Document Type : Research

Author

Assistant Professor of Institute for Science and Technology Studies of Shahid Beheshti University.

10.30465/lsj.2023.44183.1423

Abstract

Ramseyfication is one of the methods philosophers have proposed for formalizing structural realism. Ketland (2004), while providing explications about the Ramseyfication of theories and introducing some concepts related to it, presents a formulation of the Newman problem. He believes it can be almost said that the problem is as follows. The description of the theory, according to Ramsey’s way, in addition to empirical adequacy, only yields the cardinal number of entities in the world. In this article, in addition to providing a more precise formulation of Ketland about the Newman problem, we examine it. Furthermore, an explanation of the structural relationship between theory and the world will be presented based on definitions that are somehow given by borrowing from Ketland’s definitions, including “metaphysically correct structure” and “metaphysically and partially correct structure.” The structural consideration is also based on a definition of approximate truth, which is justified on the grounds of inference to the best explanation. We can give a plausible explanation of structural realism with the illustrations presented.

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Main Subjects

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