Philosophy of Logic
Muhammad Tajik Joobeh
Abstract
Foundationalism is an epistemological theory of truth in which knowledge acquires its validity from self-evident propositions, but these basic propositions, due to their conceptual clarity, are not treated as to their significance. One important, yet unanswered question is, what is the criteria for being ...
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Foundationalism is an epistemological theory of truth in which knowledge acquires its validity from self-evident propositions, but these basic propositions, due to their conceptual clarity, are not treated as to their significance. One important, yet unanswered question is, what is the criteria for being self-evident? In this article, various definitions and conditions will be presented and then we will deal with five criteria, all of which have been mentioned in philosophical and logical literature: the first one offers immediate(presential) knowledge as a guarantee for the truth value of self-evident, the second considers self-evident as if they are incorporated in our nature, the third idea find a connection to a divine being as a solution, and finally the fourth theory is a compound one, it distinguishes between conceptual clarity and truth-value and for each one suggests an independent solution, for conceptual clarity it points out to the self-sufficiency of these propositions i.e. they do not need any external middle term to relate the subject to the predicate, and for truth value, it suggests intuition as evidence and then practical argument assists our intuition to guarantee the truth value of self-evident propositions, the last theory seems to offer a more plausible explanation than others
Traditional Logic
Ahmad Mohammadi Peiro
Abstract
This article aims to answer the question, what is the truth of topoi in rhetoric? To answer this question, two other questions must be answered. 1. How does the definition of topoi include all its examples? 2. What is the function of topoi in achieving rhetorical analogies? To answer these questions, ...
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This article aims to answer the question, what is the truth of topoi in rhetoric? To answer this question, two other questions must be answered. 1. How does the definition of topoi include all its examples? 2. What is the function of topoi in achieving rhetorical analogies? To answer these questions, with analytical descriptive method, we first examined the definitions provided by logicians. Then, by examining the various topoi, we came to the conclusion that these definitions are not comprehensive for all examples. In the following, to provide a clearer and comprehensive definition of topoi according to the types of topoi and the purpose of their classification, we came to the conclusion that topoi are general rules and formulas that the orator uses to produce arguments on a certain topic. This definition includes both common topoi and special topoi. Finally, to complete the definition process, how it works was explained by citing an example.
Traditional Logic
Keramat Varzdar
Abstract
This research addresses and evaluates Mortezā Moṭahharī's perspective on the role of Aristotelian logic in identifying errors in thought, aiming to scrutinize and criticize his reductionist stance. Moṭahharī confines the utility of traditional logic exclusively to the formal rectification of human ...
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This research addresses and evaluates Mortezā Moṭahharī's perspective on the role of Aristotelian logic in identifying errors in thought, aiming to scrutinize and criticize his reductionist stance. Moṭahharī confines the utility of traditional logic exclusively to the formal rectification of human arguments, dismissing any responsibility for correcting material errors. He contends that logic fundamentally lacks the capacity to rectify the material errors of individuals, asserting that only through "attention" and "care" can one shield oneself from such errors. The analysis presented in this research reveals several shortcomings in Moṭahharī's argumentation: 1) His reductionist stance confines Aristotelian logic to formal reasoning structures; 2) He conflates the detailed examination of the "materials of argument" with determining the governing laws of said materials; 3) His interpretation of "material logic" as the exploration of the "psychological causes of material error" succumbs to the fallacy of "psychologism"; 4) The absence of general rules for recognizing the validity of reasoning materials results in skepticism; 5) "Attention" and "care" are deemed general conditions to avoid any mistake, not specifically material errors. These critiques collectively demonstrate the untenability of Moṭahharī's theory concerning the function of Aristotelian logic
Traditional Logic
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Aristotle defined a proposition as to be either true or false (ṣādiq aw kāẓib). But Avicenna, who mentioned the Aristotelian definition in all his books, except in his latest book, Pointers and Reminders, deviated from Aristotle’s and defined a proposition according to the truthfulness and ...
