Logical Studies

An argument based on linear logic in favour of scientific realism concerning the problem of observable/unobservable distinction

Document Type : Research

Authors

Mohammad Shafiei 1
aram batobeh 2

1 Postdoctoral researcher, Departement of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

2 philosophy of Science group, science and research branch tehran,islamic azad university

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2019.4150
Abstract
The possibility, or lack thereof, of drawing a sharp distinction between the observable and unobservable entities, as a main debate between the scientific realism and antirealism, is still one of the most controversial problems in philosophy of science. One of the arguments offered in favour of realism states that there is in principle no such a determinate distinction. On the other hand, the consistency of scientific antirealism relies on the distinction between the observable and the unobservable. If such a distinction is shown to be untenable in an objective manner, then as a consequence the antirealistic viewpoint would be inconsistent. Antirealists, in order to save the consistence of their viewpoint, point out to the (alleged) vagueness of the notion of “observable” and thus try to retain the distinction despite the apparent problems around it, as is the case in some well-known solutions for the paradox of vagueness. In this paper we will give a new interpretation of Linear Logic as it may shed a new light on the problem of vagueness and accordingly contribute to the studies pertained to the problem of the distinction between the observable and unobservable entities. We will show that if the offered approach to the problem of vagueness would be correct then to appeal to the vagueness of the notion of observabilty would not be helpful for the antirealistic viewpoint. 

Keywords

Scientific realism
Linear logic
Vagueness
distinction between the observable and unobservable
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Logical Studies
Volume 10, Issue 1 - Serial Number 19
October 2019
Pages 157-178

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