Ainsworth, P. M. (2009). Newman’s Objection. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(1), 135-171.
Ainsworth, P. M. (2010). What is ontic structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41(1), 50–57.
Barrett, T. W., & Halvorson, H. (2016). MORITA EQUIVALENCE. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9(3), 556-582.
Bueno, O., & French, S. (2011). How Theories Represent. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(4), 857–894.
Carnap, R. (1928 [2003]). The Logical Structure of the World. Trans. R. George. Chicago: Open Court.
Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science, 3(4), 419–471.
Carnap, R. (1939). Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. In O. Neurath, R. Carnap, & C. Morris (Eds.), International Encyclopedias of Unified Science (Vol. 1, pp. 139-213). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. (1966). Philosophical Foundations of Physics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. (M. Gardner, Ed.) New York: Basic Books.
da Costa, N., & French, S. (2003). Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Demopoulos, W., & Friedman, M. (1985). Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest. Philosophy of Science, 52(4), 621-639.
English, J. (1973). Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey. Journal of Philosophy, 70(14), 453-462.
French, S., & McKenzie, K. (2015). Rethinking Outside the Toolbox: Reflecting Again on the Relationship between Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics. In T. Bigaj, & C. Wüthrich (Eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics (pp. 25-54). Brill | Rodopi.
Frigg, R., & Nguyen, J. (2020). Modelling Nature. An Opinionated Introduction to Scientific Representation. New York: Springer.
Glymour, C. (2013). Theoretical Equivalence and the Semantic View of Theories. Philosophy of Science, 80(2), 286-297.
Halvorson, H. (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science, 79(2), 183-206.
Halvorson, H. (2013). The Semantic View, If Plausible, Is Syntactic. Philosophy of Science, 80(3), 475-478.
Hodges, W. (1993). Model Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Hudetz, L. (2019). The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages. Synthese, 196, 1131-1149.
Ketland, J. (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(2), 287-300.
Ladyman, J. (1998). What is structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 29(3), 409-424.
Ladyman, J. (2002). Understanding Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.