Logical Studies

Toward the Nature of the Meinongian Propositions

Document Type : Research

Authors

Hassan Hamtaii 1
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati 2

1 Dept. of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

10.30465/lsj.2024.47935.1458
Abstract
This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.
This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.
This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

Keywords

Nature of proposition
unity
Regress
Meinong
Russell

Subjects

همتایی، ح.، حجتی، س. م.، نبوی، ل. (1400). وحدت در گزاره های رمزانشی. منطق‌پژوهی، 12(2)، 57-84
همتایی، ح.، حجتی، س. م.، نبوی، ل. (1401). علیه پریست؛ در ماینونگ‌گراییِ وجهی. منطق‌پژوهی، 13(2)، 185-209.
همتایی، ح.، حجتی، س. م. (1401). علیه دوحمل گرایی در سنت ماینونگی. اندیشه فلسفی، 2(3 )، 249-268.
Bozon, S (2004). Why HST* and HST* do not solve the Russell-Myhill paradox after all. Proceedings of the Nineth ESSLI Student Session
Clark, R. (1978). Not Every Object of Thought has Being: A Paradox in Naive Predication Theory. Noûs, 12(2), 181.
Cocchiarella NB (2007) Formal ontology and conceptual realism. Synthese library, vol. 339. Springer, Dordrecht
Cocchiarella, N. B. (2010). Predication in Conceptual Realism. Axiomathes, 23(2), 301–321. doi:10.1007/s10516-010-9140-x
Gabriel, G.; Hermes, H. ; Kambartel, F. ; Thiel, C. ; Veraart, A. ; McGuinness, B. & Kaal, H. (eds.) (1980). Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Blackwell
Gaskin, R. (2008). The Unity of the Proposition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilmore, C. (2022). Why 0-adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions. In Tillman C. & Murray A. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. London: Routledge. pp. 304 – 319.
Griffin, N. (2017) .Nuclear and Extra-nuclear Properties. IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications (FLAP) 4(11): 3629-3658
Hylton, P. (1984). The nature of the proposition and the revolt against idealism. In R. Richard, J. B. Schneewind, & Q. Skinner (Eds.), Philosophy in history: Essays on the historiography of philosophy (pp. 97–375). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jespersen, B. (2019). Anatomy of a proposition. Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324.
King, J.C. (2019). On propositions and fineness of grain (again!). Synthese 196, 1343–1367.
Mousavian, S. N. (2011). Gappy propositions? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-157.
Orilia, F. (1996) A contingent russellian paradox. Notre Dame J Formal Logic 37:105–111
Parsons, T. (1980) Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pelletier, F.J. and Zalta, E.N. (2000), How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man. Noûs, 34: 165-202. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00207
Pickel, B., (2019). Unity through truth. Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
Priest, G. (2016). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Second edition. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (1903). [Reprinted 2010]. Principles of Mathematics. Routledge.
Russell, B. (2001). [First published 1912]. Truth and Falsehood. In The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp 69-75.
Russell, Bertrand (2010) [First published 1903]. Principles of Mathematics. Routledge
Soames, S. (2010). What is Meaning?. Princeton University Press.
Speaks, J. (2020). Cognitive Acts and the Unity of the Proposition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):646-660.
Shakespeare, W. (2011). Four Tragedies. United Kingdom: Penguin Books. ePub version retrieved from https://library.lol/main/D3789C35B11BA20A17167B05EC100214 on June 1, 2023.
Zalta, E. N. (1983). Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics. D. Reidel
Zalta, E. N. (1995). Two (Related) World Views. Noûs, 29(2), 189-211.
Logical Studies
Volume 14, Issue 2 - Serial Number 28
January 2024
Pages 227-244

Home

Guide for Authors

Submit Manuscript

Reviewers

Contact Us