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Aristotle defined a proposition as to be either true or false (ṣādiq aw kāẓib). But Avicenna, who mentioned the Aristotelian definition in all his books, except in his latest book, Pointers and Reminders, deviated from Aristotle’s and defined a proposition according to the truthfulness and lying of his “utterer.” (The compoisition which yields an assertion and which is one whose utterer is called “truthful” in what he says, or “a liar”). (Avicenna 1984, Inati’s translation, p. 77, ll. 222-223). This means that “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” are the description of the utterer and not of the propostion itself, and this is contrary to the definition of Aristotle and of Avicenna himself in all previous works, which consider “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” to be the description of the utterer and not the propostion. Some contemporaries have proposed reasons for Avicenna's shift from the first definition to the second one, and while reporting them, I show that the attribution of none of them to Avicenna is documented. On the contrary, I present a new reason that the probability of referring to Avicenna is not less, if not more, and that is that the words “ṣādiq” and “kāẓib” in ancient Arabic (before the Graeco-Arabic translation movement) did not mean what “true” and “false” and their equivalents mean in English and other languages, but that they meant “truthful” and “liar” and their equivalents mean in English and other languages.
Comparative Studies in Logic
behzad parvazmanesh
Abstract
The topic of concepts and ideas in classical logic is less noticed, while this part of logic knowledge is very important because it is the infrastructure of the topics of propositions. the relationships between concepts is one of these topics that provides one of the most infrastructure of the categorical ...
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The topic of concepts and ideas in classical logic is less noticed, while this part of logic knowledge is very important because it is the infrastructure of the topics of propositions. the relationships between concepts is one of these topics that provides one of the most infrastructure of the categorical syllogism. This type of syllogism is one of the main goals of classical Aristotelian logic. In this topic, the relationship between the concepts and their contradictions is examined; But calculating and achieving the ratio of this concepts to their contradictions become difficult and ambiguous. This research introduces the two concepts of "complete" and "incomplete" for the two places general and particular relationships of aspect and contrast. These new concepts lead to the expansion of these relationships to the six of them and solves the aforementioned problem. Also, evaluate this proposal with the special and new criterion of well-constructed knowledge systems which has been studied in another research of the author. An evaluation result of the improvement of the quantity and quality of the Aristotelian particular relationships table has been compared to the six of them.
Non-Standard Mathematical Logic
Fatemeh Shirmohammadzadeh Maleki
Abstract
Subintuitionistic logics as a theme were first studied by G. Corsi, who introduced a basic system F in a Hilbert style proof system. The system F is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke frames in which the assumption of preservation of truth is dropped and which are not assumed to be ...
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Subintuitionistic logics as a theme were first studied by G. Corsi, who introduced a basic system F in a Hilbert style proof system. The system F is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke frames in which the assumption of preservation of truth is dropped and which are not assumed to be reflexive or transitive. Dick de Jongh and F. Sh. Maleki, have introduced a basic logic WF in a Hilbert style proof system, much weaker than F. They proved that subintuitionistic logic WF is sound and complete with respect to the class of neighborhood models with a somewhat more complex definition than the neighborhood models for classical (non-normal) modal logics. So far, no natural deduction system has been presented for any of these two basic systems F and WF. This paper is devoted to the introduction of natural deduction systems for subintuitionistic logics WF and F.
Traditional Logic
Abstract
Poetics is one of the five arts of logic. All of five arts are molded in the form of syllogism and from a material appropriate to each art. The material of poetics is imagined propositions, from which poetic syllogisms are composed. Logicians have different views on presenting the form of poetic syllogism. ...
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Poetics is one of the five arts of logic. All of five arts are molded in the form of syllogism and from a material appropriate to each art. The material of poetics is imagined propositions, from which poetic syllogisms are composed. Logicians have different views on presenting the form of poetic syllogism. Al-Farabi and Avicenna, as two great logicians, have each taken a different path in this regard. Al-Farabi considers the form of poetic syllogism as one of the invalid modes of second figure and Ibn Sina considers it as one of the valid modes of first figure. In addition, Ibn Sina considers the example of a poetic proposition sometimes as the conclusion of a syllogism and sometimes as the minor premise of a syllogism. In this article, we have tried to explain why each of these two logicians has chosen a specific figure and mode of syllogism as the poetic syllogism, and regarding Ibn Sina, we will also explain the difference between the two examples that he has mentioned as examples of poetic syllogism.
