Logical Studies

Abstract It is obvious that things are subject to change in our world. For example, the nib of a pencil may be broken; however, the pencil is the same pencil as before, with the only change that its nib is now broken. However, the problem is not so simple. During the history of metaphysics, there have been those- such as Parmenides, Melissus, Zenon, McTaggart, Geach, Russell- who rejected change and motion in such a customary sense. On the other hand, philosophers’ mainstream has tried to represent views and sound arguments for the existence of motion and change, for instance, Aristotelian-Avicennian approach is one of the most important of them. The peripatetic account relies on the distinction of essence and accidence and develops its theory of motion. In this paper we try to show that both positive and negative approaches mentioned above are defeated; their defeat is not due to the weakness of their arguments but is rooted in the wrong logic selected for the base of their metaphysics. This paper is an endeavor to show the advantage of paraconsistent logic relative to classical logic in explaining the problem of change.

Abstract The analytic- synthetic distinction is one of the most important topics in modern philosophy, the scope of which has been traced in contemporary analytic philosophy. This distinction has led to disputes and conflicts among philosophers, so that in a general classification, analytic philosophers can be divided into friends and foes of this distinction. There are few works in Persian in the field of analytic philosophy. About the mentioned distinction, there is almost no serious writing or even translation that only focuses on this distinction. But not long ago, in 2019, a book titled The Nature and Role of Analytic and Synthetic Propositions in Logic and Epistemology was written by one of the seminary and university scholars. This book is the selected work in the year book of the seminary. Having said that, it should be expected that the first book in this topic will be an accurate and serious book. What follows is focused on the critical review on this book. Of course, this review should be accompanied by clarifications and reconstructions, which this article has tried in this direction as well.

Abstract The Muslim logicians have described the necessity term in the necessity signification as three different levels: The absolute necessity, The evident necessity as its general term, and the evident necessity as its specific term. Using the descriptive analytical method, this journal has proved that by conditioning these levels, this signification wouldn't include six groups of concepts: 1- external non-necessary concepts 2- non-predicated concepts 3- particular concepts 4-separable accidents 5- non-evident(as its general term) necessary accidents 6- non-evident(as its specific term) necessary accidents that are not evident accidents(as its general term). These concepts can't be included in expression signification as well because they wouldn't be placed in the signification of complete or partial accord. The logicians' models for a bipartite division of expression signification aren't flawless and don't point out a solution for the universality of the division. Therefore, this journal has introduced a new division for expression signification in which the third group(after two groups of complete and partial accord significations) is called "external signification" and it includes the signification of necessity as its subsequent.

Abstract Ḥillī, with mastery of logic and uṣūl and with a comparative and critical perspective toward earlier logicians, undertook an important reconsideration of the classification of the categorical proposition. He expanded the traditional fourfold structure of propositions (singular, generic, indefinite, and definite) into a more comprehensive fivefold system by distinguishing between the generic and the general proposition. Ḥillī’s innovation, through a precise redefinition of the distinction between the generic proposition (where the subject is considered in terms of its abstract quiddity) and the general proposition (where the subject is considered in terms of applying universality to individuals), opened the way for applications in uṣūl, logic, and jurisprudence. This innovation, however, was overlooked due to the dominance of the logical school of Khūnajī and his followers, but it was later revived in the works of subsequent uṣūlīs in the form of the conceptual distinction between the actual proposition (ḥaqīqī) and the external proposition (khārijī). Adopting a historical approach, this article analyzes the dimensions of Ḥillī’s innovation in revising the classification of categorical propositions, and after explaining the reasons for the neglect of his scheme and the lack of reception among logicians, it advances the hypothesis that Ḥillī’s innovation was particularly appreciated among later uṣūlīs due to its methodological and jurisprudential applications.

