Anselm’s Ontological Argument  and the Self-Comparison Problem

Ghadiri, Hamed; Hosseini, Davood

Anselm’s Ontological Argument and the Self-Comparison Problem

Document Type : Translation & Critic

Authors

Hamed Ghadiri ¹

Davood Hosseini ²

¹ M.A Student in Philosophy-Logic, Tarbiat Modares University

² Assistant Professor of Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modarres University

Abstract

Anselm’s ontological argument is the most famous one which has been controversial since its appearance. One crucial part of the argument is “if [that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived] exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater.” According to this part, one can make a comparison between “that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived” when it does not exist and itself when exist. Thus, there is a problem (we dub it self-comparison problem): how can one model this kind of comparison?
In this paper we will try to evaluate four attempts to solve the problem–namely those of Milican, Oppenheimer & Zalta, Lewis, and King. In responding to the problem, Milican and Oppenheimer & Zalta have dissolved the problem; Lewis uses possible-worlds semantics to model the comparison; and King, as Lewis, models it but by means of the intentional objects theory. We firstly argue that the problem is genuine and cannot be dissolved, secondly Lewis presupposes his, arguably problematic, possible-worlds metaphysics; and thirdly, King errs in recognizing the relata of the comparison.

Keywords

Keywords: Anselm’s Ontological Argument

self-comparison problem

possible-worlds

intentional object

قدیری، حامد و داود حسینی (در دست ‌چاپ). «برهان وجودی آنسلم به تقریر زالتا و نقد آن»، مجلة فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه تهران.

Anselm (1077). Proslogion, Davies, B. and G. R. Evans (eds.), Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barbes, Jonathan (1972). The Ontological Argument, London: Macmillan.

Charlesworth, M. J. (Trans.) (1965). St. Anselm’s Proslogion, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chihara, C. S. (1998). The Worlds of Possibility, Oxford: Clarendon.

King, Peter (1984). ‘Anselm’s Intentional Argument’, History of Philisophy Quarterly, Vol. 1.

Lewis, David (1970). ‘Anselm and Actuality’, Nous, Vol. 4.

Lewis, David (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.

Milican, Peter (2004). ‘The One Fatal Flaw in Anselm’s Argument’, Mind, Vol. 113.

Nagasawa, Y. (2007). ‘Milican on the Ontological Argument’, Mind, Vol. 116.

Oppenheimer, P. and Edward N. Zalta (2007). ‘Reﬂections on the Logic of the Ontological Argument’, Studia Neoaristotelica, Vol. 4, No. 1.

Oppenheimer, P. and Edward N. Zalta (1991). ‘On the Logic of the Ontological Argument’, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspective 5, The Philosohy of Religion.

Oppenheimer, P. and Edward N. Zalta (2011). ‘A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 2.

Oppy, Graham (1996). ‘Ontological Arguments’, The Stanford Electronic Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ (revised 2011).

Oppy, Graham (2007). ‘More That One Flaw, Reply to Milican’, Sophia, Vol. 46.