نوع مقاله : ترجمه و نقد

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار فلسفه دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 دانشجوی دکتری دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

3 دانشیار زبان‌شناسی تربیت مدرس

چکیده

بسیاری از فیلسوفان مدعی هستند که معنا و محتوای سمانتیکی زبان، امری هنجاری است، یعنی معنای یک کلمه تعیین‌کنندة الگوی درست‌کاربرد بوده و این الگو را تجویز می‌کند. مهم‌ترین استدلال‌هایی که فیلسوفانی مانند کریپکی و بوقوسیان به نفع هنجاری‌بودن معنا ارائه داده‌اند بر مفاهیمی مانند «قواعد»، «کاربردهای صحیح»، و «امکان خطای سمانتیکی» استوار است. اما برخی فلاسفه، ادعای هنجاری‌بودن معنا را زیر سؤال برده و انتقاداتی به آن وارد کرده‌اند. در این مقاله از این نظریه که هنجارهای زبانی ریشه در جنبة اجتماعی زبان دارند دفاع می‌شود؛ یعنی معنای کلمات به خودی خود، در مورد کاربردهای صحیح و ناصحیح بی‌طرف است، اما قوانین اخلاقی یا اجتماعی هر جامعه هنجارهایی را به زبان تحمیل می‌کند.
 
 

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Normativity of Meaning

نویسندگان [English]

  • Seied Mohammad Ali Hodjati 1
  • Homan Mohammad Ghorbanian 2
  • Lotfollah Nabavi 1
  • Arsalan Golfam 3

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University (Corresponding author),

2 Ph.D Student in Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University

3  Associate Professor of Department of Linguistic, Tarbiat Modares University

چکیده [English]

Many philosophers claim that semantic content of language is normative, which means that meaning of a term prescribes the pattern of use or determines which pattern of use can be described as ‘correct’. The most important arguments for normativity, made by Kripke, Boghossian and others, are based on the concepts of ‘regularities’, ‘correct uses’  and ‘possibility of semantic mistakes’. But some philosophers have scrutinized the slogan ‘meaning is normative’ and have found some flaws in pro arguments. There are good reasons to consider the normativity of meaning as a side effect of ‘being public ’; that is, meaning, as itself, is neutral to correct or incorrect uses, but the moral or social laws of society impose several norms on language.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Normativity of meaning
  • Rule-following
  • common knowledge
  • Semantic mistakes
 
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