Matter versus Modality in Avicennian Logic

Rostami, Arash; Darabi, Alireza; Eslami, Shahla

doi:10.30465/lsj.2026.53047.1510

Matter versus Modality in Avicennian Logic

Document Type : Research

Authors

arash rostami ¹

Alireza darabi ²

Shahla eslami ³

¹ PhD student in Islamic Philosophy and Theology.

² Department of Logic, Iranian Institute of Philosophy and Wisdom Research, Tehran, Iran

³ Department of Philosophy, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.

10.30465/lsj.2026.53047.1510

Abstract

The central problem of this article is the semantic transformations of the “matter (mādda) of the proposition” in Islamic logic, for which at least four major positions have been advanced: (1) Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) defines the matter of propositions as the nafs al-amr relation of predicate to subject and reduces it to the triad necessity/possibility/impossibility, while treating constraints such as permanence (dawām), non-permanence (lā-dawām), non-necessity (lā-ḍarūra), and temporal or qualificational conditions (fixed time, indeterminate time, and the like) under modality (jihah), not under matter; (2) Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī, by adding non-permanence and non-necessity alongside permanence and necessity, brings the number of matters to four; (3) Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī enumerates thirteen matters, thereby increasing the inventory but blurring the boundary between matter and modality; (4) Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, criticizing Abharī’s multiplication and returning to the Avicennian three, restricts matter to nafs al-amr relations among concepts (nisab nafs al-amriyya bayna al-mafāhīm). On the basis of texts representing these four views, together with other logicians,

Keywords

Mādda

(Matter)

Jihha (Modality / Direction)

Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) Khūnajī

Samarqandī

Subjects