Document Type : Research
Abstract
Cobreros et al. (2012) developed a theory of vagueness in order to model tolerance principles coherently, in the sense that not everything falls under a vague predicate and no sorites paradox is valid. It is argued in this paper that their characterization of tolerance principles does not match with the standard conception of tolerance in the literature. In addition, their theory validates a stronger version of tolerance which suffers from clear counter examples. Furthermore, their theory validates tolerance just in a weak sense. That assimilates their theory with dominant theories of vagueness, those which accommodate tolerance principles not as true.
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