نوع مقاله : پژوهشی
نویسنده
استاد گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی(ره)
چکیده
پارادوکس مور یک ترکیب عطفی در باب باور است که اگر اظهار نشود، می تواند صادق باشد، امّا اگر اظهار شود، پارادوکس تولید می‌کند. این پارادوکس در دو قالب حذفی و ارتکابی مطرح شده است و از وقتی که مور آن را مطرح کرد، مقالات بسیاری دربارۀ آن نوشته شده‌اند که در میان آنها سهم جان ویلیامز بیش از دیگران بوده است و تقابل نظر او با حمید وحید بر سرِ این مسأله بازتاب مناسبی از محلّ نزاع و نظرهای متفاوت در باب آن است. ویلیامز قائل به دو رویکرد معرفتی و باور خودآگاهانه است. بر حسب رویکرد اوّل، اظهار گزاره موری چون ناموجّه است، مستلزم نقصان معرفتی است و بر حسب رویکرد دوم، وقتی که آن گزاره خودآگاهانه اظهار شود، پارادوکس تولید می‌شود. حمیدِ وحید قائل به رویکرد تفسیر ناقص است که، بر اساس آن، اظهار گزاره موری موجب نقض اصل حسنِ‌ظنّ می‌شود؛ اصلی که می‌گوید که همواره باید سخنِ سخنگو را صادق تلقّی کرد مگر آنکه بینّه‌ای علیه آن وجود داشته باشد. در این مقاله مناقده این دو فیلسوف معاصر در باب پارادوکس مور، تحلیل و بررسی می‌شود.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
John Williams and Hamid Vahid on Moore's Paradox: Critique and Counter-Critique
نویسنده [English]
- Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University (RA)
چکیده [English]
Moore’s paradox is a proposition that can be true if it is not stated, but if it is stated, makes a paradox. This paradox has been raised in two forms, omission and commission, and since it was raised, many articles have been written about it, among them the contributions of John Williams has been more than others, and the confrontation of his view with Hamid Vahid’s view on this issue has provided a good reflection of the conflict and the different opinions on it. Williams believes in two approaches: the epistemic approach and the conscious belief approach. According to the first approach, since uttering the Moorean proposition is unjustified, it requires epistemic defect, and according to the second approach, when it is uttered consciously, it makes a paradox. Hamid Vahid believes in the theory of incomplete interpretation approach, according to which the expression of Moore’s proposition defeats the principle of charity, which says that the speaker’s words should always be considered true, unless there is an evidence against it. In this article, the critique and counter-critique of these two contemporary philosophers about Moore’s Paradox is analyzed and examined.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Moore's paradox
- Evans' principle
- charity principle
- defective interpretation
- justified belief conscious belief
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