Shams al-Din Samarqandi in his books Qistas al-afkar and Sharh al-Qistas presented two new analyses of the khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions which are different from those of his predecessors. He held relations among these propositions which have new consequences on the inferential relations between them. Samarqandi conditioned the khariji proposition on the "external existence" of its subject and predicate, also conditioned the haqiqi proposition on the "possibility" of the external existence of its subject and predicate, and considered the mental proposition unconditional to these two conditions. He has also regarded the khariji as implying the haqiqi and the haqiqi as implying the mental, all these in the affirmative propositions and the converse of these relations in the negatives, without distinguishing the universals from the particulars. These inferential relations claimed by Samarqandi are different from those expressed in the works of other Muslim logicians such as Afzal al-Din Khunaji and Qutb al-Din Razi, who seem to be the only Muslim logicians who have explicitly discussed this issue. In this article, we have analyzed and critiqued the claims of Samarqandi and shown that the inferential relations claimed by him do not correspond to the examples he gives for khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions, and are therefore not accurate enough.