Document Type : Research

Author

• Keramat Varzdar

Lecturer in the Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran

Abstract

This research addresses and evaluates Mortezā Moṭahharī's perspective on the role of Aristotelian logic in identifying errors in thought, aiming to scrutinize and criticize his reductionist stance. Moṭahharī confines the utility of traditional logic exclusively to the formal rectification of human arguments, dismissing any responsibility for correcting material errors. He contends that logic fundamentally lacks the capacity to rectify the material errors of individuals, asserting that only through "attention" and "care" can one shield oneself from such errors. The analysis presented in this research reveals several shortcomings in Moṭahharī's argumentation: 1) His reductionist stance confines Aristotelian logic to formal reasoning structures; 2) He conflates the detailed examination of the "materials of argument" with determining the governing laws of said materials; 3) His interpretation of "material logic" as the exploration of the "psychological causes of material error" succumbs to the fallacy of "psychologism"; 4) The absence of general rules for recognizing the validity of reasoning materials results in skepticism; 5) "Attention" and "care" are deemed general conditions to avoid any mistake, not specifically material errors. These critiques collectively demonstrate the untenability of Moṭahharī's theory concerning the function of Aristotelian logic

Keywords

• Logic
• Benefit of logic
• Aristotelian logic
• Form of argument
• Material of argument
• Mortezā Moṭahharī

Main Subjects

• Traditional Logic