Critical Review of Telic Pluralism about Logic

Alaeinejad, Hamid; Haji Hosseini, Morteza

doi:10.30465/lsj.2019.4492

Document Type : Research

Authors

Postdoc Researcher, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2019.4492

Abstract

According to Beall and Restall pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic and intuitionistic logic are all correct. In this type of pluralism, logic is considered to be normative; in the sense that one who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bounded to accept the result of that argument. Some philosophers try to show that accepting Beall and Restall pluralism is incompatible by the acceptance of the normativity of logic. However, Blake-Turner and Russell have proposed telic pluralism that is not based on the normativity of logic; claiming that their arguments is not threatened by the collapse argument. In this article, by examining telic pluralism, we have determined that Blake-Turner and Russell’s pluralism lacks strong arguments in defense of non-normativity of logic. On the other hand, we try to present a version of the Priest’s collapse argument that still can be used against telic pluralism.

Keywords

References

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Logical Studies

Critical Review of Telic Pluralism about Logic

References

References

7- Blake-Turner, Russell, (2018). Logical pluralism without the normativity, DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3

Volume 10, Issue 1 - Serial Number 19
October 2019
Pages 195-211

Critical Review of Telic Pluralism about Logic

References

References

7- Blake-Turner, Russell, (2018). Logical pluralism without the normativity, DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3

Volume 10, Issue 1 - Serial Number 19October 2019Pages 195-211

Volume 10, Issue 1 - Serial Number 19
October 2019
Pages 195-211