Document Type : Research

Author

Postdoctoral Researcher in Logic

Abstract

The main problem of this article is logical validity analysis. According to Field, the necessary condition for intertheoretic logical validity of an argument is normative restrictions on belief in the premises and conclusion of that argument. However, the traditional view is that lexically valid arguments are not logically valid, despite applying such restrictions on beliefs, and therefore the said condition cannot be considered sufficient for logical validity. A large part of this article is devoted to examining this traditional view. It is believed that the distinctive feature of logical arguments from arguments made in other scientific branches is the formality of logical arguments. In this article, we examine what the formality of logic means and show that the belief in the logical invalidity of lexical arguments can be something of a dogma. we show that the belief in the logical invalidity of such arguments is something of a dogma. In this case, the acceptance of normative restrictions on the belief in the premises and conclusion of an argument can be considered a necessary and sufficient condition for intertheoretical logical validity.

Keywords

 
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