نوع مقاله : مروری
نویسندگان
1 فلسفه و حکمت و منطق، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، تهران، ایران
2 گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Standard deontic logic is unable to distinguish between arguments that contain ought-to-be and those that contain ought-to-do, using the same formalization for both. Yet these two types of “ought” are semantically and logically different, and a logician who works with Standard deontic logic cannot separate them. Ignoring this important distinction creates serious problems, most notably the neglect of the role of the agent in moral action. In this paper, we demonstrate that drawing inferences from one type of “ought” to the other is not valid, and that the only relation that may be drawn between them is an empirical one rather than a logical one. Finally, we examine NDL deontic logic, which is introduced by James Forrester as a solution to this problem, and show that although it resolves some of the shortcomings of Standard deontic logic, it has not succeeded in preserving its neutrality with respect to ethical theories.
کلیدواژهها English
