Document Type : Research
Author
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University (RA)
Abstract
Moore’s paradox is a proposition that can be true if it is not stated, but if it is stated, makes a paradox. This paradox has been raised in two forms, omission and commission, and since it was raised, many articles have been written about it, among them the contributions of John Williams has been more than others, and the confrontation of his view with Hamid Vahid’s view on this issue has provided a good reflection of the conflict and the different opinions on it. Williams believes in two approaches: the epistemic approach and the conscious belief approach. According to the first approach, since uttering the Moorean proposition is unjustified, it requires epistemic defect, and according to the second approach, when it is uttered consciously, it makes a paradox. Hamid Vahid believes in the theory of incomplete interpretation approach, according to which the expression of Moore’s proposition defeats the principle of charity, which says that the speaker’s words should always be considered true, unless there is an evidence against it. In this article, the critique and counter-critique of these two contemporary philosophers about Moore’s Paradox is analyzed and examined.
Keywords
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