In this paper, after criticizing Sadra’s solution which is the distinction between Primitive and Common Predications, we will suggest a new solution based on analyzing the concept of ‘informing’ and show that ‘our inability of informing from absolute unknown’ is a feature of our cognitive state, not absolute unknown itself.
Sharifzadeh,R. and Hojati,S. M. A. (2012). The paradox of Informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of ‘Information’. Logical Studies, 3(1), 77-95.
MLA
Sharifzadeh,R. , and Hojati,S. M. A. . "The paradox of Informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of ‘Information’", Logical Studies, 3, 1, 2012, 77-95.
HARVARD
Sharifzadeh R., Hojati S. M. A. (2012). 'The paradox of Informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of ‘Information’', Logical Studies, 3(1), pp. 77-95.
CHICAGO
R. Sharifzadeh and S. M. A. Hojati, "The paradox of Informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of ‘Information’," Logical Studies, 3 1 (2012): 77-95,
VANCOUVER
Sharifzadeh R., Hojati S. M. A. The paradox of Informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of ‘Information’. Logical Studies, 2012; 3(1): 77-95.
