Logical Studies

Logical Connectives in Deviant Logics Based on Quine's Meaning-Variance Thesis

Document Type : Research

Author

Kourosh Arish

Phd student of Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabatabai University, Tehran, Iran .

https://doi.org/10.30465/lsj.2023.44701.1427
Abstract
The explanation of the meaning of logical connectives in this paper is under epistemological and semantic topics and has a philosophical-logical approach. Also, the field of philosophy of language and the relationship between grammar and logic is one of the other areas that have been addressed. After establishing of classical logic, new logical systems appeared in the field with the aim of generalizing or modifying classical logic. The invalidity of some theorems of classical logic in these new reformed systems, which were called non-classical logic, created serious challenges and questions about the nature of logic. Quine is among those who, by proposing the theory of meaning-variance thesis, took a completely different position towards deviant logics. He judged between logics from an epistemological point of view and relying on natural language. His thesis was quite clear. "A change in logic is a change in the subject and actually a change in the meaning of logical connectives". Quine's thesis is generally accepted, but it also has critics. In the next step, the criticisms against Quine are described and evaluated. Meanwhile, the focus is on Putnam's criticism and his interpretation of the meaning of logical connectives. Also, Morten's criticisms from the perspective of the philosophy of language to Quine's thesis of meaning-variance have been described and evaluated. At the end, it is concluded that changing different logics does not always mean changing the subject and accepting the change of subject can not necessarily change the meaning of logical connectives.

Keywords

Meaning-variance thesis
Deviant logic
Logical connectives
Quine
Putnam
Morton

Subjects

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Logical Studies
Volume 14, Issue 1
July 2023
Pages 23-56

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