Logical Studies

Negative facts and Truthmaker for Negative propositions

Document Type : Research

Authors

Amir Jalilighazizadeh 1
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati 2
Mohammad Saeedimehr 3

1 PhD student in Philosophy-Logic, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University. Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

3 Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2021.26105.1270
Abstract
According to the maximalism about truthmaker, every true proposition has a truthmaker. One of the challenges faces maximalism is: what kind of entities are truthmakers of negative propositions? There are many solutions suggested by maximalists. One class of these solutions is based on negative entities.
In the present paper we first briefly explain the problem. Then we indicate some solutions which are based on negative entities and some objections. These solutions are based on views entitled “totality states of affairs”, “polarity”, “absences” and “fundamental negative facts”. According to the solution based on totality states of affairs, in every negative case, in addition to positive facts the totality of them makes another fact, which in turn, plays the role of Truthmaker of negative proposition. According to the polarity solution, objects instantiate the properties into positive and negative manner and negative facts that result from the negative instantiation are considered as Truthmaker of negative propositions. According to the absence solution, the Truthmaker of negative proposition is considered as the absence of Truthmaker belonging to its alternative positive proposition. According to the fundamental negative facts solution, fundamentally there are negative facts the same as positive facts and these facts are Truthmaker of negative propositions.

Keywords

Truthmaker
Negative propositions
Totality states of affairs
polarity
absences
Negative facts
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Logical Studies
Volume 11, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
February 2021
Pages 97-111

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