Abstract Mirza Qomi's explanation about practical reason is important in three ways: (1) He is considered one of the most serious critics of Aristotelian logic and the way of reasoning in this logic, and he has followed a different path from the defenders of this logic. (2) The logic governing Mirza Qomi's thought is considered a psychological logic. and (3) by presenting a different explanation of the nature of reason, he considers imitation as a type of reason and opens the chapter of reference to imitation in practical matters.
It is shown that Mirzai Qomi considers every persuasive thing as a reason. By deviating from formalism in Aristotelian logic, Mirza believes in the multiplicity of forms in argument and believes that the manner of the mujtahid's reasoning determines the form of the argument a posteriori; Therefore, as a priori, no form can be accepted as the form of argument. According to Mirza, there is no logical certainty and logical certainty is also a kind of psychological certainty. If absolute certainty is a psychological matter, three requirements arise: (1) The distinction between specific suspicion and general suspicion disappears and all suspicions become equally valid. Therefore, (2) there is no difference in the validity of suspicions from which source they come? and (3) persuasive imitation has no difference from the epistemological point of view with psychological certainty, and rather it is considered a partial imitation of certainty; Therefore (4) we can use imitation in practical matters.

Abstract In this article, we discuss absolutely unprovable propositions from the point of view of Brouwerian intuitionism. According to Brouwer’s definition, a proposition is absolutely unprovable if the creative mind as an ideal mathematician has a proof that both the proposition itself and its negation are unprovable from a constructive point of view. Brouwer has shown that the existence of such propositions is impossible. In his book on Brouwer and Intuitionism, Mark van Atten has described and elaborated Brouwer’s short proof on this matter. The Persian translator of this book has reconstructed and explained this proof in two different ways. In this paper, we present a more appropriate reconstruction of Brouwer’s proof. In the meantime, we will deal with Gödel’s work in generalizing Brouwer’s result from propositional logic to first-order predicate logic. In addition, we will point out that such formalizations of intuitionistic ideas in the formal language of logic cannot do justice to Brouwer’s ideas.

Abstract Counterfactual emotions, such as envy and regret, play a foundational role in shaping human behavior, influencing moral judgment, and guiding social interaction. Because they arise from the comparison between actual states and imagined alternative scenarios, these emotions serve as powerful cognitive mechanisms that motivate individuals to reassess their decisions, modify their actions, and anticipate future consequences. Consequently, they are of substantial importance to the advancement of research in artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems, where modeling human-like affective reasoning remains a central challenge. In this article, we formalize the counterfactual emotions of envy and regret using the Counterfactual Emotions (CFE) framework [2]. Furthermore, we examine their intensity through quantitative constructs such as the “degree of importance,” “degree of inadequacy,” and “degree of counterfactual avoidability” introduced in [1]. This study provides a theoretical and computational foundation for developing intelligent agents capable of understanding, representing, and adapting to the complex emotional and ethical dimensions of human interaction.

Abstract For Aristotle both words and propositions signify. However, the question is what the significate is and under what conditions a specific word or proposition can have a single signification. This issue leads to a discussion of homonymy and "to be spoken of in many ways." Of the 20th-century Aristotelian scholars, Irwin argues that the significate is essence, while Shields contends that the significate is meaning, which has multiple degrees ranging from shallow meaning (the lexical) to deep meaning (the essence). This paper argues that the main factor in the signification of words and propositions is that the significate must have real unity. The real unity of the signified of words, determined based on the doctrine of Categories, can occur in two forms: "in virtue of one," such as human, and "with reference to one," such as being. On the other hand, the true unity of the significate of propositions relates to the real unity of the conditions under which a proposition can be true. Therefore, in Aristotle's discussion of signification, we are seeking real unity, and ordinary linguistic meaning is not his ultimate goal. The significance of this discussion lies in this fact that the signification of words is one of Aristotle's important tools in philosophical discourse.

Abstract Even though the principle of non-contradiction is one of the most important principles governing philosophy, especially since the time of Aristotle, some people have gone against this principle and challenged it. The present study mainly aims to show the historical course of the dialethism and the solutions provided by
the dialetheists to believe in the possibility of the sum of contradictions from ancient times until now. The present study aims to show the historical course of the dialethism and the solutions presented by the dialetheists to believe in the possibility of the sum of contradictions. The main problem of this research is that what arguments and solutions have the prominent opponents of the principle of refusal of contradiction presented for their point of view, and it has used the descriptive method and critical analysis to reach the answer to this problem. In order to outline the thought process of defense of dialethism, first the background of the principle of non-contradiction is examined. Then, dialethism and its relationship with trivialism will be discussed, and after that, the background dialethism from ancient Greece to modern times will be reported in detail. The explanation of the logic of dialethism will be the end of this work.