Traditional Logic
Sadegh Zarinmehr
Abstract
The Muslim logicians have described the necessity term in the necessity signification as three different levels: The absolute necessity, The evident necessity as its general term, and the evident necessity as its specific term. Using the descriptive analytical method, this journal has proved that by ...
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The Muslim logicians have described the necessity term in the necessity signification as three different levels: The absolute necessity, The evident necessity as its general term, and the evident necessity as its specific term. Using the descriptive analytical method, this journal has proved that by conditioning these levels, this signification wouldn't include six groups of concepts: 1- external non-necessary concepts 2- non-predicated concepts 3- particular concepts 4-separable accidents 5- non-evident(as its general term) necessary accidents 6- non-evident(as its specific term) necessary accidents that are not evident accidents(as its general term). These concepts can't be included in expression signification as well because they wouldn't be placed in the signification of complete or partial accord. The logicians' models for a bipartite division of expression signification aren't flawless and don't point out a solution for the universality of the division. Therefore, this journal has introduced a new division for expression signification in which the third group(after two groups of complete and partial accord significations) is called "external signification" and it includes the signification of necessity as its subsequent.
Traditional Logic
Hosein Ahmadi
Abstract
Argumentative premises refer to propositions that do not require reasoning and are considered the basis of the five arts - argument, polemic, rhetoric, fallacy, and poetry to explain these premises, three types of categorizing have been presented, and this research in addition to presenting the evolution ...
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Argumentative premises refer to propositions that do not require reasoning and are considered the basis of the five arts - argument, polemic, rhetoric, fallacy, and poetry to explain these premises, three types of categorizing have been presented, and this research in addition to presenting the evolution of these categories, presents the problems that exist in the mentioned criteria and expresses a new criterion for the categorizing of the argumentative premises, which seems useful to eliminate the fallacies that have explained in the text of this research; The premises of the reasoning are: "certainties, Strong Likelihood, Common Beliefs, Illusions, persuasions, Accepted, Imaginations, Fallacies" that the above terms can be classified based on their nature in such a way that Certainties and strong likelihoods are mutually exclusive because these two propositions are indicative of the level of belief derived from their correspondence with external reality; Similarly, common beliefs and illusions are mutually exclusive because they indicate the cognitive processes through which these propositions are derived; likewise, accepted truths, persuasions, and imaginations are also mutually exclusive because all three represent a degree of influence on the audience; fallacies are considered mutually exclusive with all the aforementioned bases of argument because fallacies are propositions that are mistaken for another basis of argument due to verbal or conceptual errors.
Philosophy of Logic
Morteza Moniri
Abstract
In this article, we discuss absolutely unprovable propositions from the point of view of Brouwerian intuitionism. According to Brouwer’s definition, a proposition is absolutely unprovable if the creative mind as an ideal mathematician has a proof that both the proposition itself and its negation ...
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In this article, we discuss absolutely unprovable propositions from the point of view of Brouwerian intuitionism. According to Brouwer’s definition, a proposition is absolutely unprovable if the creative mind as an ideal mathematician has a proof that both the proposition itself and its negation are unprovable from a constructive point of view. Brouwer has shown that the existence of such propositions is impossible. In his book on Brouwer and Intuitionism, Mark van Atten has described and elaborated Brouwer’s short proof on this matter. The Persian translator of this book has reconstructed and explained this proof in two different ways. In this paper, we present a more appropriate reconstruction of Brouwer’s proof. In the meantime, we will deal with Gödel’s work in generalizing Brouwer’s result from propositional logic to first-order predicate logic. In addition, we will point out that such formalizations of intuitionistic ideas in the formal language of logic cannot do justice to Brouwer’s ideas.
