Logical Studies

Meaning as a Dynamic Network of Particular Beliefs: Rethinking the Kripke–Wittgenstein Sceptical Paradox

Document Type : Research

Authors

koorosh salimi 1
ali akbar ahmadi atarmjani 2

1 PhD Candidate in Philosophical Logic, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2025.53321.1514
Abstract
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein introduces a sceptical paradox: neither objective facts nor private intentions determine future rule‐applications, and the final authority rests with the community.
This paper offers an internal, post‐Kripkean reconstruction of the sceptical solution: the communal criterion of correctness is preserved, while the individual’s mental guidance is redefined as the inner dimension of that very social mechanism of meaning.
The proposed framework, called the Dynamic Network of Particular Beliefs, develops a form of socially embedded dispositionalism—a communalized version of dispositionalism—in which the mind’s similarity‐based tendency constitutes the inner continuation of communal behaviour at the individual level, rather than an external addition to it.
Meaning arises from the intertwining of two components:(1) the individual’s network of particular beliefs, shaped through socially validated linguistic practices; and (2) the mind’s natural tendency to extend similarities, which integrates new cases into familiar clusters without recourse to explicit rules or interpretive regress. The community remains the final arbiter, thereby securing normativity and corrigibility. In the immediate act of linguistic use, the sense of similarity performs the guidance, while particular belief provides the historical structure of that guidance.
Accordingly, the theory moves from Kripke’s attributional model to a belief‐based one, unifying individual guidance and social normativity within a single dynamic structure—one in which the notion of family resemblance is elevated from a merely descriptive motif to an explanatory mechanism of linguistic guidance.

Keywords

Skeptical Paradox
Kripke&‌‌‌ndash
Wittgenstein
Particular Belief
Family Resemblance
Normativity of Meaning
Philosophy of Language
Subjects
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Logical Studies
Volume 16, Issue 1 - Serial Number 1
September 2025
Pages 245-279

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