Logical Studies

Abstract The main purpose of this essay is to review and criticize the paper published earlier in this journal, Logical Study, titled ‘the Paradox of the informing from Absolute Unknown: Analyzing the Concept of information’ written by Sharifzadeh and Hodjati. In spite of having some useful points, the paper is, in several aspects, problematic. We review and criticize respectively such problematic points as: the expression of non-judgeability (ukmnāpadhīrī) in the absolute unknown (majhūl muṭlaq) debate; the invalidity of refer to Qaramaleki and Jahed in the criticism of the previous solutions; absolute non-existent division (ma‘dūm muṭlaq) into ontological and epistemological non-existent; the relationship between the absolute unknown and the absolute non-existent, and their solutions; neglecting the rule of far‘īyah and the predecessors’ strong definitions of the absolute non-existent; the solutions of the paper and its frequent inconsistencies; the successfulness of the paper in showing the indefensibility of the previous solutions; criticism of the analysis of the paper of ‘information’ (khabar) and probably of speech (sukhan); and misunderstanding the predecessors’ purpose; neglecting the definition of absolute unknown and the reason why it couldn’t be informed and spoken.
 

Abstract Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are based on the concepts of ‘regularities’, ‘correct uses’  and ‘possibility of semantic mistakes’. But some philosophers have scrutinized the slogan ‘meaning is normative’ and have found some flaws in pro arguments. There are good reasons to consider the normativity of meaning as a side effect of ‘being public ’; that is, meaning, as itself, is neutral to correct or incorrect uses, but the moral or social laws of society impose several norms on language.

Abstract Even though, in Aristotelian and Islamic logic and philosophy, inherently impossible affairs don’t actualize in the world and can’t be actualized, they are considered meaningful, and thus their characteristics and their philosophical judgments have been discussed by Islamic philosophers. In this paper, I have argued that there are some flaws in the arguments which have presented for the meaningfulness of impossible affairs by such philosophers. In addition, I have suggested some philosophical and logical arguments for their meaninglessness. According to some Islamic philosophy rules, such as ‘the contrast between a’dam wa malike’ (positive and privative), we can argue that impossible affairs are indeed compound words which are constructed through wordplay. Although the parts of such compound words may have meaning, they, as a whole, don’t refer to anything and so don’t bring about anything in our minds. We have just the illusion of their meaningfulness when we are talking about them, and that’s why we call them ‘pseudo-concepts’. This view has some important consequences which have been discussed in the paper.
 
 
 

Abstract Anselm’s ontological argument is the most famous one which has been controversial since its appearance. One crucial part of the argument is “if [that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived] exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater.” According to this part, one can make a comparison between “that than which nothing greater cannot be conceived” when it does not exist and itself when exist. Thus, there is a problem (we dub it self-comparison problem): how can one model this kind of comparison?
In this paper we will try to evaluate four attempts to solve the problem–namely those of Milican, Oppenheimer & Zalta, Lewis, and King. In responding to the problem, Milican and Oppenheimer & Zalta have dissolved the problem; Lewis uses possible-worlds semantics to model the comparison; and King, as Lewis, models it but by means of the intentional objects theory. We firstly argue that the problem is genuine and cannot be dissolved, secondly Lewis presupposes his, arguably problematic, possible-worlds metaphysics; and thirdly, King errs in recognizing the relata of the comparison.
 
 
 

Abstract Diodorus, Philo, and Chrysippus were the most important Megarin-stoic logicians. Modalities were one of the most interesting topics for them. In the history of logic, their views about modal concepts, definition of necessity, possibility, impossibility and the relations between these concepts are important and can be helpful to illustrate some other logicians’ views.
Because of the deterministic view which is associated with his definitions of the modal concepts, Diodorus’ views have been discussed more than two other logicians’ views,. Philo and Chrysippus’ definitions are closer to common sense but aren’t compatible with their deterministic views.
 
 

Abstract Quine, the famous American empiricist philosopher, in wake of his criticisms of quantified modal logic, believes that the logic is committed to a doctrine which he calls Aristotelian Essentialism, and tries to prove that the doctrine is meaningless. He defines Aristotelian Essentialism as a doctrine which distinguishes between things’ essential and accidental properties, and the distinction is independent from the language in which the things are referred to, and also the ways by which they are specified. In the present paper, based on Aristotle's works, I have tried to find out whether Quine has defined the Aristotelian essentialism correctly, and whether his criticisms of essentialism include what Aristotle means by essentialism or not? I have argued that Quine has not analyzed Aristotelian essentialism correctly.
Keywords: Essentialism, Modality, Aristotle, Quine.