The present article is one of the first written in the Western world on the relationship between logic and ontology (or metaphysics in general). Bocheński shows that Gottlob Frege, the father of mathematical logic, by placing truth instead of inference as the subject matter of logic, brought logic very close to ontology and metaphysics, to the point that some of Frege's followers, such as Heinrich Scholz, considered logic and ontology to be one and the same. On the other hand, of course, a group such as Ernest Nagel remained faithful to tradition and considered logic and ontology to be completely distinct from each other. In explaining this historical controversy on the relationship between logic and ontology, Bocheński points out that the roots of this controversy are in Aristotle's two books on syllogisms and polemics (originally titled Prior Analytics and Topics). In Prior Analytics, Aristotle expresses his logical results (i.e., the moods of syllogism) in the form of truths and laws, while in Topics, he had proposed logical results in the form of rules of debate and of dialogue between two opponents (the questioner and the answerer). Bocheński claims that the logical tradition after Aristotle, from the Stoics to before modern logic, all saw logic in the form of Aristotele’s Topics, i.e. as rules of debate and dialogue, unlike mathematical logicians such as Leibniz, George Boole, and Frege, who saw logic in the form of Aristotele’s Prior Analytics, i.e. as axioms and laws.