Document Type : Research

Authors

• Behnam Zolqadr ¹
• Davood Hosseini ²

¹ PhD Student, Philosophy Department, Tarbiat Modares University

² Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Tarbiat Modares University

Abstract

According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object and have their properties independent of whether they are intended or not. (2) Anti-realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object only if they are intended. Otherwise they are not object and thus no properties are ascribed to them. In this essay we will raise some objections to Priest’s anti-realist Modal Meinongianism, and then we propose a different anti-realist approach. In our account of anti-realist Modal Meinongianism fictional objects are considered as incomplete objects.

Keywords

• realism
• Modal Meinongianism
• Incomplete Object
• Non-Existent Object
• reference

Main Subjects

• Analytical Philosophy
• Philosophical Logic