Document Type : Research

Author

PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Sciences, Institute for Humanities and Cultural, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The "Strong Programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge is known by Edinburgh school and the relativistic approach of this school. According to their attitude all things accounted as "knowledge", have causes that make them acceptable in the society; no matter they are right or wrong. And the sociologists have to find these causes. This program, despite weaker programs that exclude scientific knowledge, is based on the idea that social factors have a role in the formation of empirical scientific knowledge, and even mathematics and logic -- types of essential knowledge. In this article we are trying to introduce and explain Edinburgh school's thought on logic and mathematics. So, first of all we will introduce the intellectual foundations of this school, and then we will try to explain briefly its main approaches with respect to sociological aspects in mathematics and knowledge. Then we will focus on the most important and outstanding case studies and their appraisal. Finally we will bring forward some points about their theoretical approaches and present some conclusions that seem to be drawn from this discussion.

Keywords

Main Subjects

لاکاتوش، ایمره (۱۳۸۷). «اثبات ریاضی چیست؟»، در دیدگاه‌ها و برهان‌ها، ترجمه، تألیف، و گردآوری: شاپور اعتماد، تهران: نشر مرکز.
 
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