Putnam, Semantic Externlism, and Model-theoretic Argument

Ghadiri, Hamed; Saeedimehr, Mohammad

Document Type : Research

Authors

Hamed Ghadiri ¹
mohammad saeedimehr ²

¹ PhD at Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

² Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

Abstract

Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) in most of his philosophy focused on the question ‘how does mind/language hook onto the world?’ He followed this question and proposed various opinions in different fields of philosophy. In semantics, he defended semantic externlism and in metaphysics and ontology, he criticized metaphysical realism through two arguments including model-theoretic argument. Here I will show that Putnam’s argument for semantic externalism and his model-theoretic argument, while are different in field, structure, and formulation, have been supported by a common thought concerning the relation between mind/language and the world. To achieve this goal, firstly I will introduce both arguments and propose new formulations for them. Secondly, I will enumerate five similarities between these formulations, and finally, on the basis of these similarities, I will propose the supporting thought formed as an argument. According to this supporting thought, the strict separation between mind and the world leads to indeterminacy of referential relation between them; but our common sense and realistic intuition implies that this relation is determined; therefore, mind and the world are not strictly separated; i.e. are interpenetrated.

Keywords

References

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Logical Studies

Putnam, Semantic Externlism, and Model-theoretic Argument

References

References

Volume 9, Issue 1 - Serial Number 17
October 2018
Pages 113-136

Putnam, Semantic Externlism, and Model-theoretic Argument

References

References

Volume 9, Issue 1 - Serial Number 17October 2018Pages 113-136

Volume 9, Issue 1 - Serial Number 17
October 2018
Pages 113-136