Analytical Philosophy
Mohammad Hossein Esfandiari
Abstract
One of the questions in ontological pluralism is whether or not to accept the generic quantifier. But if we accept the generic quantifier due to reasons that are for the acceptance of the generic quantifier, then ontological pluralism will face problems due to other reasons, for example, it is as if ...
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One of the questions in ontological pluralism is whether or not to accept the generic quantifier. But if we accept the generic quantifier due to reasons that are for the acceptance of the generic quantifier, then ontological pluralism will face problems due to other reasons, for example, it is as if pluralism and monism are just notationally variant of each other and there is no genuine and important difference between them. In other words, the acceptance of generic quantifier offers a kind of monistic counterpart for pluralism, and this monistic counterpart causes three basic problems for pluralism. Of course, these three problems are considered to be one of the most important criticisms of ontological pluralism. In the following article, these three problems are discussed. After clarifying each of them, we have criticized and rejected them. Our key in rejecting these three problems is the assumption that the generic quantifier is not an elite and fundamental quantifier and can only be defined based on restricted quantifiers. Therefore, it has been shown that ontological pluralism, if accepts the generic quantifier and if it does not consider this generic quantifier as elite, it will not face any problem.
Philosophical Logic
Abstract
Different kinds of nonstandard conditionals of modal nature, are studied in conditional logic or Dyadic Modal Logic. Preference structures are one of the important categories of semantic models for these logics. Deontic conditionals and nonmonotonic conditionals are two kinds of these nonstandard conditionals, ...
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Different kinds of nonstandard conditionals of modal nature, are studied in conditional logic or Dyadic Modal Logic. Preference structures are one of the important categories of semantic models for these logics. Deontic conditionals and nonmonotonic conditionals are two kinds of these nonstandard conditionals, such that these models have been introduced as one of their main semantics.In this paper we have a brief review of the literature of preference models in these two branches. Then we compare the subjects studied under the topic of preference models in both fields and have an analysis about the meaning and the acceptance of the axioms of conditional logics, when the conditionals either read as deontic conditionals or as nonmonotonic ones.In addition, we present some examples to show that in the both fields, preference models have shortcomings in expressing the correct and intuitive reasoning. We offer some extended semantics from nonmonotonic literature to overcome these shortcomings.
Non-Standard Mathematical Logic
javid jafari
Abstract
The logic {LP} is a paraconsistent logic that bears strong structural and semantic similarities to the LP logic introduced by Graham Priest. It is defined using Nmatrices, a semantic tool that plays a significant role in the study of paraconsistent logics by allowing for the analysis of contradictory ...
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The logic {LP} is a paraconsistent logic that bears strong structural and semantic similarities to the LP logic introduced by Graham Priest. It is defined using Nmatrices, a semantic tool that plays a significant role in the study of paraconsistent logics by allowing for the analysis of contradictory statements without collapsing the entire logical system. In this paper, we first present the semantic framework of this logic and then develop a proof theory for it based on Gentzen-type sequent calculus. We show that this proof system is both sound and complete with respect to the proposed matrix semantics. Another focus of this study is the analysis of certain distinctive features of the {LP} logic, where noticeable differences from the original LP logic emerge. In particular, we examine the non-standard behavior of the conjunction operator in this logic, which functions in such a radically different way from common logics that the term “conjunction” barely seems appropriate.
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