Document Type : Research

Author

• ali reza attarzadeh

PhD student of Greek and medieval philosophy

Abstract

Theory of meaning isn’t the central problem of Husserl’s phenomenology, but he treats of meaning for supporting his notion of pure logic. Since there is a strong connection between logic and language, Logical investigations begins with the discussion of language and meaning. In order to identifying the essence of expression, Husserl excludes indication and reference from it, and argues for distinction between sense and reference. Then he applies this distinction on different types of expression (proper name, universal name, sentence). This distinction is the center of Husserl’s theory of meaning, and according to this article, it continues in Husserl’s second intellectual period. In the second period, He proposes this distinction under the distinction between noema and object. In this article, we shall concern with Husserl’s view on sense and reference and the nature of sense. In the last section of this article, we shall discuss of Husserl’s solution for avoiding Platonism.

Keywords

• Theory of meaning
• expression
• sense
• reference
• noema
• Platonism