاثیرپذیری فیلسوفان جریان نخست را در طرح و بسط ایده زبان ایدئال از فلاسفه جدید (دکارت، لایبنیتس و تجربهگرایان کلاسیک) نشان دهیم، و در ثانی توضیح دهیم که چگونه هر دو جریان مذکور –اولی در در حمایت و دومی در رد ایده زبان ایدئال- متاثر از جنبهای از اندیشه فرگه در باب معنا و نسبت آن با مصداق بودند، و آخر این که نقش پررنگ نگاه ویتگنشتاین متاخر به مساله معنا و نیز مفهوم «شباهت خانوادگی» او را در افول آرمانی به نام زبان ایدئال وضوح بخشیم.
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